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are concerned about is sprawl—a condition in which development is too widely 
spread throughout a limited geographical area. This kind of random, unplanned 
development creates negative externalities on the infrastructure of cities, suburbs, and 
some rural areas, but also leads to environmental hazards like smog and stormwater 
runoff.   
Smart Growth initiatives seek to remove the barriers to homeownership, 
public services, and job opportunities by providing access to valuable land resources 
in suburban and urban centers. Twenty states have implemented Smart Growth 
policies.  As other states continue to grapple with ways to address sprawl, many of 
them have begun to experiment with similar strategies, such as urban growth 
boundaries, limitations on exclusionary zoning, and the imposition of impact or 
development fees to stave off encroaching development.  
 The interesting question is under what conditions do states consider instituting 
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some in the Smart Growth community are aware of the growing conservative 
sentiment around the country today, in many instances they were able to convince 
both Republicans and Democrats to embrace the Smart Growth approach to growth 
management. 
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Chapter 1:  The Politics of Land Use in America 
 From the Founding to Smart Growth 
A growing chorus of advocates is rallying behind states and local 
governments to push for comprehensive land use reforms. These constituencies—
mostly from the urban planning, environmental and farming communities—are 
calling for progressive programs to combat urban and suburban sprawl. A new, more 
innovative approach to governance is being touted with states and metropolitan 
governments assuming the lead. Their objective is to overcome the structural 
impediments to successful implementation of growth management policies. They 
view local government fragmentation and lack of coordinated efforts as reasons for 
the inability to respond effectively to the regional impact of sprawl.  
Smart Growth is one policy alternative that has received nationwide attention 
at all levels of government. In the most general sense, Smart Growth is defined as a 
growth management policy that addresses sprawl by directing land development away 
from metropolitan areas that experience accelerated growth and redirecting those 
infrastructural resources to depressed urban and suburban neighborhoods. Smart 
Growth policies have three main characteristics: they involve a comprehensive 
approach to land use planning; they may impose some degree of regulatory barriers 
that dictate how and where real estate development can take place; and, they 
generally involve an enhanced responsibility for the state in growth management 
practices. There are currently at least a dozen states that have passed Smart Growth 
programs as an alternative policy solution to sprawl. However, a number of states 
have rejected Smart Growth due, in large part, to political disagreements related to 
governance. In this dissertation, I will explore the state-level response to urban 
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sprawl, looking to Smart Growth as a policy alternative. Specifically it asks: Under 
what conditions are states most likely to adopt innovative, comprehensive growth 
management reforms, such as Smart Growth? The primary argument is that politics 
matters. Reform cannot proceed without the influence of these political agents: an 
influential governor; a professional state legislature that is committed to passing 
reform legislation; the influence of grassroots and interest groups; and, a political 
ideology that supports an active role for the state in land use decision making. 
Both quantitative analysis and case studies highlight the political conditions 
that ultimately affect policy outcomes. Controlling for socioeconomic conditions, I 
argue that political factors are powerful determinants of public policies. Using a 
probit procedure, I will predict the impact of these political variables on Smart 
Growth adoption. To supplement this analysis, I have selected two states to ascertain 
the degree to which they have relied on Smart Growth strategies to address housing 
deficiencies, disinvestments in cities, and other sprawl-related problems. One state, 
Maryland, has a Smart Growth program that is considered by many in the planning 
community as the poster child for responsible growth management practices. The 
other state that I have chosen—Virginia—does not have a Smart Growth program at 
the state level. Follow-up interviews will also be undertaken. 
Before proceeding, there are issues beyond the scope of this dissertation that 
will not be addressed. First, I will not make normative judgments about the merits, 
desirability, or necessity of Smart Growth. Rather, I acknowledge that Smart Growth 
has gained widespread attention—acclaim in some circles, disdain in others—and is a 
topic of great political debate. This research will also not concern itself with 
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understanding the nature of sprawl or devote too much attention on sprawl’s negative 
versus positive impacts. However, I submit that sprawl has imposed considerable 
economic and social costs on society as a whole. Finally, I realize that Smart Growth 
is controversial, in part, because some supporters call for a state-centered approach to 
land use policy, a power that has historically been in the hands of local governments. 
While I do not challenge this assumption, I also do not advocate for more centralized 
state control of growth management, nor will I argue for more localized land use 
planning. Smart Growth has been successful at both local and state levels, but this 
dissertation is concerned with Smart Growth implemented at the state rather than the 
local government. The objective is to explore the politics of Smart Growth at the state 
level and understand how differing points of view shape policy outcomes. 
With this goal in mind, this chapter will be divided into four main sections. 
Section I will cover the historical, political, and cultural perspectives on land use in 
America. Section II will provide a narrative on the origin and evolution of the Smart 
Growth movement in the states and discuss stakeholder response to the Smart Growth 
agenda. Section III will provide a review of the literature on the land use planning and 
management, and Section IV will give a brief synopsis of each chapter including a 
brief description of the research design. 
Section 1.1: The History of Land Use Management in the U.S. 
Land as an American Concept 
Land has always been viewed as a valuable commodity and landownership is 
an extension of American democratic ideals. Since the founding of our nation, land 
has also been the basis of social and political conflict. Private property ownership is a 
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symbolic representation of prosperity and social status. Development of land and its 
use in America was quite different than that in other industrialized societies. In this 
“Letters from an American Farmer,” Crevecoer observed that land in America was 
plentiful and could be easily manipulated through modern cultivation (Levy 1988).1
In his treatise on American culture, Tocqueville echoed this sentiment and added that 
one of the most distinguishing characteristics of Western culture was the absence of a 
feudal system. Land was available to anyone who could afford it.2
Landownership as a liberal democratic value also presented a notable paradox 
because only wealthy, white males could own land. What is more, several states 
passed laws mandating that only property owners were allowed to vote in various 
local and statewide elections. Many early thinkers and activists who were committed 
to universal suffrage opposed state laws that barred individuals who did not own land 
from participating in the democratic process. In one of his earlier letters, John Adams 
writes: 
 “…power always follows property. This I believe to be 
as infallible a maxim in politics, as that action and 
reaction are equal, is in mechanics. Nay, I believe that 
we may advance one step farther, and affirm that the 
balance of power in a society accompanies the balance of 
property in land. The only possible way, then, of 
preserving the balance of power on the side of equal 
liberty and public virtue, is to make the acquisition of 
land easy to every member of society; to make a division 
of the land into small quantities, so that the multitude is 
possessed of the balance of real estate, the multitude will 
have the balance of power, and in that case the multitude 
 
1 Political Thought in America: An Anthology, Second Edition. Michael B. Levy (ed.). Prospect 
Heights, IL: Waveland Press. 
2 Democracy in America. 1969. J. P. Mayer, ed. New York: Doubleday. 
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will take care of the liberty, virtue, and interest of the 
multitude, in all acts of government.”3
Reformers created the National Reform Association to promote the rights of 
all to acquire and own land and not just privileged groups (Geisler, et al. 1984, 11). 
Farming groups, like the Grangers (Farming Alliance), populists and Free Soil party 
coalesced around the concept of land as a precious, valuable resource. Suspicious of 
wealthy corporate interests, railroads, and banks, these groups organized around farm 
aid principles, calling for more government subsidized loans to protect farmers and 
their land from encroachment.  Of course, northern and southern politicians were 
divided on these issues.  The cornerstone of the 1852 northern Democratic platform 
called for equal opportunity to own land and universal suffrage. Because agricultural 
land was essential to the South’s economy, slavery persisted, but the new Republican 
Party in 1856 pushed for reforms due to its opposition to slavery.  
In the end, the reformers won and the historic Homestead Act of 1862 was 
passed under Abraham Lincoln, guaranteeing 160 acres of land would be available 
and tilted for private use. Anyone willing to live on the land for at least 5 years and 
improve it for crops and other agricultural uses could do so for a minimal fee. The act 
would benefit all who were interested in owning land, even new immigrants who 
sought land in the West.4 The Homestead Act was enthusiastically supported by 
Lincoln and after the war, newly freed slaves were promised 40 acres along the 
Georgia coast by John Eaton, Ulysses Grant’s Superintendent of Negro Affairs. Due 
 
3 Ibid. p. 170 
4 Benjamin, Hibbard. 1965. A History of Public Land Policies. New York: McMillian. 
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to the political leverage of big plantation southern farmers, this promise was never 
fulfilled (Geisler et al., 1984, 15).  
Politics of Land Use and Growth Management 
 Disputes over land use date as far back as the Homestead Act of 1856. 
Homesteaders wanted to protect their land from encroaching big developers who also 
wanted a stake in new real estate of the west. Settlement of undeveloped land in all 
regions of the country was widespread and a growing concern for the environment 
and land preservation emerged as a result. In the late 19th century a new 
conservationist movement gained attention with presidential supporters like Theodore 
Roosevelt and Grover Cleveland. These presidents, along with land reformers, such 
as John Muir and John Wesley, pushed for the preservation of forest reserves, 
greenspace, and coastal lands (Geisler et al. 1984, 17). These reformers worked to 
pass the National Reclamation Act of 1902, probably among the first and most 
vigorous growth management laws of that time. The act regulated farmland, irrigation 
and waterways, stormwater drainage and management. Its stringent provisions 
protected about 1.6 million acres of western land (Ibid. 20). Even during that time, 
controversies arose over private property claims and governance issues. Opponents 
resented what they viewed as a top-down, intrusion of the land market. Large wealthy 
landowners and agricultural business monopolies attempted to find loopholes in the 
legislation and succeeded politically, while smallholder tenants and poor farmers 
relented.  In an unlikely alliance, Democratic Socialists, religious leaders and 
populists called for more aggressive programs to assisted small farm holders and low-
income families with securing credit to purchase land. 
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Section 1.2: Historical Origins of Smart Growth as a Political Construct 
Smart Growth is a nebulous term and yet, it has become a mainstay in some 
state policymaking communities as an anecdote to rapid growth and sprawl. There is 
no single definition of Smart Growth, nor is there a simplistic Smart Growth formula. 
There are as many approaches to Smart Growth as there are states seeking it. As I will 
demonstrate, each approach is influenced by state planning systems, socioeconomic 
dynamics, and most importantly, political climate. But in the most general sense, 
Smart Growth has come to be viewed as a set of public policies that are designed to 
help a fast-growing, sprawling urban, suburban or metropolitan area cope with its 
expanding populace while attempting to make more efficient uses of land 
development. According to supporters, Smart Growth seeks to address sprawl-related 
problems by slowing growth in outer-ring or rural areas. Smart Growth advocates 
have developed a set of policy elements in response to interrelated conditions that 
they believe sprawl has caused that affect the lives of everyday citizens, such as 
traffic congestion, and lack of affordable housing. What supporters seem to agree on 
is that Smart Growth has the purpose of limiting outward expansion of development 
where sprawl or low-density development is rampant (Downs 2001, Knaap 2002). 
They also agree that any Smart Growth policy should have the goal of preserving 
large amounts of open space, farmland and natural resources.  Third, any 
development that is “smart” should be in the form of mixed land use or densities and 
should offer citizens a wide variety of amenities that are easily accessible (e.g., parks, 
town centers, biking trails).  
8
At the same time, Smart Growth programs must encourage a variety of 
transportation choices and lessen dependence on automobiles. Perhaps the most 
controversial of these claims is that the costs of infrastructure projects that create 
sprawl should placed on developers who build in sprawling areas rather than widely 
dispersed among the citizens. The implication is that governments ought to pass 
Smart Growth policies that impose some form of regulatory barrier against real estate 
developers. Thus, in the politics of Smart Growth, there are two camps: on one side 
are the anti-growth or slow-growth constituencies who support most Smart Growth 
proposals. These constituencies primarily consist of environmentalists, urban 
planners, some farming groups, and in some cases, suburban residents who have 
expressed discontent with sprawl-related traffic congestion. On the other side of the 
debate are pro-growth and most real estate developer communities who are suspicious 
of Smart Growth proposals that impose some form of restriction against land use 
practices. 
 
Section 1.3: The Emerging Smart Growth Movement in the American States 
 State land-use planning dates as far back as the 1920’s when then-Secretary of 
Commerce, Herbert Hoover, spearheaded the enactment of the landmark Standard 
City Planning Enabling Act and Standard Zoning Enabling Acts (Levin et al. 1974, 9; 
APA 2002, 7).  These acts had the primary purpose of protecting private property at 
the local level. The prevailing notion was that local governments should be the 
primary decision makers when it came to land use management, states were to 
assume a less central role in the planning process, while local governments remained 
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responsible for enforcing zoning ordinances. Prior to this historic legislation, states 
attempted to preempt the zoning powers of the local governments. The argument for 
centralized control was that local government and municipalities were ineffective at 
controlling growth because of weak city and county governments. Therefore, states 
issued three main objectives for state intervention in land-use control. First, states 
would make an effort to establish regulatory statutes that would establish clearly 
defined objectives and administrative roles for statewide comprehensive planning. 
 Next, land-use decisions should be value-free and fair; that is, planning should 
not have discriminatory effects or induce controversy. Finally, once regulations are 
established, the land will regulate itself unless there is a need for further regulatory 
controls.5 In 1925, states began to implement planning strategies, especially in New 
Jersey, Vermont, and Wisconsin (Linowes et al. 1975, 24). In 1934, 36 states 
establish planning boards, commissions and other minor regulatory agencies; and in 
1936, all states except Delaware established full-time, specialized state planning 
agencies.6
Before the enabling acts, state planning agencies were central forces in the 
initial planning movement. They had close ties to the governor, legislative 
committees, and interest groups. In most states, the governor appoints heads of the 
planning commission and controls the budget. State assemblies provide the legislative 
mandate and could delegate specific administrative tasks to various agencies. Interest 
groups were especially equipped with specialized information about how the planning 
 
5 Ibid. p. 11. 
6 Ibid. p. 24. 
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and zoning process works. By and large, however, states failed to achieve their 
regulatory objectives under the enabling acts because local government claims to 
autonomy and home-rule factors. Comprehensive planning, as dictated by the states, 
was unpopular and there was disagreement as to the jurisdictional responsibilities of 
local regulatory agencies. In addition, localities were more concerned with increasing 
their tax base and attempts to incorporate land-use controls were futile, especially if 
no financial incentive (or penalty) was in place to encourage them to comply. They 
feared that publicly owned land would depress land values and discourage potential 
industries from investing in their economy. By the end of the 1930’s, all attempts at 
comprehensive planning failed, specifically due to the prevailing emphasis on 
economic development at the local level. In the end, most planning functions 
devolved to the local, municipal and regional governments, especially in the area of 
zoning.  
 In the 1940’s and 1950’s, urban revitalization movements took center stage as 
a response to the Depression and World War II. Post-war innovations in health and 
technology, along with the invention of the automobile, led to increasing urbanization 
of metropolitan and suburban areas, which in turn, led to the expansion of highways 
and mass transit systems. Investors were attracted and lured to the city, where the 
prospect of job creation and productivity were greatest. The focus turned to the 
national government and its relationship with local, urban areas. The federal 
government issued funding in the form of community development grants and a host 
of experiments were undertaken to tackle the ills of Urban America. These 
experiments were geared towards improvements in the areas of housing and 
11 
 
transportation. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the 
Department of Transportation were created and efforts to preserve open space, 
improve transit system, provide affordable housing, and better public facilities were 
primary goals. States assumed little to no role in these efforts.7
Beginning in the late 1960’s and 1970’s, state level planning activities were 
still limited to just that—planning and nothing else, while local governments’ primary 
responsibility was zoning. The federal government continued its presence by taking a 
direct regulatory role in enforcing clear air and water standards. However, few states, 
like Hawaii and Vermont, were successful at direct state planning and zoning 
responsibilities (APA 2000). By 1974, both Hawaii and Vermont, along with Maine, 
Florida and Oregon mapped out plans for state comprehensive land-use policies. 
Mapping and geographic systems were created to identify areas for growth 
management. And in that same year, Congress passed the Land-Use Planning Act of 
1974, which provided grants to states to assist with planning efforts (Burchell et al. 
2000; Linowes et al. 1975, Morehouse 1981).  
Local governments became discontented and feared that there would be 
duplicative efforts by the states; that state preemption of local responsibilities were 
still undesired; jurisdictional concerns could produce confusion and conflict; and that 
states would be unable to effectively determine local government planning needs. 
Local governments had already established independent planning commissions that 
oversee the growth management process. The efforts by these independent agencies 
constitute a separate political enterprise from housing, transportation, and 
 
7 Ibid. p. 27. 
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environmental administrative processes. But these entities also have a say in the area 
of land-use planning. How the state would deal with these complex jurisdictional 
issues was unclear. Hawaii was one of the few states in which state centralized 
control worked. The success of comprehensive planning in Hawaii was due to 
fragmented and weak local government enforcement or policing powers. What is 
more, there was no contention between interests, say, rural versus urban or public 
versus private ownership. Farmers were not a strong political force and private 
ownership was not widespread (Linowes et al. 1975, 53). 
Meanwhile, as urbanization and metropolitan growth continued to rise, 
families relocated to outer-ring suburbs to escape the hustle and bustle of sprawling 
central cities. Cars made it easier for those who could afford them, to literally buy 
into the American Dream. That dream was not realized in congested, urban cities; it 
was a dream that could only be achieved in the safety of gated suburban communities. 
As socially mobile families continued to migrate outside the central city, businesses 
seeking a more propitious environment in which to operate followed. Development 
also leaped to the suburbs. The end results were urban areas that were stricken with 
poverty, homelessness and substandard schools. Suburban areas increasingly became 
congested with traffic, pedestrian-unfriendly, and compacted by clusters of shopping 
malls and office parks. Growth declined in urban centers and accelerated in suburbia, 
producing many unintended economic and social problems.   
In the 1980’s, states began to realize the problems related to sprawl spillover 
into other jurisdictions as a direct consequence of leapfrog or excessive outward 
development. Florida’s 1985 historic land-use planning statutes were one of the first 
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attempts at reform of growth management at the state level. The emphasis of the 
Florida statutes was protection of open land from encroaching development, 
particularly along the coast and environmentally sensitive areas (APA 2002, 10). By 
the 1990’s states saw the need for direct intervention or more centralized control.  
 
Smart Growth Pre-History 
 In the 1990’s Smart Growth was first conceived by the American Planning 
Association (APA), the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
the Henry M. Jackson foundation and the Natural Resource Defense Council 
(NRDC), and the Surface Transnational Policy Project (STRP) (Burchell et al. 2000, 
825). The first coalition, comprised of the APA, HUD, and the Jackson Foundation 
was charged with encouraging states to pass growth management laws that promoted 
fair and affordable housing, improved transportation systems and environmental 
protection. The other partnership between the NRDC and STRP produced a report 
that entailed a Smart Growth toolkit. This toolkit was a set of proposals that could be 
used to address each negative aspect of sprawl: traffic congestion, poor air and water 
quality inadequate or dilapidated housing and other building structures (called 
Brownfields), and so on (p. 826). 
 In 1997, Maryland was the first state to adopt Smart Growth. The cornerstone 
of its Smart Growth plan placed limitations on new development and instead, 
encouraged construction in state-designated areas. Other states followed suit—Rhode 
Island, Colorado, and the landmark New Jersey State Development and 
Redevelopment Program. In 1999, Smart Growth met with increased public attention 
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and awareness, interest, and major news magazine covered. The state of Pennsylvania 
was acknowledge for its leadership in Brownfield redevelopment; Georgia touted as a 
pioneer in the area of transportation, and President Clinton and Vice President Al 
Gore promoted their “Livable Agenda,” which highlighted various aspects of Smart 
Growth policies (p. 835). In this new, innovative approach to growth management, 
planning and not primarily zoning, was the primary focus. Planning centered on the 
New Urbanism concept. New Urbanism entails reducing sprawl by focusing on types 
of development in residential neighborhoods.8
Proponents of New Urbanism argue for more compact forms of development, 
such as town houses rather than detached, single-family homes, would preserve land. 
This approach is now modified to incorporate mixed-use with a variety of densities 
that do not only pertain to residential, but commercial development as well. In other 
words, housing and public amenities should be easily accessible and closely located. 
This “smarter” mode of growth management, they argue, would lessen the impact of 
sprawl by cutting down commute times, save energy by reducing the reliance on cars, 
encourage social interaction, and reduce air pollution—all while conserving valuable 
land resources. The initial focus on the New Urbanism dimension of Smart Growth 
led many to believe that Smart Growth was not really comprehensive or multi-
faceted. Today, this is not the case. Most advocates agree that Smart Growth should 
focus on future challenges to sprawl. The objective is not to stop growth completely; 
the goals are to deter sprawl by making better use of existing infrastructure and to 
target future development to areas of greatest need.  
 
8 Downs, Anthony. 2001. “What Does ‘Smart Growth’ Really Mean?” Foresight 8 (2): 1-5. 
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Section 1.4: Overview of Chapters 
 
In Chapter 2, I introduce my theory of Smart Growth in the states and develop 
the argument that Smart Growth legislation is most likely to be adopted if a state has: 
an influential governor with strong constitutional powers, a professionalized state 
legislature, influential interest groups and other stakeholders with the capacity to 
shape public policy either directly or indirectly; and, most important, a political 
ideology that supports a more centralized role for the state government in the areas of 
land use and growth management. Absent from this list is the role of the political 
parties. As demonstrated by the findings of the statistical analysis in Chapter 3, I 
demonstrate that neither single-party control of the state legislature nor divided 
government has an impact on the likelihood that a state will pass or adopt a statewide 
Smart Growth policy. 
For Chapter 3, I assess the relative importance of various factors accounting 
for Smart Growth passage in all 50 states. To accomplish this undertaking, I employ a 
probit procedure to predict the impact of various political factors on Smart Growth 
The research question is: What factors account for the adoption of Smart Growth in 
the American States? The dependent variable is dichotomous and represents each 
state’s decision to adopt or reject Smart Growth policies between 1998 and 2002. The 
variable is coded 1 if a state has enacted statewide, comprehensive Smart Growth and 
0 otherwise. About 20 states have adopted and implemented a Smart Growth 
program.  
 Some states are pursuing Smart Growth at the local, regional and/or state level 
but have not fully implemented a statewide comprehensive program. These states are 
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coded 0.  There are four political variables: (1) an index of the formal and informal 
powers of the governor; (2) an index that captures the degree of state legislative 
professionalism; (3) the influence and activity of interest groups measured in terms of 
campaign contributions from environmental and construction industries; and, (4) an 
updated measure of state ideology. There are two socioeconomic indicators included 
as controls: (1) an interaction term that incorporates state population density and the 
number of housing units per square mile and (2) the percentage of gross state product 
that consists of real estate development.  
Based on the results of the analysis, political ideology and the urban sprawl 
indicator proved to have the greatest impact on the likelihood that a state adopts 
Smart Growth. Neither of the other two economic indicators performed well. The 
governor’s formal authority to invoke the item veto was highly significant, as was the 
governor’s ability to influence policy decision making informally—by being popular. 
In states with successful enactment of Smart Growth programs, a pattern emerges: the 
governor was instrumental in encouraging state agencies, regional and local 
governments to agree to and develop comprehensive land use management plans.  In 
Maryland and New Jersey, both governors were dedicated to alleviating sprawl and 
were able to get Smart Growth legislation passed in their legislatures. Other state 
governors experienced considerable resistance. Former California governor, Gray 
Davis, grappled with various economic and environmental crises that crippled his 
leadership potential for some of his initial growth management priorities. In Florida, 
there were some successes with comprehensive growth plans, but also opponents 
proliferated in various industries. Based on my own preliminary background research 
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over the past year and a half, I have gathered additional anecdotal information on 
governors’ response to sprawl and views on Smart Growth that will help develop a 
narrative of Smart Growth in each state. 
 Legislative professionalism also demonstrated significance; specifically, the 
number of days in session and having professional staff had a positive impact on 
whether or not a state adopted Smart Growth. I found no evidence that campaign 
contributions from the construction or developer industry mattered in terms of Smart 
Growth; however, there was an inverse relationship between contributions from 
environmental groups and Smart Growth: the less money they spent, the more likely 
Smart Growth will be adopted. Although this is contrary to what I had argued, I 
offered an alternative explanation and found evidence in support of my claims, which 
is discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5. Finally, party affiliation and party control 
had no impact on Smart Growth adoption. Smart Growth policies have been 
championed by both Democrats and Republicans. The results confirm this assertion, 
and the interviews with various government officials in the Maryland and Virginia 
agree that both party elites have campaigned on a Smart Growth agenda in recent 
elections. 
 Chapter 4 will focus on the state of Maryland where Smart Growth has taken 
center stage. The discussion starts by tracing the historical precedents of the 
Maryland Smart Growth law. Next, I reiterate the importance of various actors and 
stakeholders involved in the Smart Growth movement and how Smart Growth 
ultimately reflected a compromise between various opposing groups. To gain a better 
understanding of the politics of Smart Growth in the state of Maryland, I had 
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discussions with 32 actors either directly or indirectly involved in the Smart Growth 
movement. The respondents come from varied communities: the Glendening and 
Ehrlich administrations; state representatives, both Democratic and Republican, 
supporters and opponents of Smart Growth; members from Smart Growth advocacy 
groups; representatives from the Smart Growth counter-movement, pro-industry 
communities; and other, neutral observers.  
 I will demonstrate that the interviews support the central claims advanced in 
this dissertation; namely, that political ideology has an overwhelming impact on the 
chance that Smart Growth is successful in the state. A majority of the respondents 
chose the governor as having the most influence on public policy, followed by the 
state legislature, with interest groups rounding out the top three. A slowing economy, 
coupled with a more conservative political environment, has created somewhat of a 
backlash against Smart Growth since Republican Governor, Robert L. Ehrlich, has 
assumed leadership. 
 In Chapter 5, the discussion turns to a case study of the Smart Growth 
movement in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Virginia has no statewide Smart 
Growth program. This case study provides a contrasting narrative of Smart Growth 
and highlights the failure of Smart Growth advocates to convince the governor and 
state legislature to adopt a statewide, comprehensive policy. I engaged in 
conversations with 33 actors, many who were involved in efforts to push Smart 
Growth in the state. I also met with members of the counter-movement from the 
legislature and executive agencies, property rights and citizen organizations, and 
corporate entities. Again, I conclude that ideology has a major impact: Smart Growth 
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allied forces were successful in pushing for more local and regional Smart Growth 
efforts in the more progressive region of Northern Virginia. They were least 
successful in the conservative regions of the state, like those in Stafford and 
Williamsburg counties. But even in progressive, fast-growing Loudon County, Smart 
Growth enthusiasts face mounting challenges from property rights groups who have 
taken legal action against what they view as too strict regulations on building 
densities. The other major contrast between Smart Growth Maryland and Virginia is 
the role of the governor. In Virginia—unlike Maryland—the governor was least 
involved in the Smart Growth movement. Interest groups were vitally important and 
most influential in seeing their objectives met. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 wraps up the discussion of the politics of Smart Growth in 
the American states. The reader should realize that while the concept of Smart 
Growth is not new, the policy, as implemented has come to be viewed as an 
innovative approach to growth management. But Smart Growth is a very politically 
charged issue. The rewards that were won by Smart Growth advocates were achieved 
on the basis of the political skills and tactical resources used at their disposal in the 
state of Maryland: the influence of a resolute and powerful governor; an acquiescent 
and professional state legislature; and an underlying liberal ethos that prevailed 
during that time and helped Smart Growth to proceed without too much resistance. 
But today, Smart Growth appears to be in retreat. Setbacks have occurred, even in the 
state of Maryland and Oregon, as those states have experienced a more politically 
conservative climate with budget cuts in Smart Growth programs. Further, opponents 
contend that Smart Growth has not done much to alleviate the problems associated 
20 
 
with sprawl and the notorious traffic congestion experienced by Maryland commuters 
(Staley 2001).  
 In Virginia’s Loudon County, where Smart Growth policies have taken root, 
the Virginia Supreme Court has thrown out the county’s slow-growth zoning 
regulations, which has blocked home building in the nation’s fastest-growing county, 
and a newly-elected board dismantled many of the growth-curbing statutes in 2003. 
Without these regulations, Smart Growth advocates worry that the court ruling will 
clear the way for more low-density developments in the sprawling region. In Oregon, 
the contentious Measure 37 ballot initiative passed by an overwhelming approval by 
voters in 2004. The measure states that state and local governments must compensate 
property owners when land use restrictions reduce the value of their property (Liberty 
2004). 
 Finally, my theory of Smart Growth revisits the on the long standing debate 
between political scientists and economists on the determinants of public policy. This 
study does not discount the influence of socioeconomic conditions, but it does assert 
that political considerations matter more, particularly in the case of Smart Growth. 
Concerns about the state of the economy did not factor much in the politics of Smart 
Growth, and both the statistical analysis and the interviews bear this out. In other 
words, the economy had no impact on whether or not Smart Growth is adopted. In 
sum, this research reaffirms what we already know about the American states: they 
differ. States differ in terms of socioeconomic and political orientations. And since 
they differ, we see variations in terms of how policy decisions are rendered. The 
contrasting narratives on the Maryland and Virginia Smart Growth movement provide 
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compelling evidence to suggest that differences in state political systems have a 





Chapter 1: The Politics of Land Use: From the Founding to Smart Growth 
 
SMART GROWTH POLICY ELEMENTS 
Policy Element 1 Preserve Open Space (farmland, historical or cultural resources) 
Policy Element 2 Environmental Protection/Conservation of Natural Resources (water, air, energy, wildlife, habitat, etc.) 
Policy Element 3 Developing Infill Sites/Brownfield Redevelopment 
Policy Element 4 New Urban Designs (pedestrian friendly architecture) 
Policy Element 5 Include Citizens in Land-Use Decision making Ventures/Consensus-Building Strategies 
Policy Element 6 Provision for Creating Widespread Affordable Housing 
Policy Element 7 Encourage Regional Governing Solutions to Urban/Suburban Sprawl (e.g., tax-base revenue sharing) 
Policy Element 8 Reduce Auto-Dependence by Increasing Emphasis on Mass Transit/Light Rail Systems 
Policy Element 9 Promote Compact, High-Density or Mixed-Use Development 
Policy Element 10 Create Fiscal Incentive Structure to Encourage Cooperation from Local/Regional Governments and Planning Organizations 
Policy Element 11 
Impose the Social Costs of New Development Onto Real Estate Developers 
(cost of new infrastructure, environmental, developer fees, impact fees, 
urban growth boundaries, etc.) 
Sources: Downs, Anthony T. (April 2000). "What Does Smart Growth Really Mean?" Foresight: 
American Planning Association Magazine, 8 (2):1-5. 
 American Planning Association. 2002. Planning for Smart Growth: 2002 State of the States.Washington, D.C.: APA. 
 Florida Department of Community Affairs. 2000. "Growth Management Programs: A Comparison of Selected States." A Report Prepared by the Florida DCA.
Myers, Phyllis. 2000. "Growth at the Ballot Box: Electing the Shape of Communities in 
November 2000." A Paper Prepared for the Brookings Institution 
Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy. 
 Hirschhorn, Joel S. 2000. "Growing Pains: Quality of the New Economy." A Report Prepared for the National Governors Association. Washington, D.C.: NGA. 






Chapter 1: The Politics of Land Use: From the Founding to Smart Growth 
 
TABLE 1.1 
THE CONTOURS OF SMART GROWTH 
STATES THAT PASSED COMPREHENSIVE  
GROWTH MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION, BY DECADE 
State Decade Title Law 
Florida 1972 Environmental Land Water Management 
Act 
Fla. Stat. 380 et seq. 
1984-1985 Omnibus Growth Management Act  
1998-1999 Criteria for land use plans, infill 
development 
 
Hawaii 1961 Hawaii Land Use Law Hawaii Rev. Stats Ch. 
205 
1978 Hawaii State Plan Act 100 
Oregon 1973 Land Conservation and Development Act S.B. 100, Oregon Stats. 
197 
Vermont 1970 Environmental Control Act Act 250, 10 Vermont 
Stats. 151 
1988 Growth Management Act Act 200, 24 Vermont 
Stats. 117 
1990 Amendments to Ch. 117 Act 280 
Maine 1988 Comprehensive Planning and Land Use 
Regulation Act 
30 M.R.S.A. Sec. 4960 
Washington 1990 Growth Management Act Sub. House Bill 2929 
1991 Amendments to 1990 Growth Management 
Act 
ReSHB 1025 
New Jersey 1985 State Planning Act NJSA 52-18A-196 et 
seq. 
1999 Smart Growth Planning Grants  
2001 State Development and Redevelopment Plan  
Georgia 1989 Coordinated Planning Legislation O.C.G.A. 50-8-1 et seq. 
1992 Amendments to Planning Law  
Rhode Island 1988 Comprehensive Planning and Land Use 
Regulation Act 
Rhode Island General 
Laws, Ch. 45-22 
2000 Referenda on developer rights, open space  
Maryland 1992 Economic Growth, Resource Protection and 
Planning Act 
 
1997 Smart Growth Areas Act  
2001 Greenprint Program H.B. 1379 
Arizona 1998 Growing Smarter Act, transfer development 
rights act 
S. 1238, Ch. 145 
2000 Growing Smarter Plus Act  
New Hampshire 2000 Smart Growth Bill H.B. 1259 
Pennsylvania 2000 Growth Area Legislation, transfer 
development rights 
H.B. 14 (Act 67), S.B. 
300 (Act 68) 
Tennessee 1998 Growth Policy Law Public Chapter 1101 
Wisconsin 1999 Growth Management Law A.B. 133 
Delaware 2001 Comprehensive Plans and Annexation Law H.B. 255 
Planning Coordination S.B. 105 
Graduated Impact Fees H.B. 235 
Reality Transfer Tax for Conservation Trust 
Fund 
H.B. 192 
Sources: APA 2002; Sellers 2003; Bollens 1992 
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Chapter 2:  Towards a Coherent Theory of Smart Growth Adoption 
 
Chapter 2 begins by outlining the theoretical debates surrounding the Smart 
Growth controversy. Both Smart Growth supporters and skeptics face an uphill battle 
in pushing for their respective goals. Nevertheless, there have been notable instances 
where stakeholders have come to mutual agreement on how Smart Growth policies 
are implemented in such a way that benefits all parties. Because this research 
highlights the importance of political factors, I discuss these factors in detail and why 
I believe they are most relevant in understanding the politics of Smart Growth. I 
conclude this discussion with a brief description of my research design, which will set 
the stage for the model that will be introduced in Chapter 3 and the quantitative 
analysis. 
 
Section 2.1: Sprawl and Smart Growth: Making the Connection 
 
Visit any major city or metropolitan area and one might come away with a 
number of perplexing observations. Smog and pollution have clouded the air so much 
that city skylines are barely recognizable. Older suburbs are left to decay due in large 
part to disinvestment, leapfrog development, and flight to newer, outer-ring suburbs 
and rural areas where land is cheap and plentiful. Suburban enclaves are demarcated 
gated communities that boast an impressive array of palatial single-family homes. 
Roads and highways are congested with bottle necked traffic as commuters scramble 
to get to and from their destination. Commuting times are costing citizens valuable 
time with their families. Overcrowded schools are becoming a major problem and a 
subject of ongoing debate. Available land that could be developed for community 
parks have been converted to mega shopping malls and retail centers. Meanwhile, 
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cities are crippled by the lack of desirable jobs and adequate housing. Some older 
suburban areas suffer from the loss of population and declining land values. All of 
these conditions are associated with a phenomenon called sprawl. Sprawl is defined 
as a pattern of land use that is characterized by randomly dispersed and low-density 
development. Typically viewed as a phenomenon endemic to urban areas, sprawl 
related problems also spillover into suburban, rural, and even cross-state jurisdictions. 
Voters are beginning to realize the social and economic costs of sprawl, and states are 
responding to those demands by putting forth an aggressive campaign that addresses 
sprawl. The strategy for addressing sprawl involves containing growth in areas where 
development has been excessive, and by redirecting valuable resources to areas of 
greatest need, particularly cities and older suburbs. 
In recent years, the Smart Growth movement has been touted by a broad 
coalition of supporters as the preferred policy solution to sprawl. Voter discontent 
with sprawl has helped to propel Smart Growth to the top of the governmental 
agenda. And advocates have much to celebrate. Twenty states have either flirted with 
or fully adopted comprehensive growth management plans since 1997. The leading 
progenitors of the Smart Growth movement can thank the American public for the 
support at the polls. However, supporters also understand that they face mounting 
challenges. They must not only promote Smart Growth as an appropriate idea; they 
must also convince state lawmakers that Smart Growth is socially, economically, and 
politically feasible. Moreover, while the Smart Growth agenda continues to be 
debated, discussed and implemented by states across the country, there is also a 
growing and highly organized countermovement. The alternative perspective calls on 
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state—particularly local governments—to adopt and maintain market oriented 
solutions to sprawl rather than regulatory, top-down command and control methods. 
It is my view that the politics of Smart Growth provides important 
implications for the study of state and local politics. My interest in Smart Growth has 
led me to explore more intently the nature of state and local relations. This 
relationship between states and their localities is a very special one. In the area of 
land-use regulation, that relationship can become more or less complex, depending on 
the constitutional directives and the structural arrangements that shape or constrain 
policymakers as they render decisions. In the case of Smart Growth, most of the 
implementation responsibility that was historically set aside for local governments is 
now centralized at the state level. State governments usually tend to set the agenda, 
the standards by which implementation must take place, and local governments are 
often required to comply with state objectives. Even in the case of California, which 
has decentralized land use regulation to local governments, each locality must present 
its plans for implementation to a state task force on Smart Growth for approval before 
those plans can be carried out (American Planning Association 2001). The states 
under examination provide an interesting and unique narrative on the politics of land 
use decision making.  
A study of Smart Growth may also lead to some interesting questions for 
students of state and local politics to ponder. Smart Growth policies have been in 
effect for nearly seven years, so this research is somewhat limited. However, as more 
and more states consider and implement Smart Growth, researchers might want to 
consider various explanations for why the policy has diffused across the states over a 
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period of time. Another important consideration that Smart Growth lends itself to is 
the question of why the movement seems devoted to mobilization at the grassroots 
level, especially where parties appear to be less relevant than interest groups. Finally, 
a study of Smart Growth at the state level has relevant policy implications for 
representative democracy. In states across the country, legislatures are attempting to 
involve citizens in land use decision making by reintroducing the referendum and 
initiative process. As we shall see later on, California and Virginia, as well as many 
New England states, have witnessed a dramatic increase in ballot measures involving 
land use and growth management issues within the last decade or so.9
The politics of land use planning in the American states is certainly about who 
gets what, when, and definitely where. From the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) 
movements that proliferated in the 1970’s to present day discussions on Smart 
Growth, the dispute over growth management alternatives seems never ending. One 
point of contention that will be explored in this chapter is the disagreement regarding 
the appropriate level of governing in the area of land use decision making. Beginning 
in the Reagan era and taking root during the devolutionary period of the mid-1990’s, 
states have assumed a greater role in economic development and land use planning. 
This responsibility was formerly centralized at the local level. But as we shall see, 
barriers to enact and implement state comprehensive land use policies, such as Smart 
Growth, really reflect deeply held beliefs about the proper role of government in the 
lives of American citizens. In addition, understanding the conditions under which 
 
9 Myers and Puentes (2001). 
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Smart Growth is successful or not involves a theoretical exploration of the politics of 
regulation and which stakeholder groups will be impacted. 
 In order for states and their localities to thrive, they must compete with one 
another to lure corporate investment. A healthy industry can help increase the tax 
base or enhance the bond rating of a state or locality (Fowler 1988, Grady 1987). The 
level of regulatory control of the market may force corporate entities to reconsider 
where they locate. Real estate companies that wish to develop in an existing urban 
area that has already experienced accelerated growth may have to bear the costs of 
development or relocate to a suburban area where the benefits of deregulation far 
outweigh the costs. However, for the urban planning community and 
environmentalists, increased regulation can lead to social benefits like curbing traffic 
congestion and improving the infrastructure for better roads, highways and schools. 
In the end, there are trade-offs—between economic growth and addressing various 
social needs. For conservationists, the common good not only means protecting the 
environment but also preserving valuable land resources. This is the central premise 
in the controversy that surrounds Smart Growth.  The dilemma involves whether or 
not sacrificing a public good—parks and recreation, for example—for economic 
development (e.g., building more retail centers that provide jobs for semi-skilled 
persons), is socially, economically, and politically feasible. 
Some skeptics view Smart Growth as an attempt to hinder the market from 
functioning properly in a growing high-tech and global economy.10 They argue that 
Smart Growth fails to offer a coherent policy solution—that the reliance on a 
 
10 See specifically, ALEC (2001) and Staley (2001a, 2001b). 
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comprehensive approach to sprawl promises too much, overburdens local 
governments, and does not allow the market to correct instances where accelerated 
growth has created negative externalities. On the other hand, advocates of Smart 
Growth argue that state involvement does not have to imply that growth is 
undesirable. On the contrary, they argue that Smart Growth can help strike a balance 
between pro-growth interests, conservationists, urban planners and other 
stakeholders. Advocates of the Smart Growth movement envision a policy that 
curtails growth, while at the same time, does not overburden corporate interests and 
creates desirable social benefits like clean air and water. In the end, a mutually 
beneficial outcome is achieved and all stakeholders in the process are winners. 
 If Smart Growth is successful, real estate developers and construction 
industries could argue that the deck is stacked against them if regulatory controls are 
enforced. Developers contend that stringent or even moderate forms of land 
restrictions, primarily developer fees, will hinder them from building new 
subdivisions or single family dwellings that consumers want, thus generating profit. 
Other opponents of Smart Growth are county governments, who appear to be leery of 
state intervention in local government affairs.11 Since the landmark Enabling Acts of 
the 1920’s, states granted planning and zoning powers to local governments, and for 
states like Maryland and Georgia, county governments assume the primary 
 
11 In my conversation with a high-ranking Maryland Department of Smart Growth official, the view 
that state government involvement in land use management is an intrusion on local, particularly county 
government responsibilities seemed widespread in the state of Maryland. County governments 
generally tended to agree with smart growth initiatives where they have a commanding role. In effect, 
they retain the powers of implementation, but state government would assume the responsibility of 
identifying areas where growth is needed, especially in underdeveloped edge cities. The state would 
also identify “smart code” areas where accelerated growth is taking place. In smart coded areas, 
development or construction of new residential or commercial establishments would be prohibited.  
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responsibility of implementing land use policies through enforcement of zoning 
ordinances (Morehouse 1981, DeGrove 1984).  The final category of stakeholders 
opposed to Smart Growth is private property rights groups that have proliferated in 
recent years. These organizations are mostly comprised of neighborhood citizens who 
form NIMBY coalitions that are often opposed to “takings” from either local or 
federal government.12 
The most likely supporters of Smart Growth are environmental groups, since 
they favor more state regulation of land to promote conservation; they are the likely 
winners in the politics of regulation. The state chapters of the Sierra Club and Friends 
of the Earth have led the charge against sprawl since the 1970’s and have continued 
their efforts against its impact on the environment. But conservation groups are not 
the only stakeholders who seek to gain an advantage in the Smart Growth debate. 
Many farming groups have emerged in recent years on the side of land use 
regulations. The Farmland Trust Preservation lists hundreds of groups that have 
seemed to unite around state Smart Growth initiatives. However, there are many 
populist farming groups that distrust government, and these groups are particularly 
active in the South and Midwest.13 They are particularly suspicious of the power of 
“eminent domain,” whereby government can seize rural land that is usually owned by 
private companies or individuals to other private entities. The land is generally 
prepared for private uses, commercial or residential housing. The implication is that 
 
12 “Takings” refer government seizure of private land for public purposes. The most common examples 
of takings are private property for recreation facilities or the creation of a historic preservation site.  
13 See American Farmland Trust report, 1999, which can be downloaded from 
http://www.farmland.org/. Also see Samuel Staley (2000), “The ‘Vanishing Farmland’ Myth and the 
Smart Growth Agenda.” Report prepared by the Reason Public Policy Institute, January 2000. 
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government has created “shadow” partnerships with corporate interests for private 
gain. Eminent domain procedures have in fact taken place in southern communities 
like Covington, Georgia and many rural areas in Maryland.14 
Section 2.2: Conceptual Framework for Smart Growth in the American States 
The assertion that politics matters does not discount the influence of 
economics. A state’s overall fiscal health, as determined by the revenue it generates, 
will dictate the amount of funding for Smart Growth programs. However, it is more 
important to recognize that the key factors are power, resources, tactical skills and 
strategy that actors bring to bear on the political process. These actors are state 
governors, state legislators, political parties, non- and for-profit organizations and 
citizen action groups. Dimensions of the political process, such as political culture, 
ideology and public opinion, are also powerful influences on the political process. Yet 
the relative influence of these political variables greatly depends on contextual 
factors, such as electoral turnover in the state legislature or the dynamics of public 
opinion.  Some states have political parties that are not as powerful as interest groups, 
some governors have weak formal powers and state legislatures are more active in 
setting the agenda and controlling the appropriations process than the executive.  
These contextual conditions make it more or less likely that Smart Growth adoption 
will occur at the state level.  
 
14 For example, in April of 2000, the Maryland legislature passed a law, S.B. 509, authorizing the 
designation of a large area of Baltimore County (over 100 properties, including three apartment 
complexes) as a redevelopment zone. However, a citizen referendum was successful in overturning the 
measure by a wide margin in the November 2000 elections. 
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I argue that the success of Smart Growth adoption greatly depends on the 
characteristics of each state political system: the governor, state legislatures, the 
bureaucracy, courts, and state political culture. The executive branch—namely the 
governor and state agencies—along with state legislatures are the most visible 
political institutions in the politics of Smart Growth. In addition, there are additional 
players whose influence should not be discounted, namely interests groups. Without 
the vital influence of interest groups, Smart Growth would provide a rather dull and 
boring story. Absent from this list are political parties. I will demonstrate in 
forthcoming discussions that neither single-party control of the state legislature, inter-
party competition, nor divided government will have an impact on the adoption of 
Smart Growth in the states. 
 Interest groups appear to exert considerable influence on the policy process in 
the states. They are becoming more visible in their lobbying activities (Reeves 1990, 
85; Jewell 1982, 639) and have the necessary resources to achieve group objectives. 
In the Smart Growth movement, there are considerable cross pressures from ecology 
groups and business. Nevertheless, there is a widely held belief that economic 
interests are dominant forces in American state politics (Lindblom 1977, Peterson et 
al. 1987). Economic incentives are much more favored by state governments than 
environmental regulatory approaches because these policies encourage investment in 
state economies, especially when the goal is to generate jobs.  Ringquist and Garand 
(1999) maintain that states and localities often provide generous financial incentives 
or rewards to corporate interests to offset regulations. There are notable instances 
where private groups have accepted some restrictions on where and how they develop 
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in exchange for various forms of financial incentives, such as tax credits for doing 
business in economically depressed urban areas.  
Despite demands made by corporate entities to lower their regulatory burden, 
the presence and influence of conservation organizations continues to thrive. 
Environmental groups, such as state divisions of the Sierra Club and 1,000 Friends 
organizations are just as adept and are equally powerful lobbies as corporate interests 
in fundraising campaigns and raising citizen awareness about urban sprawl. However, 
just as there are some business groups that are not entirely opposed to regulations, 
there are also some environmental groups that are just as adamant that too many land 
restrictions could have unintended consequences. The Sierra Club’s admonition that 
Smart Growth should not only be conservation-specific; rather, policies should also 
be fair and serve the interests of the disadvantaged or poor by encouraging affordable 
housing and promoting safe and decent neighborhoods. Too many growth regulations, 
they believe, could actually drive up the costs of construction, thereby making it 
difficult for urban residents to afford housing in the cities. This perspective differs 
from that of the Friends of the Earth, a single-issue organization whose platform is 
mostly devoted to conservation causes. Similarly, there are corporate interests—for 
instance, the Bank of America Corporation in Sacramento, California—that have 
created partnerships with conservation groups to encourage environmentally-friendly 
development projects in disadvantaged areas.  
Policies that offset the costs of regulation by offering incentive-based 
programs are popular among many businesses and conservation groups alike, 
particularly the real estate and construction companies. This incentive-based approach 
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is exemplified as the hallmark of Maryland’s Smart Growth program that was passed 
in 1997. By reducing some regulatory burden and focusing on mechanisms that both 
conservationists and pro-business can live with, proponents have designated 
Maryland as the “poster child” for Smart Growth.  Across the state, road signs that 
proclaim “Smart Growth Begins Here” are viewed by many advocates as evidence of 
the state’s commitment to the Smart Growth approach. Other states, like New Jersey, 
Oregon, Arizona and Colorado, look to the Maryland example as an experimental 
answer to sprawl-related problems. 
Section 2.3: Intellectual Response from the Discipline 
There are literally thousands of reports, anecdotes, articles, conference papers 
and books written about Smart Growth. It would be a rather daunting task to sift 
through it all and come away with a clear understanding of what Smart Growth is.  
The intellectual response to Smart Growth has been offered by urban planners, 
economists, and even sociologists. Even with the varied responses to Smart Growth, a 
recurrent theme is that politics matters. Smart Growth programs are passed by state 
legislatures and often result from the executive’s power to set the agenda. Interest 
groups mobilize voters by raising consciousness about sprawl issues. They also bring 
forth information for state decision makers to consider during debates, testimony and 
hearings. Yes, the politics of Smart Growth is in full force, yet political scientists 
have been noticeably silent on the issue until very recently. 
Political scientists who have written extensively on the subject point squarely 
to the importance political factors. Gerber (2001) observes that states have been most 
successful in passing Smart Growth initiatives when voters provide direct cues to 
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decision-makers and developers on land use plans that they support and oppose. 
Conservation groups and citizen action groups were central in negotiating with real 
estate contractors about where they wanted growth to occur. The most important 
implication is that elected officials do in fact listen to citizen demands and hold 
developers responsible for failing to adhere to those demands. However, concessions 
allow developers to construct new housing, commercial, and public goods in 
exchange for moderate regulations on construction in areas where traffic congestion 
is greatest (p. 24).  
Borick (2001) takes an in-depth look at state level land use initiatives and 
considers the influence of political variables, namely party control of state legislature, 
public opinion and the strength of interest groups in encouraging the passage of anti-
sprawl measures. He finds that state-centered approach to growth management is 
convincing in two important respects. First, states can rely on command and control 
tools, where the governor directs state agencies to implement local plans and enforce 
strict mandates against development. Or, states can promote policies that offer 
incentives, where they provide local governments or private entities with fiscal 
rewards for preserving open space or redirect development plans to the most 
economically distressed areas (p. 5). Borick finds that interest group strength and 
public opinion measures15 are highly significant, while partisan control of the state 
legislature is not statistically significant (Ibid. p. 15).  
 Finally, Meyers and Puentes (2001) investigate 553 growth-related state and 
local ballot measures in 38 states to assess states’ inclination towards progressivism. 
 
15 Borick uses public opinion data derived from Erikson et al. (1999). 
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All ballot measures related to four of the 10 Smart Growth principles: open space 
preservation, investments in roads and highways, parks and recreation, and regulatory 
provisions on development.16 All four areas were highly controversial. Among the 
most important findings was that open space preservation movements tended to 
reflect ideological inclinations. States in the northeast tended to have the greatest 
number of these types of referenda and also were the most progressive, while states in 
the southeast had the least number of open space preservation measures and were the 
least progressive in terms of passing Smart Growth initiatives. The most compelling 
finding is the impact of public opinion regarding voters’ beliefs about the proper level 
of government that ought to address land use issues. Home rule measures giving local 
government more control over growth management issues failed in the more 
progressive or ideologically liberal states of Maine and Massachusetts (Ibid. 10). 
Measures that strengthen municipal and county level governance passed in Kentucky 
and New Mexico. Lastly, property rights organizations and farmland preservationists 
dominated state ballots in the West, particularly in California and Arizona (Ibid. 
21).17 
What is most striking about these studies is that they highlight the importance 
of political factors but fail to find a significant role for parties. Party variables lack 
potency when it comes to Smart Growth. Both parties understand the nature of voter 
discontent with sprawl. In order to be elected, their policy positions must not stray far 
 
16 See Appendix in Chapter 1 for a description of smart growth policy areas. 
17 See also a fascinating study by Jeffrey A. Dubin, D. Roderick Kiewiet, and Charles Noussair (1992), 
“Voting on Growth Control Measures: Preferences and Strategies.” Economics and Politics, 4(12): 
191-213. The authors find that liberal voters are more supportive of growth controls, blacks and 
Latinos are less likely to support growth regulations due to perceived loss of jobs, and homeowners are 
more likely than renters to support controls (p. 197). 
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from the median voter. Neither party will agree that the consequences of sprawl—
poor air quality, traffic congestion, crowded schools, and disinvestment in central 
cities—are a good thing. On the contrary, both major parties present themselves as 
the party that will adequately address and eradicate sprawl. And both Republicans 
and Democrats boast that Smart Growth is a bipartisan effort. According to the 
American Planning Association (2002), at lease one-half of the states have addressed 
some aspect of Smart Growth. Of the states that have adopted statewide 
comprehensive Smart Growth, about one-half have Republican governors, including 
former Arizona governor and Democrat, Jane Hull, and former Republican governors, 
Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania and Christine Todd Whitman of New Jersey. Republican 
support for Smart Growth challenges the conventional wisdom that Republicans do 
not support regulatory-based public policies. Democrats at the state legislative and 
executive levels also support Smart Growth efforts, particularly former Minnesota 
state senator, Myron Orfield and current governor of Michigan, Jennifer Granholm, 
who campaigned vigorously on a Smart Growth platform during the 2002 mid-term 
elections and was ultimately successful.18 
Political scientists rightly point out that voters have a central role in 
convincing states to pass Smart Growth related measures. Yet, these scholars do not 
go far enough to explain exactly how citizen demands to eradicate sprawl gets 
translated into implemented policies. In other words, it is not enough just to focus on 
ballot outcomes. I am concerned with how the process of mobilization occurs, and it 
 
18 See the Smart Growth America report, “Americans Want Growth and Green; Demand Solutions  




is my contention that pressure groups and their political activities are crucially 
important. Interest groups behave as conduits between the public and decision 
makers. Based on the information that they provide and the resources that they have 
at their disposal, groups are more important than partisan politics when it comes to 
the specific issue of Smart Growth. I will show that political disagreements about 
Smart Growth reflect ideological inclinations, not party affiliation. This dissertation 
will highlight the importance of groups, as well as, state level decision makers as the 
most influential actors in the politics of Smart Growth.  
Section 2.4: Research Design 
Research Question 
Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky’s (1971) discourse on the changing nature of state 
and local policy studies calls for research at the state level that investigates the impact 
of political factors beyond a focus on parties or voter participation. According to the 
authors, research on state and local politics must include the role of the executive, the 
legislature as an institution, the increasing presence and influence of interest groups, 
and the distribution of benefits. The research question for this dissertation is: Do 
characteristics inherent in state political systems influence the decision to adopt or 
reject Smart Growth policies? In simpler terms, what factors contribute to the 
adoption or rejection of Smart Growth in the American states? I argue that there are a 
number of political variables, controlling for socioeconomic indicators, which 
determine the success or failure of Smart Growth. The political forces that shape 
land-use decisions are clear. In order for there to be successful administration of 
Smart Growth, states rely on: (1) an influential governor, (2) a state legislature that 
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can offer Smart Growth as a policy priority and direct clear and sound proposals to 
achieve that end; (3) the presence and strength of interest groups in their capacity to 
shape public policy, directly or indirectly; (4) a political ideology and culture that 
supports a more centralized role for states and/or regional governance.  
Hypotheses & Arguments 
H1: Liberal states will pass Smart Growth initiatives. Conservative states will 
not pass Smart Growth. 
 
When discussing political context and the factors that comprise it, political 
ideology continues to have a considerable impact. Political outcomes reflect a general 
belief about what the role of government ought to be and how society should be 
governed. Policy makers, too have their own ideas on how government policies ought 
to influence our lives. Liberals generally believe that government should assume 
greater responsibility in both the social and economic realm. When it comes to social 
issues, liberals believe that government ought to protect both individual and group 
freedoms. Liberals also believe that government should regulate business to ensure 
that their profit motive does not infringe on citizens’ right to enjoy certain public 
goods, such as clean air and water. Conservatives, on the other hand, tend to argue 
that government interference is undesirable, especially in the economic realm. The 
proper role for government is to allow the market to function by not imposing 
unnecessary restrictions on how businesses operate. The objective is to allow the 
market to respond to consumer demands. Since the Smart Growth controversy 
concerns what the proper role for government ought to be in terms of managing 
growth, the decision to adopt Smart Growth will reflect political ideology. 
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H2: States with powerful corporate interests will act to block Smart Growth 
policies. States with powerful environmental lobbies will succeed in passing 
Smart Growth. 
Interest groups have an important role in influencing policy making in the 
states. Interest groups have used skillful tactics to actively block legislation that is 
unfavorable to their objectives or promote policies that promote their agenda. 
Particularly in response to the Smart Growth movement, interest group allies and 
opponents come from varied communities.19 Allied forces that are able to persuade 
state legislators to accept Smart Growth initiatives or adversarial coalitions that 
oppose such proposals will have an impact on whether or not these programs are 
enacted.20 However, it is very difficult to measure interest group power or influence 
in empirical terms. 
Turning to interest groups in the states, the work of Gray, Lowery, and 
Hrebenar provide some useful insight in terms of measuring influence empirically. 
Two dimensions of interest group influence are widely used—group presence and 
activity (Gray and Lowery 1996, Hrebenar and Thomas 1990, 1995). Interest group 
presence, measured in terms of interest group density, or the number of registered 
interest groups in each state. The other dimension is interest group activity, which 
 
19 Supporters of smart growth include many state and local chapters of the Sierra Club and Friends of 
the Earth. Proponents also come from the construction industry, including the National Association of 
Home Builders and the National Association of Industrial and Office Properties. Opponents of the 
Smart Growth Movement include Partnership for Quality Growth, a coalition of real estate developers 
and other corporate groups), the American Legislative Exchange Council, comprised of 3,000 state 
legislators opposed to many land use regulations. ALEC is also the largest group of state elected 
officials. Proponents in the policy community include the Brookings Institute, the Urban Land Institute 
and the American Planning Association. Opponents in the policy community include the Heritage 
Foundation and the National Center for Policy Analysis. 
20 Several interest group scholars who assert that groups are more effective at blocking legislation 
than affecting its passage (Kingdon 1993; Gray and Lowery 1996; Grumm 1971).  
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often involves analyses on the impact of campaign contributions. Hearings and 
testimonies are also common, but it is difficult to assess the amount of impact they 
actually have because they do not account for all groups who actually have access to 
the state legislature. For this research, I will consider campaign contributions because 
they provide a useful empirical measure of influence. I hope to show that the amount 
of money spent to influence legislative decision making is important because groups 
will not spend money on causes where they perceive a loss.  
 
H3: Governors with strong formal and informal powers will encourage the 
 enactment of  Smart Growth policies. 
 
Governors are most often the progenitors of innovative public policies. 
According to Hansen (1989, 57), they assume the lead in determining and promoting 
state governmental agendas. In the Smart Growth movement, many governors 
demonstrated leadership and expertise. Their responsibility as executors of public 
policies has grown, as devolution responsibilities continue to be centralized at the 
state level. The governor is the chief administrator and he or she has the authority to 
oversee and direct state agencies on how Smart Growth policies should be 
implemented (see also Burns et al. 1996, 137). These important executive institutions 
include the State Environmental Protection Agency (particularly in New Jersey), the 
State Department of Community Affairs (Florida) or the Department of Housing and 
Community development (Maryland), and transportation authorities (most notably, 
Georgia). In addition, redevelopment agencies (RDA’s) are responsible for allocating 
state grants or generous loans to encourage construction companies to build in areas 
designated as urban renewal communities.  
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Governors are in a unique position to influence decision making. Whether 
they are successful depends on their ability to persuade others to accept their ideas. 
Like U.S. Presidents, governors have access to the mass media and can use this mode 
of communication to their advantage. Governors, as agents of social change, have 
greater access to other agents of social change: other governors, interests groups, state 
executive, legislative and judicial offices. They set the agenda at the beginning of 
each legislative session and can wield considerable influence in the areas of 
appropriations and program implementation. In a recent report on Smart Growth in 
the American states, one governor aptly states:  
A key role for governors is to foster highly 
collaborative efforts that integrate all levels of 
government as well as multiple private sector interests, 
including ones that may see threats from a new style of 
growth. Such collaborations create blind support for 
innovative solutions that confront traditional 
behaviors.21 
H4: Professional state legislatures are more likely to pass Smart Growth 
policies. 
Although studies on the impact of legislative professionalism are inconclusive 
(LeLoup 1978; LaPlant and Carter 1997), I argue that professionals within the 
legislature are more knowledgeable about complex policy issues than non-
professionals. They spend more time on these issues, working with other 
professionals, including staff, listening to testimony given by interest groups or 
representatives from the academy or policy think tanks, and devote more energy 
towards developing plans for implementation. Smart Growth requires considerable 
 
21 “Growing Pains,” (Hirschhorn 2000, 28). 
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knowledge about the intricacies of land use, development, and urban planning, as 
well as related issues dealing with sprawl, the environment, transportation, 
Brownfield redevelopment, and infrastructure design.  
Section 2.5: Data & Methodology 
I will assess the relative importance of various factors accounting for Smart 
Growth adoption in all 50 states. To accomplish this undertaking, the most 
appropriate methodological approach is an Ordered Probit technique to predict the 
impact of political factors on Smart Growth adoption, controlling for socioeconomic 
indicators. The dependent variable is binary, taking on a value of 1 for states that 
have adopted Smart Growth or 0, otherwise. There are four political variables: (1) an 
index of the formal and informal powers of the governor; (2) an index that captures 
the degree of state legislative professionalism; (3) the influence and activity of 
interest groups; and (4) an updated measure of state ideology. There are two 
socioeconomic indicators included as controls: (1) an interaction term that 
incorporates state population density and the number of housing units per square 
mile; and, (2) the percentage of gross state product that consists of real estate 
development. 
Governors 
 Governors have become prominent players in politics within the last few 
decades, especially since most of the governing responsibility has fallen on their 
shoulders. Scholars of gubernatorial politics, most prominently Thad Beyle (1968), 
attempted to capture the essence of both formal and informal powers of governors. 
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Formal powers include the line item veto, a constitutional power that governors can 
use to override legislative budgetary actions. Forty-three of the fifty governors can 
exercise the item veto and do most often on appropriations measures, (542). Other 
most commonly used formal powers are governors’ ability to propose and form the 
budget, appointive powers, and executive control over state agencies through 
executive orders. Executive orders have increased as a management tool or to exert 
control over state agencies (Gromley 1996, 163). Like U.S. presidents, governors’ 
informal powers rest on their ability to persuade.22 Measures of informal powers 
include popular support, media perception, interest group ratings and bargaining skills 
(Miller 1987, 240, Abney and Lauth 1983, Hansen 1989, 57). 
 For this research, I create an index of gubernatorial influence relying on three 
formal power indicators and one measure of informal power. The three formal 
measures of gubernatorial influence are veto power, appointive power, and executive 
orders invoked in the area of economic development. Veto and appointive power data 
are collected from the Books of the States. Data for executive orders are gathered 
from the Council of State Governments’ Book of the States for the election years 
1998, 2000 and 2002.  For each formal measure, a score of 1 indicates that a governor 
has a constitutional authority in the respective area, or coded 0 if the governor does 
not have the authority. For the informal power measure, I consider the percentage of 
votes received in previous election. This data is also easily obtainable from the Book 
of States and the U.S. Statistical Abstract. This informal measure of governor 
influence reflects public approval of the governor during any given election. It is a 
 
22 See namely Richard Neudstadt (1990), Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics 
of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
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widely held belief that popular governors are more effective in directing state policy 
priorities than unpopular executives. 
 
State Legislatures 
 I put forth the argument that the more professional a state legislature is, the 
more influence, knowledge and expertise it has about difficult or complex policy 
issues like Smart Growth. Brace and Weber (1999, 73) offer a useful definition of 
legislative professionalism: “The enhancement of the capacity of the legislature to 
perform its role in the policy making process with an expertise, seriousness, and 
effort comparable to that of other actors.” According to Squire (1997, 420), 
legislative professionalism has increased since the 1960’s.  By the 1980’s, 
professional legislatures outnumbered “citizen” or amateur legislatures. Morris 
Fiorina’s (1994) work has been cited as one of the most thorough investigations of 
legislative professionalism, although it has met with some criticism (Stonecash and 
Agathangelou 1997). Many of the measures that Fiorina and others (Mooney 1995, 
Moncrief et al. 1996, Ritt 1993, Kurtz 1990, 1992) are accepted as reliable indicators 
of professionalism. 
 For this analysis, three of these indicators—days in session, compensation, 
and average number of professional legislative staff—will be included in my index of 
professionalism. The actual number of days in session and the average salary are 
important factors because they explain why state legislatures have become more 
professional since the 1960’s. With more time spent on considering important issues, 
the incentive becomes greater to stay in office if legislators receive a financial reward. 
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Moreover, where there are constitutional restrictions on session length, the degree of 
professionalism is affected. Therefore, I expect that as issues become more complex 
and as decision makers spend more time and effort gathering information, debating 
and making decisions on complex issues, their days in session will increase, along 
with pay. As they continue to spend more time legislating, they become specialized in 
any given subject matter. 
Finally, I will include two variables: the average number of legislators in each 
state assembly and the mean number of professional staff. Legislative staff is vitally 
important because they perform an informational function that often supplements are 
counters that of interest groups.23 It could be worthwhile to see if states with larger 
professional staffs rely less on interest groups than states with smaller staffs. The 
answer could lead to some interesting implications about legislative professionalism 
and interest group influence.  Salary or legislative compensation is another important 
indicator of legislative professionalism. Although it can be argued that legislators 
could be paid more even if they spend less time in session, this is rarely the case in 
reality. To offset this probably, I consider both average compensation and days in 
session. All professionalism measures of the index are created from data collected 
from the National Conference on State Legislature and the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, which updates this data frequently. 
23 For instance, Moncrief et al. notes that studies on the important role that professionalized staffs 




 Interest groups have proliferated at the state level and in recent years, their 
influence on public policy has expanded, whereas political parties’ capacity to 
dominate the political agenda has waned (Gray 1984, Morehouse 1981, Salmore and 
Salmore 1993, 131). Further, as state government responsibilities and the complexity 
of issues increase, so too does lobbying directed at the bureaucracy (Morehouse 1981, 
135; Zeigler 1983, 120) and the state legislature (Hrebrenar and Thomas 1987, 1992; 
Thomas and Hrebrenar 1990). It is very difficult to measure interest group influence 
but attempts have been made.  Gray and Lowery consider interest group influence 
along two dimensions: presence and activity (1988). They find states that have more 
groups also tend to be those states where interest groups are more politically active 
and are more influential. At the congressional level, focus on campaign contributions 
but argue that interest groups are rational actors that avoid spending money on 
contentious issues where they perceive a loss (Wright 1985). 
One more important note to make with regard to interest groups is the very 
interesting finding from LeLoup (1978, 617) that weak legislatures rely more on 
loose ties with political parties rather than interest groups and executive influence.24 
Could the opposite also hold true that weak party politics increases interest group 
strength, especially where state legislatures are more professional?  
 I argue that campaign contributions provide a reliable measure of interest 
group influence (Browne 1985; Grady 1987, 90). The question at hand is whether 




interests? In other words, can businesses or construction companies influence the 
political decision making process through their campaign contributions? Or, has 
environmental interests become adept at persuading legislatures to adopt proposals 
favorable to their cause through their fund-raising efforts? With public opinion on 
their side, conservation groups are bringing awareness to the public about sprawl’s 
negative impact on air, water and land resources. To test the influence of both 
corporate and environmental groups, I include a measure consisting of campaign 
funds to state legislators compiled by the Institute on Money in State Politics, an 
organization that maintains a database on individual and group campaign 
contributions at both the national and state levels.25 
The Continuing Effects of Political Ideology 
In several classic studies, scholars demonstrate the continuing influence and 
enduring impact of political ideology (Erikson et al. 1993; Wright et al. 1987; 
Entman 1983; Nice 1980).  According to these scholars, people do sort themselves 
into a patterned response to various types of policies and those policies themselves 
can be classified along an ideological continuum (Marcus et al. 1974). These works 
also challenge the popular assertion that socioeconomic variables, such as income and 
educational attainment, influence policy decisions independent of political 
considerations. It not only matters that people tend to participate more in politics as 
their income increases; it also matters how citizens’ attitudes about various issues or 
 
25 The National Association of State Development Agencies also keeps records of budget activity from 
state economic development agencies in all 50 states. I could possibly test to see whether agencies and 
corporate interests work in concert based on the regulatory activities of state agencies and the funds 
allocated to that effort. 
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social problems influence the ways in which they participate (Conover and Feldman 
1981).  
 I argue that political ideology has an enduring impact on public policy and 
political outcomes. While people may alter their views on a number of issues, their 
general attitudes toward political objects remain the same. For instance, if an 
individual vehemently believes that individual effort and hard work leads to 
successful lives, he or she is less likely to support increased government spending for 
assistance programs. This fundamentally American belief in individual effort is 
consistently reflected in public opinion polls and attitudes towards various policies. In 
their most recent work, Erikson and his associates (2001) demonstrate that political 
ideology continues to have lasting effects on policy making at the state level. The 
authors compare the variance in the observed ideology scores overtime and find that 
the scores correlate with each other quite nicely at about .82. They show that were 
there is change in ideological dispositions—say, an increase in the proportion of the 
electorate that identifies as moderates—that change is very slight (p. 5). 
In this analysis, I use updated ideology measures from Erikson et al. (2001) 
most recent work on state public opinion. These measures are part of an ongoing 
project that the scholars have undertaken since their seminal Statehouse Democracy 
(1993). These more recent measures data come from an analysis of public opinion 
survey data through 1999. In accordance with Erikson et al.’s derivation, the 
assignment of the scores are based on citizens’ opinions on a number of topics from a 
longitudinal study of CBS/New York Times polls conducted between 1976 through 
1989 and again from 1990 through 1994, and 1995-1999.   
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In their 1993 work, the mean scores indicate the ideological difference 
between liberals and conservatives. A score of –100 is assigned to conservative state 
governments, +100 for each liberal government, and 0 for each moderate or 
independent state government. The mean scores represent the ideological difference 
between liberals and conservatives on a variety of social and economic issues. As the 
authors suggest, the signs are switched in this study to comply with results from their 
state policy indicators.26 Thus, the higher end of the scale reflects the ideological 
leanings of liberals, the lower end reflects conservative support for various policy 
decisions.27 For this analysis, I simply consider a state’s mean conservatism score for 
the years 1995-1999. The lower the score, the more conservative a state is; therefore, 
the scale ranges from the most conservative state, Utah (.22) to the least conservative 
state, Vermont (.68).  Although the scores are really a measure of public opinion, the 
authors show that decision makers are attuned to public sentiment on salient issues, 
and therefore the public opinion measure is an ideal proxy for the overall ideological 
leaning of a state.  
In sum, the results of this study highlight very important conclusions that can 
be drawn about legislative decision making at the state level. First, we can conclude 
that state legislatures are attuned with the policy preferences of their electorate. They 
want to win elections and they know that the only way to do that is to have some idea 
of what their constituents want. We can also conclude that ideology and public 
opinion go hand in hand and have long lasting effects on how decisions are rendered. 
 
26 pp. 136-42. 
27 Ibid. p. 17. 
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The second most important lesson is that ideology and party identification are not one 
and the same. In this analysis, it is demonstrated, quite convincingly, that ideology 
outperforms party variables at all levels and in most of the issue areas. In simpler 
terms, ideology has a greater impact on state decision making than political parties. 
Testing for Socioeconomic Effects 
Two economic indicators will be included in the Probit model as controls—a 
combined term as a measure of state sprawl and the percentage of the gross state 
product from the real estate industry for each state.  I discuss these indicators further 
below: a recurring debate in the Smart Growth controversy is how to address citizen 
discontent with sprawl-related problems.  But the problem is that sprawl itself is a 
perplexing concept that is often difficult to define. Many attempts have been made, 
but sprawl remains an enigma. Some experts maintain that sprawl simply refers to a 
pattern of development that impinges on the quality of life of citizens (American 
Planning Association, 2000a; Sierra Club 1999). Others claim that sprawl is a process 
of growth—an “excessive spatial growth” of cities and outlying suburbs (Brueckner 
2000; Burchell et al. 1999). And still others offer the view that sprawl is any 
condition of development that is aesthetically unpleasing (Antonelli 1999; McAlister 
1999). 
Galster et al. (2000) seem to have uncovered many of the mysteries 
surrounding the sprawl concept. Sprawl is a “condition” that can be empirically 
measured along 8 dimensions: density, continuity, concentration, compactness, 
centrality, nuclearity, diversity, and proximity (pp. 6-7). Sprawl becomes more 
evident as values of these 8 dimensions decrease. Of these, the most popular and 
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widely used measure is density, which is operationalized as the ratio of the total 
population to the total land area; or the ratio of residential units to the total 
developable land.28 Density simply refers to the average number of residents per 
square mile. When density is greater, sprawl is contained; when density is lower, 
sprawl is present. For this research, I create an interactive term that accounts for 
population trends (density or degree of urbanization) and incorporates an indicator of 
sprawl (concentration or dispersed development). It is important to consider these two 
measures because it is quite possible that a community could experience sprawl-
related problems and not be densely populated. It is also possible that a metropolitan 
area might be densely populated and not experience sprawl.29 
I shall also include a measure that identifies the total value of real estate for 
each state. This variable controls for market conditions that dictate land values and 
directly relate to the capacity of the developer industry to locate and invest in a state. 
Since the premise is that states compete for investment, the percentage of gross state 
product originating from the real estate industry will account for the total land value 
that a state has. As computed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the gross state 
product is derived as the sum of the gross state product originating in all industries in 
the state. In concept, an industry’s gross state product or its value added is equal to its 
gross output (sales or receipts and other operating income, commodity taxes, and 
inventory change) minus its intermediate inputs (consumption of goods and services 
 
28 The data on residential and commercial units and developable land is easily obtainable from the U.S. 
Statistical Abstract of the Census Bureau. See also Sierra Club study (1999) and Burchell et al. (1997). 
29 See Remy Prud’homme and Chang-Woon Lee (1999, 1854). See also Downs (2001). 
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purchased from other U.S. industries or imported).30 I will gather this data for the 
years 1998 through 2002.  
Finally, to test the potency of state party systems, I include several party 
indicators as controls. First, I include the party of the governor for the election years 
1998, 2000, and 2002. The National Governor’s Association database provides 
reliable information that is updated for every midterm and general election year. 
Other party variables, such as party control of the state assembly and an index of 
inter-party competition will also be included. Data to construct these variables come 
from the U.S. Statistical Abstract. The Smart Growth issue is unique in that it 
appears not to reflect the conventional partisan inclinations as much as traditional 
regulatory policies do.  
 
Section 2.6: Conclusion: Towards a Coherent Theory of Smart Growth 
This chapter began with a discussion of the debate surrounding Smart Growth 
in the American states. Most observers agree that Smart Growth is a highly charged 
political issue, and despite a sluggish economy and the attention devoted to 
international affairs, sprawl remains an important, albeit elusive issue. Smart Growth 
is controversial primarily because it calls for a drastic change in how states and local 
governments plan for growth and how they address voter discontent with sprawl. 
Governors, state legislators, and interest groups are all important actors in the politics 
of Smart Growth. The decision to pass or reject Smart Growth proposals is best 
explained by how these actors respond to their constituents. However, even though 
 
30 Sharon D. Panek and George K. Downey (June 2002). Gross State Product, 1998-2002, compiled by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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opinion polls show that about 78% of the American public is opposed to sprawl, it is 
not clear as to why some states have not adopted Smart Growth while others have. I 
argue that state political ideology provides an important explanation. Because Smart 
Growth calls for an increasing role for the state, with some regulations imposed on 
the economy, it is likely that more conservative states will be antithetical to Smart 
Growth on those grounds, even if they understand that sprawl is undesirable. In 
contrast, liberal states are more likely to support and pass Smart Growth policies. 
 In the following chapter, I introduce a parsimonious model of Smart Growth 
activity in the states. It will provide an empirical testing of Smart Growth adoption 
for all 50 states to predict the impact of political variables, while testing for 
socioeconomic trends and accounting for various degrees of sprawl-related activity in 
each state. The research question is: What factors account for the adoption of Smart 
Growth in the American States? The dependent variable is dichotomous and 
represents each state’s decision to adopt or not enact Smart Growth policies over a 
five-year period. The variable is coded 1 if a state has enacted statewide, 
comprehensive Smart Growth and 0 if otherwise. About 20 states have adopted and 
implemented a Smart Growth program. Some states are pursuing Smart Growth at the 
local, regional and/or state level but have not fully implemented a statewide 
comprehensive program. These states are coded 0.   
There are four main political independent variables: (1) the relative strength of 
the governor; (2) the degree to which a state has a professional legislature; (3) the 
relative influence of interest groups, represented by campaign contributions from the 
corporate industry and conservation organizations; and (4) state political ideology, a 
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proxy for public opinion that captures how Americans view the proper role of 
government. There are two socioeconomic indicators that will be used as controls: 
population density, or a measure of people per square mile and the proportion of the 
gross state product from real estate, which captures the total land value and thus the 
propensity of developers to invest in a state. Political controls include two party 
variables: the party of the governor, control of each state legislature. In the following 
chapter, the statistical procedures for the model and results from the Probit analysis 
will be presented and discussed. 
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Chapter 3:  Why Smart Growth? An Analysis of Smart Growth Adoption and 
 the Impact of Politics in the American States 
 
In the introductory chapter, I gave an overview of Smart Growth and how the 
controversy over the policy’s impact has changed the discourse of state and local 
politics. In the previous chapter, I offered a theory of Smart Growth adoption and put 
forth a series of arguments in support of that theory. These arguments center on the 
premise that politics matters. In this chapter, I set out to test my theory of Smart 
Growth. Much of the research on Smart Growth activity say very little about the 
influence of politics and seem to be more concerned with developing empirical 
measures of concepts such as sprawl.  I believe that any model of Smart Growth 
activity should include political variables that capture both institutional and 
behavioral aspects of the political process. I have not encountered any work that 
discusses the influence of interest groups or political parties, for example. This is 
surprising, since much of the current research on Smart Growth that has been 
undertaken by organizations, such as the National Governors Association, the Sierra 
Club, the Heritage Foundation, the National Homebuilders Association, and so on, all 
declare that Smart Growth cannot succeed (or fail) without the influence of political 
actors—namely governors, legislatures and various stakeholder groups.   
 In this chapter, I ask why Smart Growth? Why has Smart Growth gained 
popularity and why have some states implemented Smart Growth policies while 
others have not? The central argument is that the decision of policymakers to adopt 
(or reject) Smart Growth is greatly determined by politics and various characteristics 
of state political systems—governmental officials, interest groups, political ideology, 
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culture, and public opinion.  In states where Smart Growth has succeeded, there was a 
political philosophy in place that supported it, interest groups that encouraged it, and 
decision makers who enacted it.  However, Smart Growth decision making in the 
states differs because state political systems differ.  By contrast, in states where Smart 
Growth has been unsuccessful, there is an underlying political ethos that opposed it 
and important actors, such as business interests, that lobby against its passage. A 
Probit analysis of Smart Growth activity demonstrates that political variables, 
particularly ideology and various aspects of institutional structures—governors’ 
formal powers and legislative professionalism—outperform economic factors, such as 
the state of the economy. The sprawl indicator, population density, is also a powerful 
predictor of Smart Growth adoption in the states. 
 Previously, I defined Smart Growth as a package of growth management 
policies that seek to address sprawl related problems in a number of policy issue 
areas, including transportation, housing and the environment. Advocates claim that 
Smart Growth policies combat sprawl by redirecting valuable resources to areas in 
greatest need of economic growth, while containing development where excessive 
growth has taken place. At the same time, however, the goal is to spare land 
development in rural areas and promote open space for parks, recreation and historic 
preservation. 
Smart Growth represents one set of policy solutions that go beyond traditional 
explanations of how the policy process actually works. It is a cross cutting issue with 
no particular partisan cues. In the previous chapter, I reviewed the existing 
scholarship on growth management policies that have been undertaken at the state 
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level. Although there is some existing research on growth management, few political 
scientists mention Smart Growth or investigate the impact of politics on Smart 
Growth adoption.31 This research will attempt to do so. I will demonstrate the impact 
of political variables in predicting Smart Growth enactment in the states. However, 
challenges abound. One of the challenges that this study confronts is how to correctly 
understand which states have actually adopted Smart Growth, since growth measures 
were implemented at the state, regional, and even local levels. The other challenge is 
how to measure Smart Growth in empirical terms. I was able to overcome both 
obstacles for this study. 
Section 3.1: Smart Growth States and the Smart Growth Variable 
As of 2002, twenty states successfully passed a Smart Growth program, 
including Maryland’s “Smart Growth Areas Act (1997),” Arizona’s “Growing Smart” 
acts (1998, 2000) and, most recently, Kentucky’s comprehensive Smart Growth 
legislation to encourage affordable housing construction in distressed urban 
neighborhoods. To correctly identify states with Smart Growth, I relied heavily on the 
American Planning Association’s 2000 and 2002 editions of the State of the States 
report. In addition, the National Conference of State Legislatures established a 
Growth Management Database for up to date Smart Growth activities currently 
taking place at the state level. Other useful tools of information, such as the Smart 
 
31 Borick comes close, but doesn’t look at smart growth enactment. However, he does find that partisan 
control of the state legislatures, public opinion on sprawl issues, and interest group strength, are all 
important factors of land use management policies and growth control initiatives (2001, p. 15). 
Gerber’s analysis (2001) focuses on California as a single case study. She examines local election 
returns to assess voter preferences for land use controls (p. 12). Probably the most widely cited and 
critiqued work on growth management policies from a political science perspective is Myron Orfield’s 
Metropolitics (2002), where the discussion centers on the spatial mismatch of economic resources 
between American suburbs and cities. His discussion of smart growth, in particular, is limited in scope. 
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Growth Network’s on-line Smart Growth journal, the National Center for Policy 
Analysis State and Local Issues section, and Smart Growth America, served as useful 
sources for state and regional Smart Growth initiatives. Finally, a content analysis of 
actual state growth management laws from 1995 to the present helped develop my 
classification scheme and provided as accurate picture as possible of Smart Growth 
activity taking place in the states. 
 Once I was able to correctly identify and classify the Smart Growth and no-
Smart Growth states, I created the binary dependent variable, where a state is coded 1 
if it passed Smart Growth and a 0 for a state without Smart Growth. I decided to focus 
solely on state-level growth management activity rather than regional or local Smart 
Growth measures, due mostly to the availability of information, but also because of 
the growing movement to centralize land-use planning at the state level—a movement 
that is not only controversial, but also has important political implications for state 
and local relations. These implications will be explored at a later stage. 
TABLE 3.1 
PROFILES OF SMART GROWTH STATES 
STATE 
Key Smart Growth 
Legislation & Year(s) 
Enacted 
SMART GROWTH POLICY AREAS 
ADDRESSED 
Arizona 
Growing Smarter Act, 
1998; Growing Smarter 
Plus, 2000; H.B. 2105, 
2002 
Infill development; priority funding areas; 
service boundaries; rural planning areas; 
historic preservation; relax development fees 
Colorado 
H.B. 1427, H.B. 1348, 
2000; H.B. 1001; 
Amendment 24, 2001; 
H.B. 1306, 2002 
Designation of heritage communities; historic 
preservation; technical assistance with local 
master plans; UGB's; state-leveraged bonds 
for the acquisition of land for preservation 




PROFILES OF SMART GROWTH STATES 
STATE 
Key Smart Growth 
Legislation & Year(s) 
Enacted 
SMART GROWTH POLICY AREAS 
ADDRESSED 
Connecticut 
Public Act 203, 2000; 
Public Act 01-117, 2001; 
Public Act 01-158, 2002 
Regional approaches (revenue sharing); 
Protected Open Space and Watershed Land 
Acquisition Grant Program 
Delaware H.B. 255; S.B. 105; H.B. 235; H.B. 1, 2001 
Brownfield redevelopment; historic 
preservation; impact/developer fees 
Florida 
H.B. 17, Chapter 378, 
1999; Forever Florida FL 
Stat. Ann. 201.15 
Extends landmark 1985 State Comprehensive 
Growth Management laws authorizing 
municipalities to designate urban infill and 
redevelopment areas; expansion of UGB's; 
lower transportation impact fees 
Kentucky 
H.B. 55, 2000; H.B. 524; 
H.B. 924; H.B. 523; H.B. 
521; H. B. 104; H.J.R. 
107, 2001 
Tax credits for historic preservation projects; 
affordable housing construction in distressed 
neighborhoods; technical assistance to 
municipalities on planning issues 
Maine 
Chapter 776, 2000; ME 
Rev. Stat. Ann., Title 5, 
620 
Limits growth-related capital investments to 
designated areas; requires state agencies to 
reward municipalities for reallocating growth 
resources to most critical areas; financial 
incentives for downtown revitalization 
projects 
Maryland 
Smart Growth Areas Act, 
1997; H.B. 285, S.B. 207; 
H.B. 889, S.B. 507, 2000; 
S.B. 204, 2000; H.B. 
1379, Code Ann., NR 5-
9A-01, 2001 
Priority funding areas; service boundaries; 
rural legacy program; historic preservation; 
developer fees; tax abatements for directing 
rehabilitation efforts to distressed 
communities; land conservation easements; 
job creation tax credits 
Massachusetts 
H.B. 4866, 2000; 
Community Preservation 
Act, S.B. 739, 2001 
Focuses on greenspace and open space 
preservation; tax credit to developers for 
construction of affordable housing units in 
distressed areas 




Planning Act, 2000 
Greenspace protection; financial incentives to 




PROFILES OF SMART GROWTH STATES 
STATE 
Key Smart Growth 
Legislation & Year(s) 
Enacted 
SMART GROWTH POLICY AREAS 
ADDRESSED 
New Hampshire 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann., 
227-M: 1 et. Seq.; Smart 
Growth Bill, 2000 
Brownfield clean-up, revitalization; 
greenspace protection; Land & Community 
Heritage Investment Program for transfer 
developer rights 
New Jersey 
State Planning Act, New 
Jersey Future Act, 1998; 
Chapter 152, 1999; H.J.R. 
15, 2000 
State generated revenue from sales tax over 
10 years to purchase land for farmland and 
historic preservation; $1 billion tax-exempt 
bonds to finance open space projects 
Oregon Land Conservation and Development Act 
Greenspace protection; urban growth 
boundaries; incentives to promote high 
density, mixed-use developments; multi-
modal transportation schemes 
Pennsylvania Acts 67, 68, 2000 
Priority funding areas; Brownfield 
redevelopment; expanding agricultural and 
farmland preservation; tax revenue sharing; 
transfer developer rights from rural to 
designated growth funds 
Rhode Island 
Comprehensive Planning 
and Land Use Regulation 
Act, 2000 
Brownfield remediation; historic preservation 
Tennessee 
Growth Policy Act, 1999; 
TN Code Ann. 6-58-101, 
2001 
Urban growth boundaries; planned growth 
areas; rural legacy and protection programs; 
local plans must be consistent with state 
Smart Growth and management priorities 
Utah Utah Future, 2000 Greenspace, rural legacy programs; establish quality growth areas for conservation efforts 
Washington Growth Management Act, 2000 
Institutes developer fees an incentive to 
promote growth in designated areas 
Wisconsin WI Law, Act 9, 1999 
Greenspace, open space protection; mixed-
use, high density development; urban infill; 
Live Near Your Work program; tax increment 
financing to encourage affordable housing 
construction in designated critical areas 
Sources: National Conference of State Legislatures, "Growth Management Legislative Databank"; 
American Planning Association ("Planning for Smart Growth: 2002 State of the States"); relevant state 
laws and statutes. 
Section 3.2: Ideology 
 Liberal state governments are more likely to pursue and enact Smart Growth 
measures. Conservative states are less likely to do so. Political scientists have long 
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sought to come up with empirical depictions of political ideology: Walker’s (1969) 
classic study of policy innovation as an expression of state policy liberalism; Gray’s 
(1973) follow-up study on innovation; Sigelman and Smith’s (1980) research on 
consumer protection regulations; Elazar’s (1984) seminal work on political culture, 
which is widely used as a source to derive measures of state ideology32; and Erikson 
et al. (1995) research on the association between public opinion and political 
ideology.33 Research on ideology at the state level and its impact on policy outcomes 
are plentiful and too numerous to list here. But the use of public opinion surveys, in 
particular, seems to be popular in the quest for measuring political ideology. Two 
recent studies are worth mentioning here. First, Brace et al. (2002), like Erikson’s 
study (1993, 2001), rely on national survey data to derive ideology measures for all 
50 states. Specifically, Brace and his colleagues examine citizen responses to the 
General Social Survey (GSS) on a variety of controversial topics, including gay rights 
and capital punishment. The researchers find that disaggregated measures of public 
opinion best captures state political ideology. 
 Like Brace, Erikson and his colleagues rely on responses from public opinion 
polls to derive their measure of ideology. Specifically, they examine constituent 
 
32 See Rodney E. Hero and Caroline J. Tolbert. 1996. “A Racial/Ethnic Interpretation of Politics and 
Policy in the States of the U.S.” American Journal of Political Science. 40: 851-71. The authors rely 
on Elazar’s political culture typology to derive state measures of political ideology for their analysis of 
policy adoption in the state. 
33 See also studies of state legislative voting behaviors (Kemp 1981) and particularly, Klingman and 
Lammers (1984). Klingman and Lammers examine roll call votes on a host of controversial issues to 
generate measures of state policy liberalism. The issues range from civil rights, AFDC or welfare 
payments, and ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (p. 601). Not surprisingly, New York, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, California, Connecticut and Wisconsin ranked at the top of the list in 
terms of policy liberalism; while North Carolina, Georgia, South Carolina, Arkansas, and Mississippi 
rank near the bottom. They find that policy liberalism is related to state variation in political culture, 
controlling for socioeconomic effects (p. 605). 
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responses to the CBS/New York Times survey overtime. Based on the survey results, 
Erikson and his colleagues developed a measure to classify states along the 
ideological continuum. The measure ranges from 0 to 1, where states with lower 
scores identified as conservative and states with higher scores identified as liberal 
(1993, 79). I use the mean ideology score for each state for the years 1998 through 
2002.  The most conservative state is Utah, with a mean ideology score of 28%, and 
the most liberal state is Vermont, with a score of 66%.34 In Utah, 44% of respondents 
identify as conservative and 16% identify as liberal. In Massachusetts, 28% of 
respondents consider themselves conservative and 27%, liberal (with 44% classifying 
themselves as moderate).35 The purpose of the Erikson study was to demonstrate a 
linkage between public opinion and political ideology. And in fact, they find that state 
political opinion is highly associated with state ideology (1993, 80). Therefore, we 
can rely on these public opinion measures to capture state ideology. 
 Smart Growth reflects the ideological philosophy that government has an 
important role in managing growth. Therefore, I expect liberals to agree that the state 
ought to pass land use policies that often involve regulatory mandates to curb 
excessive growth or sprawl. To be sure, liberal states are more inclined to adopt 
Smart Growth than conservative states. Since conservatives tend to perceive Smart 
Growth as an attempt to slow growth or stop it altogether, I expect to see conservative 
states reject such measures. 
Section 3.3: Governor and State Legislatures  
 In states where governors have strong formal and informal powers, Smart 
Growth is more likely to be successfully enacted. Institutional powers of governors 
reflect their constitutional ability to direct policy and influence political outcomes 
 
35 The signs are reversed to correspond with their state policy variables (p. 17). 
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(Gromley 1996, Beyle 1968).  The degree of formal authority varies from state to 
state.  This authority includes budgetary powers, the ability to appoint executive 
agency heads and other non-elected officials, veto power, and tenure in office.36 
Based on these characteristics, Thad Beyle (2000) created a typology of governor 
strength that has become a hallmark of presidential scholarship. According to his 
classification, governors in states like Arkansas, Massachusetts and Tennessee have 
strong constitutional powers. Governors in Colorado, Virginia and Washington have 
moderate formal powers, and Alabama and Texas rank near the bottom on the 
gubernatorial power scale.  
 
36 There are no tenure restrictions for governors in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, 
Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming, and governors serve a four-year term. Governors in New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont serve two-year terms, but there are no electoral restrictions 




FORMAL POWERS OF STATE GOVERNORS 
STRONG MODERATE WEAK 
Arkansas Alaska Alabama 
Connecticut Arizona Maine 
Hawaii California Nevada 
Kansas Colorado New Hampshire 
Maryland Delaware New Mexico 
Massachusetts Florida North Carolina 
Minnesota Georgia Oklahoma 
Nebraska Idaho Rhode Island 
New Jersey Illinois South Carolina 
New York Indiana Texas 
Oregon Iowa Vermont 
Tennessee Kentucky  
Utah Louisiana  




North Dakota  
Ohio  
Pennsylvania  





Source: Adapted from Thaddeus L. Beyle, “Governors,” in Politics in the American States, 10 ed., Virginia 
Gray et al. (Scott, Foreman and Company, 2000). 
 
Note: Categories reflect variations of gubernatorial influence based on budgetary powers, appointive 
powers, veto powers and tenure. 
For the most part, however, governors have considerable influence on the 
policy process through the use of their formal powers. In fact, a handful of prominent 
governors exercised their executive authority to set the Smart Growth agenda by 
establishing state commissions on growth management and Smart Growth task forces, 
most notably in Maryland, New Jersey and more recently, California (Smart Growth 
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Network, 2002).  The following table provides examples of where governors have 
used their formal authority to direct Smart Growth action in their respective state.37 
TABLE 3.3 
EXAMPLES OF GOVERNOR USE OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS  






Arizona 2001-2002 Establishes a “Growing Smarter” commission and oversight council. 
California No. 0-46-01 Infill development, urban revitalization. 
Delaware No. 14 Directs state agencies to encourage “sprawl busting” regulations. 
Illinois No. 2000-8 Open space and farmland preservation; restoring decaying architecture and Brownfields 
Indiana No. 01-03 Establishes the Indiana Land Use symposium. 
Maryland 
No. 01-01.1998.04, 
No. 2001-01, No. 
01.01.2003.33 
Establishes the Commission on Environmental Justice and 
Sustainable Communities; public school construction & 
renovation; extension priority funding areas or Maryland 
Priority Places 
Massachusetts No. 418 Community development, urban revitalization issues. 
Missouri No. 01-46, No. 01-19  
Establishes the Missouri Commission on Intergovernmental 
Cooperation. 
Oregon No. 00-07 Emphasizes environmental protection; open land preservation. 
Tennessee 2002 Targeted Areas; Priority Funding Areas; Brownfield Redevelopment. 
Vermont No. 01-00, No. 01-07 Directs the establishment of a Development agency. 
Sources: American Planning Association (2002); National Council of State Legislatures  (2001, 2002) 
Governors also control state legislative agendas through the budgetary process 
or by exercising the line-item veto to prevent state legislatures from acting on their 
own accord. My measures of institutional powers include four variables: budget-
 
37 The American Planning Association points out various alternative approaches to smart growth 
enactment. A governor can either enact by executive order, where the state legislature is excluded (has 
taken place in California under former governor, Gray Davis and also in Kentucky by Governor Paul 
Patton). The governor can also submit plans to the state legislature for approval and the state either 
passes or rejects legislation (Maryland). Alternatively, the governor can submit a plan, which doesn’t 
become effective until the legislature adopts (occurs more often than not). A state board or commission 
adopts a smart growth plan, or a state agency adopts a plan, which excludes both the governor and the 
legislature in the adoption process. For the latter two adoptive procedures, the enactment of smart 
growth implies that both governor and the legislature have weak institutional powers. See Growing 
Smart Legislative Guidebook, 2002 Edition. 
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making authority, executive order to direct state agencies in the areas of growth 
management and development, governor item veto authority, and appointive powers. 
Each variable is dichotomous, coded 1 if the governor has the authority to exercise 
that power as deemed by the state constitution, and 0 if otherwise. 
 Informal powers include the governor’s ability to affect public opinion 
through political persuasion.  There is not only a rising expectation that governors 
manage their administrative agencies effectively, they must also earn the respect of 
those for whom they lead in government and among the citizenry at large. Public 
perception of a governor may affect the way in which she is able to influence public 
policy and achieve her policy priorities. Unpopular governors have a harder time 
building coalitions around issues they support.  When things go wrong—a downturn 
in the economy, for instance—an unpopular governor is most likely to be held 
accountable at the polls, whether it is her fault or not. For these reasons, I also include 
a measure of popularity that is based on the percentage vote that a governor received 
in the previous election. The vote percentages are compiled from the U.S. Statistical 
Abstract and collected for the election years of 1998, 2000, and 2002. 
Section 3.4: Legislative Professionalism in the State Assembly 
The process of state-level professionalism is rooted in legislative reforms that 
have taken place over the course of the last three decades. Of the many changes that 
occurred, constitutional limitations on session length were abolished, caps on 
legislative compensation were also done away with, and state legislatures witnessed 
greater budget and decision making authority (Moncrief and Thompson 1992, 15).38 
38 See most prominently, Polsby’s (1968) exploration of the modernization process in the U.S. House 
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In addition, as legislatures modernized and casework demands became greater, they 
began to employ part- and full-time staff. Legislative staffing has had the greatest 
impact on legislative professionalism because state representatives and senators could 
rely on inside personnel rather than outside groups or administrative bureaucracies for 
specialized information. As advancements were made in science and technology and 
social problems grew in complexity, governing became a full-time enterprise, 
decision makers spent more time in session, and staff members obtained professional 
or advanced degrees (p. 30).  
Today, the average legislative session length ranges from 30 days (Alabama) 
to 285 days (California). The average number of professionalized staff varies from 10 
staff members per legislator (North Dakota) to 2,065 per legislator (California). The 
National Conference of State Legislatures and the Council of State Governments 
provide a classification of states in terms of degree of legislative professionalism. Not 
surprisingly, the legislatures in California, New York and Pennsylvania are among 
the most professionalized in the country. That is, their members and staff are full-time 
employees, and these states rank among the top in terms of legislative compensation, 
budget authority, and average professionalized staff. In contrast, amateur legislatures 
 
of Representatives over the last century. He also focuses on reforms that took place at the 
congressional level, a similar “institutionalization” occurred at the state level beginning in the 1960. 
Like their congressional counterparts, state legislators are finding that the legislative career at the state 
level is more attractive in the long run.  State representatives enjoy the perks of the office and 
relaxation on salary caps means that they can also enjoy a very lucrative career serving in the state 
legislature. See “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives,” in the American 
Political Science Review, pp. 642-1474. A more recent study of legislative professionalism by Cherie 
Maestas, L. Sandy Maisel, and Walter J. Stone, “Stepping Up or Stopping? Candidate Emergence 
Among State Legislators.” Paper prepared for the Annual Southwest Political Science Association 
meetings in San Antonio, TX, April 1-4, 1999.
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include Kansas, Mississippi, Rhode Island and Utah. Table 3.4 below gives a 
typology of state legislature types.39 
TABLE 3.4 
PROFESSIONAL, HYBRID, AND AMATEUR STATE LEGISLATURES, 2002 
PROFESSIONAL HYBRID AMATEUR 
Alaska Arkansas Idaho 
California Arizona Indiana 
Illinois Colorado Kansas 
Florida Connecticut Maine 
Massachusetts Delaware Mississippi 
Michigan Hawaii Nevada 
New Jersey Iowa New Hampshire 
New York Kentucky North Dakota 
Ohio Louisiana New Mexico 
Pennsylvania Maryland Rhode Island 
Wisconsin Missouri South Dakota 
Nebraska Utah 
North Carolina Vermont 
Oklahoma West Virginia 
Oregon Wyoming 





Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, Council of State Government, Book of the States,
2002 Edition 
I hypothesize that states with professional legislatures are more likely to adopt 
Smart Growth policies. The more specialized a state legislature is, the more influence 
it can exert on the policy making process (Gromley 1996, Miller 1987). Growth 
management is considered a very complex issue that requires considerable time, 
knowledge, and expertise.  But to get a grasp on these challenges requires extensive 
time and effort devoted to research. The accumulation of knowledge and expertise is 
 
39 Note: Categories reflect variations of full-time/part-time legislatures; legislative compensation; 
budget authority; average staff per member.  
70 
 
important; therefore, the more specialized a state legislature is, the more likely it is to 
tackle complex issues and institute innovative policy solutions.  
So, how does one go about making a compelling case that legislative 
professionalism matters in terms of influencing policy outcomes? We can rely on 
some measure of professionalism, or what Rosenthal (1996) refers to as the “five S’s 
of state legislative professionalism”—staff size, average size of the general assembly, 
session length, member salary, and legislative structure.40 I consider three of these: 
professionalized staff, average days in session or session length, and member salary 
or compensation.41 
Section 3.5: Interest Groups 
Political parties are important players in the decision making process, but they 
are neither as prominent, nor are they more politically influential as interest groups 
are when it comes to Smart Growth.  In Chapter 2, I discussed the role of various 
groups that are the central players in the Smart Growth movement—namely 
environmental or conservation organizations and pro-business interests, including 
 
40 “State Legislative Development: Observations from Three Perspectives.” Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 21 (2): 169-198. 
41 Future research might want to investigate a possible relationship between legislative professionalism 
and policy innovation or “progressiveness.” First, Walker (1969) examined a host of state reform 
proposals that were adopted over the course of several legislative cycles. He found that states with 
wealthier budgets and more professionalized legislatures were more likely to adopt liberal or 
progressive (innovative) public policies than smaller, poorer states. Gray (1973) expanded on Walker’s 
earlier work, looking at fewer issues, but confirming Walker’s conclusions. Together, Gray and 
Walker (1997) continue their work on policy diffusions and conclude that policy liberalism is highly 
correlated with state legislative professionalism. Their work might lend further credence to the 
argument that structural variables do make a difference in terms of passing liberal or progressive 
public policies. Although there have been some attempts from political scientists—myself included—
there are no systematic studies yet on the policy of diffusions of land use or growth management 
policies. Smart growth is still pretty much in its infant stage, making it difficult to conduct any 
meaningful study of diffusion. 
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construction and real estate groups. I argued that groups exert pressure on the political 
process through campaign contributions. In other words, groups influence policy 
outcomes through strategic use of campaign contributions. I hypothesize that 
environmental groups will use funding resources as a tool to influence state 
legislatures to adopt Smart Growth.  
Pro-business industries spend money to mobilize and organize against Smart 
Growth passage. Based on the policy subsystem theory proposed by Browne (1987) 
and supported by Opheim (1990), states with strong business lobbies exert pressure 
on state agencies and legislatures to reduce their regulatory burden and discourage the 
enactment of legislation that places restrictions on free market enterprise.  To this 
end, they spend money to block legislation that involves government intervention in 
the economy (Gerber 1998). States with strong corporate groups are likely to 
influence state legislatures to reject Smart Growth policies through counteractive 
strategies that involve campaign contributions.  At the congressional level, data on 
campaign contributions is plentiful and easily accessible, but not so at the state level. 
The Institute for Money in State Politics maintains a database for electoral 
contributions for various state offices. I collected this data for the election years 1998, 
2000 and 2002.  Tables 3.4 and 3.5 (below) provide campaign data from both 




CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS TO STATE LEGISLATORS, 1998-2002* 
1998  2000  2002 
State # Total  State # Total  State # Total 
Alabama 32 $21,050 Alabama 4 $3,100 Alabama 23 $36,860 
Alaska 53 $13,995 Alaska 6 $1,575 Alaska 13 $4,050 
Arizona 43 $7,140 Arizona 12 $1,761 Arizona 24 $6,525 
Arkansas -- --  Arkansas 10 $3,700 Arkansas 5 $687 
California 134 $130,625 California 47 $149,075 California 52 $92,527 
Colorado 5 $595 Colorado 5 $2,650 Colorado 3 $225 
Connecticut 149 $36,555 Connecticut 37 $6,625 Connecticut 64 $26,460 
Delaware -- --  Delaware 8 $6,600 Delaware -- -- 
Florida 259 $96,627 Florida 85 $36,050 Florida 31 $21,975 
Georgia 44 $63,840 Georgia 6 $1,700 Georgia 17 $43,256 
Hawaii 35 $31,350 Hawaii 2 $2,875 Hawaii 1 $1,000 
Idaho 12 $4,940 Idaho -- --  Idaho 47 $2,422 
Illinois 66 $80,000 Illinois 68 $89,859 Illinois 142 $127,430 
Indiana 22 $8,633 Indiana 35 $57,650 Indiana 17 $19,325 
Iowa 8 $2,100 Iowa -- --  Iowa 44 $92,408 
Kansas 4 $2,050 Kansas 2 $300 Kansas 22 $19,472 
Kentucky 3 $600 Kentucky 5 $5,000 Kentucky 1 $400 
Louisiana -- --  Louisiana -- --  Louisiana 1 $500 
Maine 26 $5,265 Maine 4 $1,000 Maine 6 $1,350 
Massachusetts 153 $43,675 Massachusetts 124 $31,487 Massachusetts 77 $48,580 
Michigan 99 $70,016 Michigan 4 $26,300 Michigan 6 $1,350 
Minnesota 14 $5,500 Minnesota 18 $2,106 Minnesota 17 $19,100 
Mississippi -- --  Mississippi -- --  Mississippi -- -- 
Missouri 30 $17,850 Missouri 31 $24,916 Missouri 17 $19,100 
Montana 18 $1,215  Montana 24 $3,031 Montana 8 $635 
Nebraska -- --  Nebraska -- --  Nebraska 10 $2,800 
Nevada 5 $7,777 Nevada 9 $47,000 Nevada 5 $25,000 
New Hampshire 18 $7,250 New Hampshire 10 $5,700 New Hampshire 9 $3,125 
New Mexico 62 $14,610 New Mexico 31 $6,230 New Mexico 23 $44,759 
New York 117 $84,570 New York 46 $13,603 New York 13 $6,850 
North Carolina 19 $4,090 North Carolina 17 $7,300 North Carolina 5 $1,150 
North Dakota -- --  North Dakota -- --  North Dakota -- -- 
Ohio 82 $30,445 Ohio 57 $19,454 Ohio 6 $2,200 
Oklahoma -- --  Oklahoma -- --  Oklahoma -- -- 
Oregon 18 $2,510 Oregon 23 $2,613 Oregon 19 $3,765 
Pennsylvania 15 $30,900 Pennsylvania 38 $53,955 Pennsylvania 13 $121,450 
Rhode Island 7 $5,141 Rhode Island 12 $3,800 Rhode Island 7 $7,000 
South Carolina 21 $17,650  South Carolina 23 $19,393  South Carolina 54 $60,750 




CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS TO STATE LEGISLATORS, 1998-2002* 
1998  2000  2002 
State # Total  State # Total  State # Total 
Tennessee 6 $5,150  Tennessee 1 $1,000  Tennessee 9 $6,200 
Texas 73 $69,418  Texas 36 $13,800  Texas 30 $37,364 
Utah -- --  Utah 11 $20,800  Utah 1 $250 
Vermont 1 $500  Vermont 4 $2,800  Vermont 5 $3,200 
Washington 55 $7,536  Washington 119 $22,413  Washington 8 $1,700 
West Virginia 1 $500  West Virginia 9 $5,075  West Virginia -- -- 
Wisconsin 80 $22,548  Wisconsin 25 $5,360  Wisconsin 19 $5,520 
Wyoming -- --  Wyoming -- --  Wyoming -- -- 
* Groups include all state and local-level conservation entities and environmental special interests. 
-- Data was unreported for this year. 




CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES TO STATE LEGISLATORS, 1998-2002 
1998  2000  2002 
State # Total  State # Total  State # Total 
Alabama 2,297 $2,737,091 Alabama 238 $473,992 Alabama 1,004 $1,494,912 
Alaska 827 $238,923 Alaska 493 $170,219 Alaska 1,143 $210,666 
Arizona 2,052 $519,970 Arizona 694 $107,769 Arizona 848 $289,575 
Arkansas 3,311 $4,952,738 Arkansas 673 $185,979 Arkansas 6,219 $6,788,119 
California 791 $152,305 California 3,593 $3,466,902 California 752 $427,598 
Colorado 3,436 $1,304,591 Colorado 721 $267,432 Colorado 1,473 $418,613 
Connecticut 7,263 $2,459,567 Connecticut 875 $143,147 Connecticut 214 $67,440 
Delaware 3,981 $3,315,139 Delaware 655 $283,198 Delaware 6,403 $2,312,766 
Florida 2,844 $2,142,652 Florida 6,900 $2,261,200 Florida 1,614 $1,719,951 
Georgia 701 $292,399 Georgia 2,266 $1,080,981 Georgia 172 $89,127 
Hawaii 5,004 $4,279,256 Hawaii 138 $42,150 Hawaii 3,419 $4,163,388 
Idaho 1,494 $745,643 Idaho 218 $69,333 Idaho 426 $435,397 
Illinois 1,785 $761,120 Illinois 4,226 $3,510,677 Illinois 243 $93,063 
Indiana 1,228 $364,265 Indiana 2,059 $2,098,272 Indiana 813 $355,132 
Iowa 895 $351,840 Iowa 1,305 $681,350 Iowa 246 $142,500 
Kansas 65 $70,704 Kansas 1,211 $405,022 Kansas 305 $78,370 
Kentucky 908 $170,484 Kentucky 1,058 $527,393 Kentucky 2,010 $913,266 
Maine 3,819 $1,666,857 Maine 322 $51,271 Maine 4,691 $1,339,239 
Massachusetts 4,385 $1,360,524 Massachusetts 3,275 $726,668 Massachusetts 2,838 $1,262,160 
Michigan 3,186 $1,474,728 Michigan 1,232 $643,193 Michigan 86 $43,525 
Minnesota 543 $245,842 Minnesota 346 $93,705 Minnesota 68 $45,400 
Mississippi 3,602 $673,400 Mississippi 32 $56,125 Mississippi 1,157 $284,570 
Missouri 590 $45,823 Missouri 4,903 $1,891,833 Missouri 602 $49,896 
Montana 714 $505,363 Montana 1,722 $205,711 Montana 66 $136,086 
Nebraska 403 $99,305 Nebraska 42 $26,910 Nebraska 797 $1,039,707 
Nevada 1,078 $508,059 Nevada 581 $454,161 Nevada 151 $96,026 
New 
Hampshire 3,044 $2,362,837 
New 
Hampshire 457 $183,708 
New 
Hampshire 704 $591,765 
New Mexico 1,883 $871,950 New Mexico 666 $193,575 New Mexico 2,554 $1,979,488 
New York 15 $2,500 New York 2,238 $1,255,281 New York 361 $226,645 
North Carolina 6,133 $2,562,403 North Carolina 4,405 $2,704,131 North Carolina 5 $3,400 
North Dakota 2,652 $1,194,455 North Dakota 39 $75,875 North Dakota 2,188 $1,006,452 
Ohio 1,982 $956,370 Ohio 4,288 $1,781,404 Ohio 1,706 $661,877 
Oklahoma 423 $162,340 Oklahoma 1,059 $317,650 Oklahoma 1,365 $1,646,402 
Oregon 1,189 $891,221 Oregon 1,555 $868,566 Oregon 2,289 $3,255,975 
Pennsylvania 1,440 $1,183,417 Pennsylvania 3,172 $1,804,334 Pennsylvania 259 $244,045 
Rhode Island 2,812 $3,494,722 Rhode Island 125 $39,552 Rhode Island 133 $95,360 
South Carolina 131 $41,312 South Carolina 1,121 $445,389 South Carolina 2,237 $3,681,100 
South Dakota 186 $58,885 South Dakota 152 $32,345 South Dakota 52 $13,870 




CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES TO STATE LEGISLATORS, 1998-2002 
1998  2000  2002 
State # Total  State # Total  State # Total 
Texas 372 $140,218 Texas 3,043 $2,763,757 Texas 302 $134,400 
Utah 3,618 $1,169,091 Utah 198 $70,868 Utah 1,934 $904,066 
Vermont 63 $29,000 Vermont 183 $40,025 Vermont 61 $31,500 
Washington 3,667 $1,113,021 Washington 3,688 $1,134,071 Washington 3,687 $1,211,564 
West Virginia 1,290 $744,730  West Virginia 1,296 $753,759 West Virginia 1,297 $761,245 
Wisconsin 3,431 $900,321  Wisconsin 3,431 $942,242 Wisconsin 3,431 $982,412 
Wyoming 57 $16,534  Wyoming 58 $17,200 Wyoming 59 $19,800 
Source: National Institute for Money In State Politics database, www.moneyinstatepolitics.org 
Section 3.6: Smart Growth and the Role of Political Parties 
An interesting observation is that political parties do not appear to have a 
significant impact on the passage or rejection of Smart Growth policies in the states. 
But there is a larger question of whether or not parties even matter at all in terms of 
influencing policy outcomes. Some say yes (Brown 1995; Morehouse and Jewell 
2002; Smith 1997), others argue that political parties have little or no impact on 
policy decisions (Berry and Berry 1994; Dilger 1998; Winters and Plotnick 1976). 
And still others conclude that party influence is conditional at best (Dye 1984; 
Erikson et al. 1993; Barrilleaux 2000).42 I want to know whether or not public 
policies enacted at the state level reflect the ideological dispositions of political 
 
42 Barrilleaux, in accordance with the traditional Downsian argument, contends that in the absence of 
electoral competition, Democrats behave more sincerely, pushing policy to the left while Republicans 
will enact conservative policies. However, when confronted with competitive political opposition, 
Democrats will move to the right while Republicans drift to the left in an attempt to appeal to 
mainstream voters (p. 62). This argument falls in line with Erikson et al.’s assertion that Democrats 
tend to behave in a less liberal manner when confronted with a Republican majority. Dye’s (1984) 
classic 30-year analysis of AFDC benefits in the states concludes that party control only mattered in 20 
states, and is further conditioned on the party of the governor and the budgetary powers at his or her 
disposal (p. 1106). This particular analysis doesn’t consider party competition. I thought that it would 
be more appropriate to consider party control as a variable, since I want to test the assumption that 
Democrats will pass more liberal public policies while Republicans enact more conservative policies. 
Since I found that smart growth is portrayed—fairly or otherwise—as a liberal policy, I want to know 
if Democratic-controlled legislatures will have any impact on its passage. 
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parties. In other words, will Democratic-controlled governments pass more liberal 
policies? Will Republican-controlled assemblies enact more conservative public 
policies? When it comes to Smart Growth—widely depicted as a liberal or 
progressive policy reform—will Democrats move to enact while Republicans reject?   
 While there has been much scholarship on party organizations at the national 
level, there is still more work to be done at the state and local levels with regard to 
understanding state party systems. The following table gives a breakdown of 
Democratic and Republican-controlled legislatures from 1980-2002. It also provides a 
measure of party competition. We are interested only in party control, where higher 
percentages reflect Democratic-controlled legislatures and lower numbers indicate 
Republican-controlled legislatures.  From the table results, there does not appear to be 
a patterned relationship between Democratic-controlled legislatures and Smart 
Growth passage (denoted with an asterisk beside the state) or Republican-controlled 
legislatures and rejection of Smart Growth. Although Maryland has a highly 
Democratic legislature and has passed Smart Growth, Arkansas, which ranks second 
in terms of Democratic control of the legislature, does not have a Smart Growth 
program. At the other end of the spectrum, New Hampshire, which has one of the 
most Republican-dominated legislatures and a Republican governor, has a Smart 








Controlled States Party Control Party Competition
Maryland* 80.5 692 
Arkansas 77.1 708 
Hawaii 78.0 713 
Georgia 77.0 723 
Louisiana 75.5 735 
Mississippi 75.3 742 
West Virginia 74.2 746 
Rhode Island* 74.0 751 
Massachusetts* 72.1 766 
Kentucky* 72.5 771 
Alabama 72.5 774 
North Carolina 67.0 828 
Oklahoma 65.0 836 
South Carolina 62.3 874 
Missouri 62.3 874 
Virginia 62.1 878 
New Mexico 62.1 879 
Tennessee* 60.0 884 




Party Control Party Competition
California 59.0 905 
Washington* 59.0 906 
Minnesota* 59.0 908 
Florida* 57.0 923 
Nevada* 57.0 923 
Connecticut* 57.0 923 
Maine* 54.5 951 
Oregon* 54.0 958 










Party Control Party Competition
New York 52.0 977 
Wisconsin* 52.0 980 




Party Control Party Competition
Illinois 48.0 983 
Michigan* 48.0 980 
Iowa 46.0 969 




Party Control Party Competition
New Jersey* 45.0 957 
Indiana 44.0 942 
Montana 44.0 941 
Ohio 44.0 941 
Pennsylvania* 43.0 939 
Colorado* 38.0 940 
Republican-
Controlled States Party Control Party Competition
North Dakota 37.0 879 
Arizona* 35.0 852 
Wyoming 35.0 850 
New Hampshire* 33.0 835 
Kansas 33.0 831 
Idaho 30.0 808 
South Dakota 27.1 772 
Utah* 20.0 751 
Source: Adapted by Morehouse and Jewell (2003, 108-9).  
 
Note: Party control numbers vary slightly from authors' 
calculation due to the addition of 2002 data. 
*States with a comprehensive Smart Growth programs. 
In the case of Smart Growth, the assumption that Democrats might be more 
willing to pass Smart Growth policies rests on the notion that Smart Growth has a 
liberal dimension. I argue that it does, but that Democrats as well as Republicans are 
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equally as likely to endorse, adopt or reject Smart Growth. In other words, when it 
comes to Smart Growth, there really is no partisan divide. This claim can be tested 
empirically. To demonstrate my point, I included party control variables for the state 
legislatures for the election years 1998-2002. I also include a binary measure for the 
party of the governor, where a 1 is coded for a Democratic governor, and 0 otherwise.  
Section 3.7: Measuring Sprawl and Making the Connection with Smart Growth 
 There have been many attempts at defining sprawl in terms of subjective 
judgments about its harmful impacts on the environment and ecosystems. But the 
goal of this study is not to evaluate the positive and negative aspects of sprawl; rather, 
the objective is to try to come up with ways to quantify what sprawl is. And before 
one can operationalize sprawl, a useful descriptive definition must first be offered. 
Some experts maintain that sprawl refers to a pattern of development that impinges 
on the quality of life of citizens (American Planning Association, 2000a) while some 
assert that sprawl is a “process” of accelerated growth that has exacerbated 
inequalities and uneven development between cities and their outlying suburbs 
(Brueckner 2000; Burchell et al. 1999; Orfield 2000, 2002). Still, others posit that 
sprawl is any condition of development that is aesthetically unpleasing, such as 
dilapidated housing or boarded up commercial establishments in a depressed urban 
area (Antonelli 1999; McAlister 1999).  
 In my view, the best attempt at defining sprawl is from Webster himself. The 
Webster’s New World College Dictionary defines sprawl as “spreading out in an 
unpatterned fashion.” Applying this definition to land, I would add that sprawl is 
simply the spreading of land development in a manner that fails to account for 
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changes in population. Population growth is very much related to sprawl because 
when growth outpaces development, open space and valuable land resources 
eventually become scarce. Thus, construction and developer companies move out to 
areas where land is more plentiful and where individuals and families demand 
spacious and elegant single-family homes with access to nearby commercial 
amenities.  
 Now that we have a handle on what sprawl is—spread out, unpatterned 
development—we can come up with a measure that describes this concept in 
empirical terms. Scholars have attempted to quantify sprawl, but oftentimes they 
develop elaborate and sophisticated models that are more confusing and complex than 
the actual concept that they are attempting to capture. My sprawl measure is much 
more straightforward. I rely on percent changes in population density over the three 
election cycles that I have chosen, 1998-2002.43 One would conceivably use an 
urbanization index to capture sprawl. The concern with relying on urbanization as a 
sprawl measure is that urbanized areas may not necessarily be “sprawling.” 
Urbanization may not be as useful because it only takes into account changes in 
population. The intervening factor is land consumption, since sprawl is related to both 
population growth and how much land is consumed.  Population density, which refers 
to persons per square mile, best captures all of these dimensions of sprawl, which 
include population changes, land area consumption, and urbanization.  
 
43 For an example discussion on population density as associated with sprawl, see Russ Lopez and H. 
Patricia Hynes (2003), “Sprawl in the 1990’s: Measurement, Distribution, and Trends.” Urban Affairs 
Review 38(3): 325-355. The authors contend that density is the most important dimension of sprawl, 
particularly in terms of land development (high vs. low density) rather than housing density. Both 
population and housing density are appropriate measures of sprawl, depending on the central focus of 
any given study on sprawl. For instance, an examination of how sprawl might impact housing choices, 
might want to incorporate measures of residential density (p. 332). 
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In addition, since I am concerned with Smart Growth activity at the state 
level, state population density is most suitable, particularly when accounting for 
differences of scale. I recorded the density percentages from the 1990 and 2000 
Census, including 2002 estimates. I then calculated the percent change.44 There does, 
in fact, appear to be a regional aspect to sprawl (population density), with the greatest 
rate of change occurring in Nevada (+67%), followed by Colorado (+31%), Utah 
(+29.5%), Idaho (+29.7%) and Georgia rounding out the top five at +26%.45 To test 
the impact of sprawl on the likelihood that a state will adopt Smart Growth, I 
hypothesize that as the rate of population density increases, states are more likely to 
enact Smart Growth initiatives to curtail sprawl. State population density percentages 
for each state are available from the U.S. Statistical Abstract and are presented in the 
following table. 
 
44 2002 numbers are included as estimates. 
45 Table 3.12 provides trends in urbanization, suburbanization, agricultural land and undeveloped land 
in acreage.  Finally, Table 3.13 gives the percentages of the total land area that is developed, 
urbanized, farmland and open space. These detailed tables are included in the Appendix. Figure 3.C is 
a graph of land use trends between 1982 and 2002.  
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Alabama 4,040,389 22 50,750 79.6 4,447,100 23 50,744 87.6 10.1% No
Alaska 550,043 49 570,374 1.0 626,932 48 571,951 1.1 10.0% No
Arizona 3,665,339 24 113,642 32.3 5,130,632 20 113,635 45.2 39.9% Yes
Arkansas 2,350,624 33 52,075 45.1 2,673,400 33 52,068 51.3 13.7% No
California 29,758,213 1 155,973 190.8 33,871,648 1 155,959 217.2 13.8% No
Colorado 3,294,473 26 103,730 31.8 4,301,261 24 103,718 41.5 30.5% Yes
Connecticut 3,287,116 27 4,845 678.5 3,405,565 29 4,845 702.9 3.6% Yes
Delaware 666,168 46 1,955 340.8 783,600 45 1,954 401.1 17.7% Yes
Florida 12,938,071 4 53,997 239.6 15,982,378 4 53,927 296.4 23.7% Yes
Georgia 6,478,149 11 57,919 111.8 8,186,453 10 57,906 141.4 26.5% No
Hawaii 1,108,229 41 6,423 172.8 1,211,537 42 6,423 188.6 9.1% No
Idaho 1,006,734 42 82,751 12.2 1,293,953 39 82,747 15.6 27.9% No
Iliinois 11,430,602 6 55,693 205.2 12,419,293 5 55,584 223.4 8.9% No
Indiana 5,544,156 14 35,870 154.6 6,080,485 14 35,867 169.5 9.6% No
Iowa 2,776,831 30 55,875 49.7 2,926,324 30 55,869 52.4 5.4% No
Kansas 2,477,588 32 81,823 30.3 2,688,418 32 81,815 32.9 8.6% No
Kentucky 3,686,891 23 39,732 92.8 4,041,769 25 39,728 101.7 9.6% Yes
Louisiana 4,220,164 21 43,566 96.9 4,468,976 22 43,562 102.6 5.9% No
Maine 1,227,928 38 30,865 39.8 1,274,923 40 30,862 41.3 3.8% Yes
Maryland 4,780,753 19 9,775 489.1 5,296,486 19 9,774 541.9 10.8% Yes
Massachusetts 6,016,425 13 7,838 767.6 6,349,097 13 7,840 809.8 5.5% Yes
Michigan 9,295,277 8 56,809 163.6 9,938,444 8 56,804 175.0 7.0% Yes
Minnesota 4,375,665 20 79,617 55.0 4,919,479 21 79,610 61.8 12.4% Yes
Mississippi 2,575,474 31 46,914 54.9 2,844,658 31 46,907 60.6 10.4% No
Missouri 5,116,901 15 68,898 74.3 5,595,211 17 68,886 81.2 9.3% No
Montana 799,065 44 145,556 5.5 902,195 44 145,552 6.2 12.7% No
Nebraska 1,578,417 36 76,878 20.5 1,711,263 38 76,872 22.3 8.8% No
Nevada 1,201,675 39 109,807 10.9 1,998,257 35 109,826 18.2 67.0% No
New Hampshire 1,109,252 40 8,969 123.7 1,235,786 41 8,968 137.8 11.4% Yes
New Jersey 7,730,188 9 7,419 1,041.9 8,414,350 9 7,417 1,134.4 8.9% Yes
New Mexico 1,515,069 37 121,365 12.5 1,819,046 36 121,356 15.0 20.0% No
New York 17,990,778 2 47,224 381.0 18,976,457 3 47,214 401.9 5.5% No
North Carolina 6,632,448 10 48,718 136.1 8,049,313 11 48,711 165.2 21.4% No
North Dakota 638,800 47 68,994 9.3 642,200 47 68,976 9.3 0.0% No
Ohio 10,847,115 7 40,953 264.9 11,353,140 7 40,948 277.3 4.7% No
Oklahoma 3,145,576 28 68,679 45.8 3,450,654 27 68,667 50.3 9.8% No
Oregon 2,842,337 29 96,003 29.6 3,421,399 28 95,997 35.6 20.3% Yes
Pennsylvania 11,882,842 5 44,820 265.1 12,281,054 6 44,817 274.0 3.4% Yes
Rhode Island 1,003,464 43 1,045 960.3 1,048,319 43 1,045 1,003.3 4.5% Yes
South Carolina 3,486,310 25 30,111 115.8 4,012,012 26 30,110 133.2 15.0% No
South Dakota 696,004 45 75,898 9.2 754,844 46 75,885 9.9 7.6% No
Tennessee 4,887,203 17 41,220 118.3 5,689,283 16 41,217 138.0 16.7% Yes
Texas 16,986,335 3 261,914 64.9 20,851,820 2 261,797 79.6 22.7% No
Utah 1,722,850 35 82,168 21.0 2,233,169 34 82,144 27.2 29.5% Yes
Vermont 562,758 48 9,249 60.8 608,827 49 9,250 65.8 8.2% No
Virginia 6,189,197 12 39,598 156.3 7,078,515 12 39,594 178.8 14.4% No
Washington 4,866,669 18 66,582 73.1 5,894,121 15 66,544 88.6 21.2% Yes
West Virginia 1,793,477 34 24,087 74.5 1,808,344 37 24,078 75.1 0.8% No
Wisconsin 4,891,769 16 54,314 90.1 5,363,675 18 54,310 98.8 9.7% Yes
Wyoming 453,589 50 97,105 4.7 493,782 50 97,100 5.1 8.5% No
Note:  Density refers to persons per square mile, based on 1990 land area
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000 Census of Population and Housing, State Data Center. The Census also gives 2002 estimates, which are included in the calculation of % change in 
population density.
April 1, 1990 April 1, 2000
TABLE 3.8:  Resident Population, Rank, Land Area, and Change in Population Density, 1990-2002
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Section 3.8: The Control Variable 
The control variable is real estate gross state product or Real GSP. While 
gross state product captures the overall health of the state economy, real gross state 
product is a measure of revenue or productivity that is generated by the real estate 
industry. The real estate gross state product, thus, will also provide information on 
how well the construction or developer industries fair in light of any Smart Growth 
activity taking place and at any given time. I include real gross state product figures 
for each state for the years 1998-2002.46 
Section 3.9: Descriptive Statistics 
TABLE 3.9 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable (Predictor) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source(s) 
Smart Growth .36 .48 0 1 APA (2000, 2002), State Statutes, Legislation 
State Ideology -.13 .10 -.43210 -.17 Erikson, et al. 2001 data 
State Population Density 176.69 241.14 1.0797 1128.042 U.S. Census of the Population and Housing 
Governor Executive Order .56 .50 0 1 NGA, U.S. Statistical Abstract 
Governor Item Veto Power .84 .37 0 1 NGA, U.S. Statistical Abstract 
Governor Appointment Powers .66 .48 0 1 NGA, U.S. Statistical Abstract 
Governor Popularity 54.37 7.57 37.3 73.4 U.S. Census, Statistical Abstract, 2000, 2002 
General Assembly Days in Session 113.73 50.49 30 285 NCSL, Book of the States, 2000, 2002 
Legislative Compensation 22337.06 16663.59 200 75600 NCSL, Book of the States, 2000, 2002 
Legislative Staff 548.98 746.61 18 3461 NCSL, Book of the States, 2000, 2002 
Partisan Control of the State 
Legislature .51 .15 .11 .87 U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1990, 2000, 2002 
Party Affiliation of the Governor .41 .49 0 1 U.S. Census, Statistical Abstract, 2000, 2002 
Environmental Group Contributions 19451.06 43876.43 100 355491 The Institute on Money in State Politics 
Construction Industry Contributions 842255.60 1136572.00 3400 6788119 The Institute on Money in State Politics 
Real Gross State Product .10 .03 .06 .18 U.S. Census, Statistical Abstract, 2002 
46 For more information on gross state product, consult the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Labor. I had originally included several additional economic indicators, such as per 




Section 3.10: Probit Estimates for the Smart Growth Model, 1998-2002 
Table 3.10 below presents the coefficients and the standard errors for each 
estimator; however, we are more interested in the probabilities. I also provide the 
predicted values, which makes interpretation of the results pretty straightforward. The 
results from the probit analysis for all the years under study generally support my 
theoretical expectations. As the results show, none of the economic variables 
performed well, and one of those indicators—state per capita income—was ultimately 
dropped due to multicolinearity and sign reversal. 47 
TABLE 3.10: Factors Predicting Smart Growth Adoption in the American States, 1997-200248 
Explanatory Variables Estimated Coefficients 
Standard 
Error P>IZI Minimum Maximum 
Predicted 
Change 
Constant -4.856 1.952 0.01*** -- -- --
State Ideology 11.681 2.359 0.000*** .103 .792 .688
State Population Density 0.004 0.002 0.02** .271 .758 .487
Governor Executive Order 0.126 0.436 0.39 .316 .403 .087
Governor Item Veto Power 2.421 0.862 0.00*** .228 .384 .156
Governor Popularity 0.036 0.021 0.05** .373 .734 .360
General Assembly Days in Session 0.011 0.004 0.00*** .239 .762 .605
Legislative Compensation -0.000 0.000 0.28 .428 .237 -.191
Legislative Staff 0.000 0.000 0.06* .257 .383 .126
Party Control of Legislatures -0.989 1.392 0.24 .511 .248 -.263
Party Affiliation of the Governor 0.210 0.366 0.28 .332 .409 .076
Environmental Group Contributions -0.000 0.000 0.02*** .395 .012 -.382
Construction Industry Contributions 0.000 0.000 0.32 .358 .378 .019
Real Gross State Product 5.049 16.613 0.38 .222 .709 .486
N = 50             
* = p < .10             
**    =  p  <  .05             
***   =  p  <  .01             
McKelvey-Zavoina R-Square 0.81  
Proportion Predicted Correctly 0.84  
Proportion Predicted Correctly 
(Null) 0.64  
Mean of the Dependent Variable 0.36  
47 I added a measure of gross state product from real estate as an economic indicator and compiled 
from the U.S. Statistical Abstract. The sign of the coefficient was in the expected direction, but the 
factor did not reach an appropriate threshold of significance. 
48 The p-values provided are based on one-tailed tests. 
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Not surprisingly, the sprawl indicator was statistically significant, but did not 
perform as well as the political variables. In addition, the economic indicator—Real 
Gross State Product—failed to achieve statistical significance. The most compelling 
finding is that political ideology has the greatest independent impact on Smart 
Growth adoption. In fact, ideology and Smart Growth are positively correlated at .56. 
Among the institutional variables, I find that governors’ formal and informal powers 
matter, but not all of the formal powers yielded positive results. The governor’s 
ability to exercise the item veto reached statistical significance but executive order 
authority did not. Governors who have access to the item veto have considerable 
power to influence policy outcomes, but issuing executive orders does not appear to 
make any difference in terms of impacting the likelihood of Smart Growth passage. 
However, I find that the informal power—the percentage of votes a governor received 
in the previous election—is highly associated with the passage of Smart Growth.  
 Among the other structural variables, legislative professionalism also has 
predictive power on the adoption of Smart Growth, but some indices of 
professionalism performed better than others. Of the indicators that were significant, 
the average days in session performed best, with the sign of the coefficient in the 
expected direction. The average number of specialized staff was significant but in the 
wrong direction; however, legislative salary is not significant. Based on these results, 
we can confirm my argument that as legislatures spend more time discussing, 
debating and examining land use issues, they are more likely to adopt Smart Growth.  
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Conventional wisdom informs us that special interests have always played an 
important role in politics. This assumption does not seem to hold here. Interest group 
influence appeared to have little effect on the likelihood that states will pursue and 
adopt Smart Growth. Undoubtedly both environmental groups and corporate entities 
are prominent stakeholders in the Smart Growth movement. Although campaign 
contributions from state environmental groups were significant, the sign is in the 
opposite direction. Financial donations from the construction industry have no impact 
on the likelihood that a state will adopt Smart Growth. 
 
Section 3.11: Discussion 
Political Ideology 
Of particular interest is the lack of a prominent role for political parties. I find 
no statistical evidence that parties matter in terms of enacting Smart Growth in the 
states. None of the party variables, including the party of the governor and control of 
the general assembly, performed well. These findings challenge the assumption that 
the two major political parties differ in their philosophical disposition to Smart 
Growth. In contrast, ideology outperformed all variables and had an overwhelming 
impact on the model in general. Liberal states are more likely to enact Smart Growth 
while conservative states are less likely. When it comes to Smart Growth, the 
question of whether or not to adopt the policy greatly depends on inherently different 
points of view about the proper role of government in managing growth. In general, 
the estimated model performs quite well, with an R-Squared value of .81 and the 
proportion of cases predicted correctly at .84. Therefore, we can be quite certain that 
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when taking all of these factors into account, Smart Growth has a great chance of 
being adopted. 
A closer examination of the probabilities presented in Table 3.10 reveal that 
political ideology outperforms all other indicators included in the model. 
Comparisons between states demonstrate the impact of political ideology on Smart 
Growth adoption. A bar graph of Smart Growth and mean state ideology 
demonstrates the relationship between ideology and Smart Growth adoption.49 
Consider, again, our example from the least liberal (or most conservative) state in the 
country: Utah. Utah’s mean ideology score between 1998 and 2002, was –.22. 
Vermont, which is the most liberal state, is about 69% more likely than Utah, to pass 
a Smart Growth initiative, according to the results.  
What about the likelihood that Smart Growth will be adopted when comparing 
two relatively liberal states? Let’s look at the moderately liberal state of Maryland 
compared to the slightly more liberal state of Illinois. In Maryland, 28% of the 
electorate identified as liberal, 25% call themselves conservative, and 47% are 
moderate. In Illinois, 29% of the respondents consider themselves liberal, 23% are 
conservative and 48% are moderate. The state ideology score is derived by taking the 
difference between the mean conservative and mean liberal scores, which are -.03 for 
Maryland and -.06 for Illinois. Calculating the probability that Smart Growth will be 
adopted, Illinois is only 1% more likely to adopt Smart Growth than Maryland. How 
about between conservative states, like the southern state, Alabama, and its western 
 
49 See Figure 3.A in the Appendix. 
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counterpart, Idaho? After calculating the mean score, Alabama (the more 
conservative state) is 7% less likely to adopt Smart Growth than Idaho. 
 
Population Density (Sprawl) and Smart Growth 
 I hypothesized that states that are confronted with sprawl are more likely to 
adopt Smart Growth public policies. The results provide compelling evidence to 
support my claim that sprawling states look to Smart Growth for a policy solution. 
Comparing a state with the slowest rate of growth (West Virginia) with the fastest 
rate of growth in population density (Nevada) yields a 49% percent chance that a state 
adopts Smart Growth. A graph of the variable means demonstrates the strong 
relationship between population density and Smart Growth adoption (Figure 3.B 
about here). We can therefore expect to see Nevada passing Smart Growth, and in 
fact, the state does have a Smart Growth program in place. West Virginia, on the 
other hand, does not have a statewide, comprehensive Smart Growth policy. 
 
Governors Powers 
 Are governors with strong constitutional authority able to influence Smart 
Growth adoption? I argued that in states where governors have strong formal and 
informal powers, Smart Growth is likely to be adopted. The formal powers included 
in the model were executive order, appointive power and budget authority. 50 The 
table shows that in states where governors have the power to issue executive orders, 
Smart Growth is 8% more likely to succeed than in states where governors do not 
 




have this power. However, because this variable fails to reach statistical significance, 
I cannot put too much faith in the results. In contrast, the authority of the governor to 
invoke the item veto had the greatest predictive impact on Smart Growth of all of the 
formal powers. In fact, the item veto variable was highly significant, and the 
likelihood that states will adopt Smart Growth when governors have use of the veto—
one of the greatest influential tools available to a governor—is nearly 16% compared 
to those governors without this authority.  
I also found that the informal power—the popularity of the governor—was 
also highly significant, which confirms my expectation that popular governors are 
able to exert influence on the Smart Growth debate in positive ways. The average 
percentage of the vote that all governors received was right around 55%, which is 
great news for any governor who wishes to achieve his or her policy priorities. The 
most popular governor in 1998 and 2002 was Maine’s Angus King (I) and the 
governor who received the least amount of popular votes was Jesse Ventura51 (MN-
Ref). States with popular governors are nearly 40% more likely to adopt Smart 
Growth than states with unpopular governors.52 
51 Ventura’s percentage vote is the result of a three-way race between himself, Republican candidate 
Norm Coleman, and Democrat Hubert H. “Skip” Humphrey III in 1998. In this race, Ventura received 
37%, Coleman received 34%, and Humphrey garnered 28% of the electoral vote. 
52 Kansas governor, Kathleen Sebelius, has pushed for one of the most ambitious statewide smart 
growth programs in the nation. She received the second highest number of popular votes in 2000 and 
2002. Among the governors who received the least amount of popular votes were Democrats Donald 
Siegelman (AL-2002), Jane Dee Hull (AZ-2002), Gray Davis (CA-2002), and one Republican, 
Colorado’s Bill Owens.  Although there are several instances where smart growth succeeded in states 
with unpopular governors, these governors owe their demise to factors outside the realm of this policy 
area. In these cases, smart growth became a reality before these governors experienced a decline in 




 The results confirm that legislative professionalism and Smart Growth are 
positively associated. However, some professionalism indicators demonstrated 
greater predictive power than others. In the model, I included the legislative session 
length, average member compensation, and the average number of professionalized 
staff per member. The session length variable was highly significant and in the 
expected direction. As state general assemblies increase their days in session, the 
likelihood increases that state legislatures will pursue and enact Smart Growth.  Thus, 
when we compare a state with the shortest legislative session (Alabama at 30 days) 
with a state with the longest, California at 285 days per session, Smart Growth as a 
60% probability of passage. States witnessed a surge in Smart Growth activity over 
the past five years, and the fact that Smart Growth bills are brought to the floor from 
the committee level demonstrates both the saliency of the issue and the amount of 
time devoted to it.  
 I can also conclude that professionalized staff plays a vital role in state 
legislative decision making. The staff variable is significant for a one-tailed test and 
in the expected direction. As state legislatures continue to modernize and committees 
specialize in complex issue areas, we can expect to see more experienced and 
professionalized staff. Based on the results, state legislatures that boast professional 
staffs are 13% more likely to witness Smart Growth passage than states without 
professionals. Finally, a word about legislative salaries. The results presented in 
Table 3.10 show that states that offer higher legislative compensation are nearly 20% 
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less likely to pass Smart Growth than states with lower member salaries.53 This 
finding is contrary to what I expected. However, the variable is insignificant and 
therefore we cannot expect this finding to carry much weight. 
Where’s the Party? 
 A few points should be made about the lack of a role for political parties. 
First, the inclusion of political variables in the predictive model—party of the 
governor and party control of the legislature—did not add any value to the results. 
Although the results from Table 3.10 show that Republican-controlled state 
legislatures were 25% less likely than their Democratic counterparts to enact Smart 
Growth, this finding holds little predictive power because the variable fails to reach 
any level of statistical significance.  Similarly, the results show that in states where 
there is a Democratic governor, Smart Growth is 7% more likely to be enacted than in 
states with Republican governors. Again, I cannot put much confidence in this finding 
because the factor does not achieve statistical significance.  
Smart Growth has been successful in the states primarily because it has been a 
bipartisan effort. As the American Planning Association (2002) reports: one-half of 
all the executive orders that were issued to direct Smart Growth efforts came from 
Republican governors, while the other half were issued by Democratic governors. In 
addition, party control did not make any difference when Smart Growth ballot 
measures arrived before the state assemblies. The approval rate for the 553 state and 
 
53 New Hampshire offers members the least amount of compensation at $200 per member, with an 
average of 170 days in session. By stark contrast, California touts an average member salary of 
$75,600. The salary seems commensurate for a 285-day legislative session. New York and Ohio are 
other high-salaried states, while Alabama is among the lowest, with an average member salary of $300 




local ballot initiatives that were enacted in 38 states received nearly 70% approval by 
both Democrats and Republicans. And finally, more Republican governors—16 of 
them—have included Smart Growth priorities on their policy agendas (p. 6). Thus, 
the accepted maxim that Republicans are politically inclined to support conservative 
issues while their Democratic counterparts are generally liberal in their policy 
dispositions, does not necessarily hold here, which makes it a ripe issue for study and 
also confirms how important issue context impacts the political process. 
 
The Interest Group Paradox 
 I argued that states with strong and viable corporate lobbies are less likely to 
pursue and enact Smart Growth measures. On the other hand, states with powerful 
environmental groups will use campaign contributions to encourage the passage of 
Smart Growth policies in their respective states. Table 3.10 shows that Smart Growth 
has a 2% chance of passage when construction groups contribute more, not less 
money. Although this finding runs contrary to what I argued, I cannot put too much 
faith in it because the variable fails to achieve statistical significance. 
 The results also set up an interesting paradox. I found that Smart Growth is 
more likely to be enacted where environmental interests spend less, not more money 
on state campaigns. In fact, the results show that the probability of Smart Growth 
passage is near 40% when environmental groups devote less money. This is exactly 
the opposite of what I argued: that as groups spend more, Smart Growth has a 
greater chance of adoption. Why is this the case? I suggest an alternative argument: 
 First, I assume that groups are strategic actors who weigh the costs and 
benefits of employing different strategies to gain political access and influence policy 
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outcomes. This line of reasoning falls closely in line with Victor (2003),54 who also 
found no evidence that campaign contributions make a difference in influencing 
policy outcomes. Why? Because groups will not waste valuable and scare resources 
(e.g., time, money, information) for causes where they perceive no chance at 
winning.55 I offer a corollary to this argument: groups will also not waste 
resources—e.g., campaign contributions—on causes for which they have a great 
chance at winning or have already won!56 
Second, I argue that with repeated interactions with political elites, groups 
already know where decision makers stand on any given issue. Groups have 
information on how legislators vote simply by relying on past voting behavior. Thus, 
if a legislator is known to vote a certain way on a range of issues that pertain to 
environmental regulation, the group has a pretty good indication of how that decision 
maker will vote on Smart Growth. Is it likely, then, that environmental groups may 
devote their resources for other policy priorities because they have been assured a win 
on Smart Growth. Finally, it is also likely that the particular lobbying activities that 
these groups engage in may not require money at all; their influence may be exercised 
through the specialized information that they offer to legislative committees and other 
interested parties. Perhaps, in this policy arena, the types of strategies groups employ 
are shaped by context (e.g., issue area and saliency, political climate, for instance), 
 
54 The author argues that policy preferences are shaped by the likelihood of winning.  
55 Hall and Wayman (1990, 801) find that interest group preferences are closely aligned with those for 
whom they lobby. See also Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) and Kollman (1997) for studies on 
strategic lobbying. 
56 Of course, my argument is based on the assumption that these strategic actors have perfect 
information on how legislators will vote. 
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and that strategic approach is not the same in all instances. I will explore these 
alternative explanations of interest group influence in forthcoming chapters. 
Section 3.12: Conclusion: Why Smart Growth? 
 Do characteristics of the political system influence the adoption of Smart 
Growth policies in the American states? In this chapter, I set out to answer this 
question, and the answer is in the affirmative. More importantly, the objective was to 
determine which characteristics have the greatest impact on the likelihood that a state 
will enact Smart Growth. My predictive model showed that Smart Growth has an 
ideological dimension. Liberal states are more likely to enact Smart Growth policies 
than conservative ones. I also demonstrated support for my argument that the political 
characteristics of states are more important predictors of Smart Growth adoption than 
even the health of the state economy. Not surprisingly, the sprawl indicator—
population density—was statistically significant as expected. States that confront 
greater challenges stemming from sprawl are more likely to implement Smart Growth 
measures to address sprawl-related concerns.  
 There is also a set of institutional variables included in the model that pertain 
to the governor and the state legislature. The results show that state executive 
authority to invoke the item veto is the most significant exercise of power that a 
governor has when it comes to Smart Growth. Although governors have utilized 
executive orders to direct Smart Growth policy in the states, there is no evidence that 
this formal authority will predict the ultimate policy outcome. However, I find that 
the governor’s popularity will have a great impact on whether he or she is able to get 
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anything done. Popular governors are more likely to rely on this informal power to 
help promote and encourage action on their most favored policy priorities. When it 
comes to Smart Growth, there is no exception to the rule; in states where the governor 
receives over 50% of the popular vote, Smart Growth measures are more likely to be 
enacted.  
Of the legislative professionalism measures, I found that legislative session 
length and the average number of professional staff per legislator are the two most 
significant predictors of Smart Growth adoption. Legislative compensation, however, 
was discovered to be insignificant. 
 The most interesting finding is that campaign contributions from pro-growth 
business lobbies have no discernible impact on Smart Growth adoption, contrary to 
my argument. However, the results do show that contributions from environmental 
groups are statistically significant, but the direction of that influence runs counter to 
my argument that groups spend more to encourage Smart Growth passage. I argued 
that environmental contributions lead to adoption of Smart Growth in the states, but 
the results revealed that the probably of enacting Smart Growth decreases as these 
groups spend more on campaigns. I offered an alternative explanation for this 
surprising result. I assume that groups are rational actors and will not waste resources 
to champion causes for which they can foresee a win. The ability to predict how state 
legislatures will vote is not as difficult as one might expect. First, assuming relatively 
little turnover, groups may examine the voting history of previous state assemblies to 
get an idea on how legislators voted in the past on a host of similar policy issues. 
Second, groups can rely on repeated interactions with governing officials, whether 
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those interactions involved direct meetings or indirect lobbying efforts. Through my 
own meetings and interviews with stakeholder groups and members of Maryland and 
Virginia general assembly, I hope to gain a better understanding of the different 
strategies that groups employ that have worked to influence the voting behavior of 
decision makers.  
None of the party variables performed well. There is no evidence to support 
the claim that Democratic-controlled state assemblies will pass Smart Growth 
legislation, or that Republicans are less likely to do so. In fact, although I have shown 
that there is a liberal dimension to Smart Growth, Republican governors and 
Republican-controlled state legislatures are just as likely to adopt Smart Growth as 
Democratic state governments. The economic control—gross state product derived 
from real estate productivity—also failed to reach an appropriate level of 
significance. In conclusion, the only consistent patterns are the overwhelming power 
of political ideology, the sprawl impact, and the lack of political party influence in 
predicting the success or failure of Smart Growth adoption in the states. In the 
coming chapters, I will investigate Smart Growth activity in Maryland and Virginia, 
taking a closer look at these findings and address some of interesting revelations 
stemming from the results presented in this chapter. Through these case studies, I 
seek a clearer understanding of the role of party elites, ideology, interest group and 
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Chapter 4:  Maryland’s Smart Growth Program 
 Smart Growth Begins Here! 
Maryland is the undisputed leader of the Smart Growth movement in the 
United States. Spearheaded by a resolute Democratic governor, the state’s 
groundbreaking Smart Growth program entitled the Smart Growth Areas Act of 1997, 
has propelled the state to national prominence. Other states have also begun to 
explore and experiment with their own Smart Growth initiatives. Oregon, New 
Jersey, Arizona and Michigan are among the states that look to the Maryland Smart 
Growth program as a model for managing growth and curtailing sprawl. However, the 
political climate has changed in Maryland since the law’s inception, and Smart 
Growth has fallen off the governmental agenda. Conservatives have gained more 
visibility and influence, due in large part, to their leader, Republican Governor Robert 
L. Ehrlich. Smart Growth advocates now worry that Governor Ehrlich has not 
demonstrated a clear commitment to Smart Growth. In a sense, they are right. Smart 
Growth has now taken a backseat to other, more pressing concerns, such as the 
budget deficit and the controversial slots issue. 
 In this chapter, I set out to understand the politics of Smart Growth as played 
out in the state of Maryland. I begin by tracing the historical precedents of the 
Maryland Smart Growth law. Next, I reiterate the importance of various actors and 
stakeholders involved in the Smart Growth movement and how Smart Growth 
ultimately reflected a compromise between various opposing groups. Most important 
to this Maryland case study of Smart Growth are the interviews. To gain a better 
understanding of the politics of Smart Growth in the state of Maryland, the interviews 
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in the Smart Growth movement. In all, there were thirty-two (32) of these 
discussions, 15 of which were carried out in-person, 13 of the 15 which were taped, 
and 17 of the total number consisted of phone conversations. The respondents come 
from varied communities: the Glendening and Ehrlich administrations; state 
representatives, both Democrat and Republican, supporters and opponents of Smart 
Growth; members from Smart Growth advocacy groups; representatives from the 
counter Smart Growth and pro-industry communities; and other, neutral observers.  
The interviewees were asked a series of questions, some specifically tailored 
to their respective positions in the institutions in which they serve.57 In this chapter, I 
present the responses to several key questions and discuss their implications for Smart 
Growth in the state.58 In sum, the purpose of the interviews is to compliment the 
findings from the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 3. More important, 
however, the interviews provided evidence to support the central claims advanced in 
this dissertation; namely, that political ideology has an overwhelming impact on the 
chance that Smart Growth is successful in the state. Finally, the interviews serve to 
highlight the importance of political, cultural and economic conditions that shape the 
overall context. However, it should also be noted and stressed that I will not attempt 
to make generalizations based on these interviews, since I am working with a non-
random selection of respondents and a small sample size. Rather, it is my belief that 
 
57 See Appendix for the standard questionnaire and the list of participants. 
58 In most instances, respondents expressed the desire not be identified by name; hence, names are not 
provided in this discussion of my findings. Most of these conversations took place during the 2003 and 




these discussions will add to what has become an interesting story of Smart Growth in 
Maryland. 
Section 4.1:  Historical Overview of Growth Management in Maryland 
 For the sake of clarity, I have organized this discussion on the evolution of 
Maryland’s Smart Growth program into four parts or phases. Phase I briefly traces the 
most important trends in growth management. Phase II describes the significant 
political events that predate Smart Growth’s inception. In this phase, I discuss the 
pivotal legislative and executive actions that served as the foundation of the landmark 
Smart Growth policy. Phase III explores Governor Parris N. Glendening’s Smart 
Growth vision and how favorable political and economic conditions contributed, in 
large part, to its success in Maryland. Finally, Phase IV focuses on Smart Growth 
under Republican Governor Robert L. Ehrlich’s tenure, as the change in political 
context and growth in conservative sentiment in the state and across the country, has 
created some backlash against Smart Growth.  
TABLE 4.1   
MARYLAND STATE PROFILE, 200059 
Profile Characteristic State Rank 
Land Area – 9,775 square miles 42 
Population – 6.125 million 19 
Population Density – 525.3 persons per square mi. 5 
Per Capita Income - $29,943 5 
School Enrollment – 818,541 39 
Population Over 65 (2025 projection) – 16% 46 
Population Under 18 (2025 projection) – 23% 19 
Counties – 23 (157 cities) N/A 
Coastline – 31 miles N/A 
Net Farm Income - $275 million 33 
Value of Farm Real Estate - $3,180 per acre N/A 
Land in Farms – 2 million acres N/A 
Average Farm Size – 168 acres N/A 
Population Living in Urban Areas – 80% N/A 
Population Living in greater Baltimore Area – 49% N/A 
Population Living in metro Washington, D.C. Area – 68% N/A 
59 Source: “Growth Management Program – A Comparison of Selected States.” (2000). Report 
submitted by the Florida Department of Growth Management. Tallahassee, FL. 
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Phase I: The First Wave—Growth Management Trends in Maryland 
 
The history of growth management in Maryland is complex and varied, but 
generally reflects a tug of war between state and local officials over which level of 
government is best suited to address land use and growth management issues. In the 
late ‘60s and early ‘70s, the state had already adopted an open space program and a 
wetlands protection plan.60 However, local governments maintained overriding 
authority in land use management. Armored with extensive zoning and planning 
powers, local governments determined their own comprehensive plans and strategies 
for sustaining healthy economic development and preserving valuable land 
resources.61 
The 1970s saw a marked departure from local government authority over land 
use planning and growth management. Motivated by the desire to maintain clean air 
standards62 and responding to reports that expressed concern over the health of the 
Chesapeake Bay, the state of Maryland began to take a more active role in growth 
 
60 The 1969 Program Open Space Act allowed the state to purchase available land for parks and 
recreational purposes using real estate transfer taxes. This law would later be refined to allow 
developer transfer funds for the same purposes, where a landowner could sell his or her property to 
public or private entities to fund development projects. The 1970 Tidal Wetlands Act also predated the 
smart growth concept of allowing the state to institute a wetlands protection plan, but one that would 
also allow developers permits to alter the land or build, provided that they adhere to strict density and 
acreage requirements imposed by the state. 
61 Recall that prior to the 1970s, land use planning and regulation was relegated to local governments 
across the country, due in large part, to the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and the Standard City 
Planning Enabling Acts that were instituted in the 1920s. For a more thorough discussion on these acts, 
see John M. DeGrove and Nancy E. Stroud (1987), “State Land Planning and Regulation: Innovative 
Roles in the 1980s and Beyond.” Land Use Law (Mar 1987): pp. 3-8. 
62 According to reports released by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, several states were in 
danger of losing federal funding for various capital projects because they failed to adhere to federal 
EPA clean air standards. Among the states that failed to meet EPA regulatory standards was Maryland. 




management.63 By 1974, for example, the authority to oversee planning proposals 
submitted by local governments was centralized in the State Department of Planning. 
Local governments were required to submit comprehensive land use and growth 
management plans every six years. Although local jurisdictions could design those 
plans in any way they saw fit, they were required to abide by state imposed 
restrictions barring development in critical areas. Adding to centralized authority in 
land use management, the state assembly passed the Maryland Agricultural Land 
Preservation Foundation law in 1975, which created special farming districts in 
largely rural areas in the western and southern parts of the state. The purpose of the 
law was to preserve millions of acres of farmland and protect these designated 
agricultural districts against local government zoning acts. Figure 4.1 below shows 
the trends in growth management in the state of Maryland.64 
Figure 4.1: TRENDS IN GROWTH MANAGEMENT 

















63 The Chesapeake Bay is a 195 miles long, 30 miles wide estuary—the largest in the U.S. The bay 
spans over a 64,000 square mile area and borders three states, including Delaware, Virginia and 
Maryland, but also spills into other parts of New York and Pennsylvania. 
64 Data provided by the National Geographic Foundation’s report on Smart Growth in Maryland (2002) 
and can be found at www.maps.nationalgeographic.com/smartgrowthmd.
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Phase II: The Second Wave—The Budding Smart Growth Movement 
 
The emergence of Smart Growth in Maryland is attributed to three main 
developments: a widespread public desire to preserve the health of the Chesapeake 
Bay; a strong resistance to state invention in local land use planning; and, political 
tension between urban and rural interests (Cohen 2002, 3). In 1983, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency released its annual report on the health of the 
Chesapeake Bay and cited Maryland as the greatest violator of clean air standards.  
In response to the EPA’s report, Maryland passed the pivotal 1984 Critical 
Areas Act, which instituted growth boundaries around the bay and prohibited further 
development in its surrounding areas (DeGrove and Stroud 1987). By 1987, the first 
Chesapeake Bay Agreement was implemented and was essentially a stated 
commitment between Maryland and its immediate neighbors to preserve and protect 
the bay by instituting consistent, regulatory growth management practices. The 
agreement called for the establishment of a 2020 Commission, which was charged 
with monitoring projected growth patterns that would affect the heath of the bay. 
 Among the strategies employed by the commission were: (1) enhanced 
restrictions on further development; (2) an extension of the 1984 Critical Areas Act; 
(3) the protection of valuable farmland in rural areas; (4) a more collaborative effort 
to oversee the preservation of the Chesapeake Bay; (5) a more concerted effort to 
protect natural resources and habitat, including wetlands, forestlands, wildlife and 
endangered species; and finally, (6) to institute programs that offer financial 
incentives in the form of rewards or sanctions to encourage development where 
needed and discourage excessive growth. All of these stated goals were instituted 
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with the ultimate objective of ensuring that the health of the bay would be sustained 
by the year 2020 (Cohen 2002, p. 4).65 It was also one of the first instances where the 
Smart Growth concept began to take shape. 
Maryland wasted no time instituting the recommendations of the commission. 
In 1989, the Non-Tidal Wetlands Act passed with overwhelming support in the state 
legislature and called for stricter limitations on development near wetlands and other 
protected areas.66 In a similar vein, the 1991 Forest Conservation Act encouraged 
developers to assume some responsibility in growth management by working to 
preserve trees and cease building projects in and around critical areas. That same 
year, the Maryland Growth and Chesapeake Bay Protection Act of 1991 further 
enhanced state control over local land use planning. But, it was the Economic 
Growth, Resource Protection and Planning Act of 1992 that was perhaps the most 
important of these legislative actions. 
The Economic Growth, Resource Protection and Planning Act of 1992, 
hereafter referred to as the 1992 Maryland Planning Act, established the Economic 
Growth, Resource Protection and Planning Commission to conduct studies of impact 
and oversee local and state government progress in land use planning. Local 
 
65 In addition, see Pendleton (2000). 
66 Also in 1989, the Barnes Commission, appointed by then-governor William Donald Schaefer, met to 
evaluate how well Maryland was responding to the 2020 Commission concerns. The establishment of 
the Barnes Commission reflected a pivotal turning point in the history of growth management in the 
state. The commission called for increased state authority by requiring that local governments be even 
more restricted in how they grew by imposing strict density requirements. Eventually local 
governments came to view the commission’s actions as an encroachment on local government powers, 
and the proposed legislation that arose out of the commission’s reports was rejected in favor of the 




governments could decide the appropriate strategies for protecting critical areas; 
however, they were required to incorporate a number of state directives in their 
comprehensive plans. Among these directives included an enhanced regulatory 
mechanism imposed by the state to achieve its commitment to protect open space, 
preserve farmland, and the Chesapeake (Ibid). This enhanced regulatory power by the 
state was the source of controversy for the local and municipal governments and 
remains so to this day. Nevertheless, the state pressed on in its efforts to address the 
objectives set forth by the 2020 Commission. The 1992 Maryland Planning Act was 
at least a step in that direction. The greater challenge was to come up with a better 
strategy for convincing local governments that their interests would also be protected. 
 
Phase III: The Third Wave—The Birth of Smart Growth in Maryland & Governor 
Glendening’s Vision 
 
It is a real honor to be recognized by professional planners 
for our Smart Growth initiatives. Maryland has become the 
national model for Smart Growth by encouraging people to 
think about land use planning in a better way, and invest in 
our existing communities, while preserving our natural 
resources and agricultural areas. With the help of planners 
and administrators, we are moving forward to curtail 
suburban sprawl and ensure that every community in 
Maryland remains a great place to live, work, and raise our 
families.67 
67 Statement made before the Maryland Chapter of the American Planning Association (APA) meeting 
in Baltimore, Maryland, upon receiving an award for leadership in smart growth initiatives from 
professional land use planners (October 20, 1999). This report is available at 
http://www.gov.state.md.us/gov/press/1999/oct/html/smartgrowthawards.html. That same year, 
Maryland’s Smart Growth program was again honored by the Ford Foundation in partnership with 
Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and the Council for Excellence in 
Government. The state was awarded a $100,000 grant for its Smart Growth and Neighborhood 




By 1997, Governor Parris N. Glendening expressed reservations with the 1992 
Maryland Planning Act (Cohen 2002, p. 7). Glendening was concerned that the 1992 
Act did not go far enough to ensure that local governments were committed to growth 
controls. He felt that their overuse of zoning regulations did not constitute 
“protection.” But, at the same time, Glendening, once the County Executive for 
Prince George’s county, was sympathetic to the concerns of the local governments—
the county governments, in particular—and expressed the desire to maintain local 
government authority. He could achieve that by placing some limitations on 
bureaucratic oversight of land use planning. With the help of supportive individuals 
in his cabinet, who were also committed to anti-sprawl efforts, the state Department 
of Planning68 drew up a preliminary plan that would: (1) develop more efficient tools 
for the implementation of growth controls; (2) encourage coordinated efforts between 
local and state governments; (3) an integrated and comprehensive growth 
management strategy that would incorporate policies to preserve open space, protect 
existing endangered habitats, while encouraging sound, efficient growth practices. 
But, the most important of this plan was to encourage innovation.69 
That same year, Governor Glendening actively encouraged and promoted the 
passage of a land conservation law. Backed by a powerful legislature, urban planners, 
environmentalists—and even some in the construction and real estate industry, 
 
68 Ron Young, Deputy Director of the State Planning Office, along with other prominent cabinet 
members, were also involved in helping to craft legislation—two bills, in particular: Senate Bill 389 
and House Bill 507—which were introduced on behalf of the governor’s office during the 1997 
legislative session.  These two smart growth bills were later reworked in conference committee and 
were eventually agreed on by both houses. 




Maryland’s landmark Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation Act was signed 
into law on October 1, 1998. There are five main policy priorities of the Maryland 
Smart Growth initiative: (1) The Smart Growth Priority Funding Areas Act of 1997; 
(2) The Rural Legacy program; (3) the Brownfields Voluntary Cleanup and 
Revitalization Incentive Program; (4) Job Creation Tax Credits and (5) Live Near 
Your Work. Maryland’s Smart Growth initiatives are centered around three core 
objectives: (1) to “save valuable natural resources,” (2) to “support existing 
communities and neighborhoods by targeting state resources to support development 
in areas where the infrastructure is already in place,” and to (3) prevent sprawl by 
“redirecting states funds to encourage development projects where there is greatest 
need.”70 The following table provides an overview of Smart Growth activity in 
Maryland’s counties and neighborhoods. 
 
70 Language taken directly from the 1997 Smart Growth Areas Act passed by the Maryland General 
Assembly. See also Cohen (2002, p. 2). For a more detailed description of these five policy initiatives 




KEY MARYLAND SMART GROWTH POLICY INITIATIVES AND TARGETED AREAS 
Smart Growth Initiative Targeted Areas 
Priority Funding Areas (PFA)
Entire Baltimore city and immediate surrounding 
areas; Columbia; Ellicott City; Laurel; Aspen 
Hill; Wheaton; Bethesda; Rockville; 
Gaithersburg; Olney; Largo; Seat Pleasant; 
Arnold; Oxon Hill; Suitland; Clinton; Waldorf; 
St. Charles; La Plata; Lexington Park; Silver 
Spring; Potomac; Chesapeake Estates; 
Cambridge; Denton; Chestertown; Crisfield; 
Berlin; Ocean City; Elkton; Craigtown; North 
East; Perryville; Owings Mills; Reisterstown; 
Glen Burnie; Arnold 
Community Legacy Areas 
SW Baltimore County; Dundalk; Brooklyn; 
Newmarket; Easton; Trappe; Oxford; Salisbury; 
Pittsville; Willards; Fruitland; Smithsburg; 
Hagerstown 
Federal Protected Areas 
College Park; Greenbelt; Catoctin Mountain; 
Wildlife Refuge; Southern Frederick County; 
Martin National Wildlife Refuge; Sharpsburg 
Rural Legacy Areas 
Middletown,; Burkittsville; Keedysville; 
Barnesville; Poolesville; New Windsor; Patuxent 
River State Park; Baltimore County; 
Susquehanna State Park; Cecil County; Ridgely; 
Shaptown; Vienna; Hebron; Prince Frederick; 
East St. Charles; Brooksville; Upper Marlboro 
State Park or Forest Areas 
Seneca Creek State Park; Rosaryville State  Park; 
St. Mary’s River State Park; Greenwell State 
Park; Indian Head; Chapel Point State Park; Fort 
Washington; Patuxent River State Park 
Other Protected Areas 
Patapsco Valley State Park; Betterton; Tuckanoe 
State Park; Manchester; Emmitsburg 
Brownfields & Voluntary Clean-Up Sites 
Entire Baltimore City and immediate surrounding 
areas; Canton; Hampden; Arlington; Brooklyn 
Historic Preservation Tax Credit Sites 
Entire Baltimore City and immediate surrounding 
areas; Reisterstown; Randallstown; Owings 
Mills; Ellicott City; Lansdowne; Mount 
Washington; Pikesville, Towson; Lutherville 
New Schools Built or Additions,  
Renovations, or Replacements 
Entire Baltimore City and immediate surrounding 
areas; Lansdowne; Dundalk; Woodlawn; 
Catonsville; Randallstown; Reisterstown; 
Lutherville; Perry Hall; Middle River; Essex; 
Hamilton; Parkville; Brooklyn 
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Since its inception, the Maryland state legislature and Governor Glendening 
have passed or authorized additional laws and Smart Growth initiatives to assist in 
implementation efforts. Table 4.3 briefly describes these initiatives under 
Glendening’s tenure: 
TABLE 4.3 
EXAMPLES OF SMART GROWTH ACTION UNDERTAKEN BY  
GOVERNOR GLENDENING AND/OR STATE LEGISLATURE, 1997-2001 
Smart Growth Initiative Description Governor and/or  Legislative Action 
Smart Growth and 
Neighborhood Conservation 
Policy of 1998 
Directs agencies to oversee 
development projects and ensure 
that they adhere to state Smart 
Growth directives 
Governor Sponsorship, 
Legislative action (H.B. 1379) 
Forestry Legacy Program 
Earmarks $200 million in 






Rewards farmers with grants for 
voluntarily transforming 
cropland into riparian forests, 
vegetable buffers and wetlands 
Executive Order 
Buffer Incentive Program 
Landowners rewarded with 
grants to encourage protection 
of wetlands (ponds, rivers, 
lakes, streams) on their 
properties by 2010 
Executive Order 
Creation of Secretary of Smart 
Growth and Director of the 
Governor’s Office of Smart 
Growth 
These two cabinet level 
positions are established as 
separate, independent positions 
not housed in the Department of 
Planning 
Legislative action (S.B. 204) 
GreenPrint Program 
$145-million over a 5-year 
period to enhance land 
conservation investments and 
environmental protection 
Governor Sponsorship, 
Legislative action (H.B. 1379) 
Community Legacy, Heritage 
Legacy 
$11 earmarked funds for 
neighborhood revitalization 
efforts and historic preservation 
projects 
Governor Sponsorship, 
Legislative action (H.B. 301; 
S.B. 202) 
Income Tax Credit for Green 
Buildings 
Provides state income tax 
credits for buildings that meet 
state density, energy efficiency 
and environmental standards 
Legislative action (H.B. 8) 
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Smart Growth Arts and 
Entertainment Districts 
Authorizes DBED to establish 
arts and entertainment districts 
to encourage preservation of 
historic monuments and art 
exhibits 
Legislative action (H.B. 691) 
Maryland Heritage Structure 
Rehabilitation Tax Credit 
Extends tax credit grant 
amounts to encourage the rehab 
of historic areas, buildings, 
artifacts 
Legislative action (S.B. 496) 
Chesapeake Bay Critical Areas 
Restores the original objectives 
of the 1984 Critical Areas Act 
by protecting the 100-foot 
buffer along the shoreline from 
developer encroachment 
Legislative action (S.B. 326) 
Stormwater Management 
Prohibits using residentially 
zoned property for stormwater 
management 
Legislative action (S.B. 880) 
Phase IV: The Fourth Wave—A Wave of Change? Smart Growth’s Vision Under 
Governor Ehrlich 
 
Under the auspices of Glendening’s Office of Smart Growth, Smart Growth 
flourished because it drew widespread support and enthusiasm from nearly every 
community with a stake in the policy. Even though there may have been minor 
philosophical differences with respect to how the program was to be implemented, 
most supporters agreed with the underlying objectives of Smart Growth.71 Because 
Glendening was also the president of the National Governor’s Association, he was 
able to take full advantage of his position to encourage other governors to follow his 
lead and institute Smart Growth initiatives of their own. The Glendening Smart 
Growth doctrine was articulated in a report from the NGA called “Growing Pains: 
Quality of Life in the New Economy,” (Hirschhorn 2000). In that report, the NGA 
 
71 A major shortcoming of smart growth as a concept is disagreement between various communities as 
to what smart growth means and how best to implement the program. For example, to urban planners, 
smart growth might mean promoting high density development, “walkable” and bicycle communities, 
and a focus on master plans that ensure a sense of place and preserves neighborhood character. Among 
the environmentalists—by no means a monolith—some call for more land conservation efforts; others 
emphasize the importance of environmental justice, preservation of natural resources, and energy 
efficiency programs.  
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calls for the urgent need for all governors to address the sprawl problems and risks 
associated with inaction. Although the report does not necessarily call for Smart 
Growth by name, it does clearly include the language of Smart Growth in its 
prescriptive strategy to effectively combat sprawl.  
 Smart Growth activity has not abetted since Republican Governor, Robert L. 
Ehrlich’s succession to office. However, the momentum to push for additional Smart 
Growth efforts has slowed. Most noticeably, there have been some major 
administrative changes. The Governor’s Office of Smart Growth has been downsized 
and is now a much smaller administrative agency under the larger Department of 
Planning. In addition, faced with the possible threats to cut social programs and 
higher education from the governor, Democrats were forced to save these more 
pressing policy priorities by reducing the Smart Growth budget in fiscal year 2004.72 
Some Smart Growth advocates worry that Ehrlich has attempted to further 
undermine growth control efforts by aligning himself with fellow conservatives on 
more controversial and unpopular issues, such as the proposal to widen Route 32 in 
Howard County and his support for the Intercounty Connector (ICC).73 Democrats in 
 
72 For instance funds to administer the popular Live Near York Work and Job Tax Incentive Credit 
program have been drastically reduced. Local governments have attempted to pull together the funds 
or solicit funding resources from local charities and private foundations. See the Maryland FY2004 
Capital Budget, published by the Office of Budget and Management, Baltimore, MD. 
73 For instance, in a Baltimore Sun article, Director of 1000 Friends, Dru Schmidt-Perkins, claims that 
Governor Ehrlich seems noncommittal to the expansion of mass transit, instead arguing for high-end 
contracts to private developers for road expansion and other capital projects rather than a gas tax hike. 
The article, “Gov. Ehrlich Submits Transport Bill for Maryland Road, Mass Transit,” can be 
downloaded at www.baltimoresun.com/news/local/. In a discussion with another representative from 
the organization, Ehrlich is accused of paying “lip service” to smart growth in order to appease the 
Democrats in the House of Delegates but has no overriding commitment to smart growth. Generally 
speaking, supporters of the ICC believe that providing additional road access connecting Montgomery 
and Prince George counties would alleviate the annoying problems associated with sprawl, such as 
bottle necked traffic congestion along Interstates 495/95 and 270 highways. Opponents, primarily from 
environmental groups, counter that the proposed ICC project would actually cause severe 
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the General Assembly and the outgoing administrative heads disagree with Ehrlich on 
a host of Smart Growth issues, ranging from proposed cuts for Program Open Space 
and the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Program, to the desire by some 
conservatives to sell state owned land resources without legislative consent.74 Still, 
regardless of lingering doubts or antagonistic charges leveled at the governor, Ehrlich 
has continued the Smart Growth legacy by instituting his Priority Places pledge, 
which extends the emphasis on Brownfield and neighborhood redevelopment. And 
although some groups like Partners for Open Space and 1000 Friends of Maryland 
have criticized the governor for cutting conservation funds, the Ehrlich 
administration—though less vigorously committed to Smart Growth than his 
predecessor—continues to champion Smart Growth efforts.75 In an address to a 
congregation of farmers, environmentalists, real estate consultants, and various local 
and state officials at a Chesapeake Bay Foundation meeting, Ehrlich reaffirmed his 
commitment to Smart Growth: “I’m going places Republican governors have never 
gone. The sooner we get past the politics and (the notion) that because you’re pro-
environment, you’re anti agriculture, and if you’re pro-agriculture, you’re anti-
environment, the better off we’ll be.”76 Below is a brief summary of Smart Growth 
initiatives under Governor Ehrlich and his Democratic-controlled state legislature: 
 
environmental damage and would not provide relief to traffic congestion. 
74 For a description of these budget items, see the House Appropriations Committee Transportation 
and the Environment Subcommittee 2003 BRFA Decision Document, 2003 Session. This report is 
available from the Office of Budget and Management, Baltimore, MD. 
75 See Partners for Open Space report, “The High Cost of Conservation Cuts to Maryland’s Counties.” 
The report can be found at http://www.partnersforopenspace.org. The 1000 Friends annual report can 
be downloaded at http://www.friendsofmd.org/data/2003annualreportcompletepdf.
76 See “Gov. Ehrlich Urges Unity at Summit to Curb Nutrient Runoff into Chesapeake Bay,” (6 Aug 
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2003). News article can be found at www.newszap.com/dover.
77 Source: Governor’s Office of Smart Growth 2002 Annual Report. The report can be obtained from 
www.smartgrowth.state.md.us.
TABLE 4.4 
EXAMPLES OF SMART GROWTH ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY GOVERNOR 
EHRLICH AND/OR STATE LEGISLATURE,  
2002-200477 
Smart Growth Initiative Description Governor and/or  Legislative Action 
Maryland Smart Sites 
Provides technical assistance to 
local governments to help them 
market sites eligible for 
Brownfield Redevelopment 
Executive Order 
Smart Step Forward 
Provides $30,000 to local 
government entities to 




Smart Growth Collaborative 
Partnership with Homebuilders 
Association of Maryland, 1000 
Friends, Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation to address concerns 
from various interests in the 
Smart Growth community 
Executive Order 
Smart Growth Subcabinet and 
Coordinating Committee 
Provides a medium for 
interested parties to discuss 
administrative concerns related 




Preservation Tax Credit 
Extends tax credit to encourage 




Increases funding for state 
Brownfields Redevelopment 
program 
Legislative action (H.B. 294) 
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Section 4.2: Smart Growth and the Governor’s Office 
 Thus far we have discussed both Governor Glendening and Governor 
Ehrlich’s response to Smart Growth. During my interviews, I asked respondents to 
identify—from most to least important—the actor most influential in getting Smart 
Growth passed in Maryland.  Twenty-seven of the thirty-two respondents ranked the 
governor as the most influential, and seven out of the 32 chose the governor’s office 
as the second most influential actor in the Smart Growth movement. Taken together, 
a majority of the discussants said that the governor was either the most or second 
most important actor in terms of political prestige and influence. This finding is 
 
78 Source: Governor’s Office of Smart Growth 2002 Annual Report. The report can be obtained from 
www.smartgrowth.state.md.us.
TABLE 4.4 
EXAMPLES OF SMART GROWTH ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY GOVERNOR 
EHRLICH AND/OR STATE LEGISLATURE,  
2002-200478
Smart Growth Initiative Description Governor and/or  Legislative Action 
Conservations Easements Preserves land preservation easements 
Legislation action (H.B. 777; 
H.B. 820) 
Smart Growth Priority 
Funding Areas Designation by 
2 or more Counties 
Allows collaborative efforts 
between regional governments 
to designate PFAs 
Legislative action (H.B. 256) 
Establishment of the 
Maryland Agricultural Land 
Preservation Foundation 
Establishes a task force to study 
farmland land use Legislative action (H.B. 740) 
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hardly surprising, given the visibility and recognition of both governors and their 
respective roles. As one former Glendening cabinet member puts it: 
Of course, it’s the governor. Governor Glendening. Smart 
Growth was his vision—the centerpiece of his governmental 
agenda. Why this issue you ask above all others? Urban 
sprawl is a major problem for Maryland. The Chesapeake 
Bay’s health is declining. The state is dealing with incredible 
air and water pollution. Let’s not even talk about traffic 
congestion. It’s ridiculous. The planning community had a 
lot to do with it as well. And the legislature…well, it helps 
the governor to have the legislature on his side. When we 
started this thing, he was fairly popular and tended to win on 
most of his policy priorities. 
 
Another representative from the Department of Business & Economic 
Development (DBED) under current governor, Robert L. Ehrlich, stressed the 
continued visibility of the governor, even with a change in administration, but 
suggests that concerns expressed by developers may take precedence over Smart 
Growth if they continue to face an undue burden placed on them by growth controls: 
You know, regardless [of] where you stand on the issue of 
Smart Growth, the bottom line is that the governor can do 
whatever [he] wants. Even with [Governor] Ehrlich, he can 
implement the policy as he sees fit, according to his will; he 
can direct his agencies like us at DBED to encourage more 
small business involvement in this grant program. But if the 
state is struggling economically, he might then suggest to the 
legislature that they cut funds from other programs that the 
legislature might support. And he can veto most anything 
that comes before him that doesn’t sit well with the business 
community or with the administration’s policy agenda. 
We’ve all seen it done before. 
 
Republican delegate from Allegany County and a member of the American 
Exchange Legislative Council,79 agreed with the prominence of the governor: 
 
79 The American Exchange Legislative Council is a conservative, pro-growth organization 




If I have to, I can influence the governor to reject these 
proposals that impose too many restrictions on developers. 
These impact fees are hurting my constituents. I believe that 
he [Ehrlich] agrees with me on a philosophical level. He has 
the power to change the law if he wants or not to execute 
[sic]. Those Smart Growth people make it seem like growth 
is the enemy, but Smart Growth has done nothing to stop 
development in my community. Sure, they’ve tried to stop 
[the growth], but they haven’t succeeded where I’m from. 
And I know the governor agrees. The land conservation 
people have gone too far and that’s why we in the 
Appropriations committee will continue to cut those 
programs when they become too much. If they [Smart 
Growth advocates] claim to want a compromise, then they 
have to come to the bargaining table and stop telling my 
county and my constituents what to do with our land. 
 
And finally, a high ranking official from Partners For Maryland Open Space agreed 
that the Republican administration’s cuts in conservation funding has been 
detrimental to Maryland counties, but also believes that the administration’s action 
reflects a larger move towards additional cuts in Smart Growth programs: 
Counties and municipalities are hurting right now. They are 
hurting financially and need those funds to carry out state 
directives and promote conservation [efforts]. The governor 
has ultimate power right now, but even the pragmatic 
Democrats who are trying to find ways of balancing the 
budget will further hurt Smart Growth because they are 
going along with the governor’s mandate. What are they 
going to do? Cut more social programs to appease the 
governor; that will hurt them during election time when they 
are going to have to explain. I wonder what will happen. 
They can’t cut everything! 
 
Section 4.3: Smart Growth and the Maryland State Legislature 
The seeds of the Maryland Smart Growth law were planted in the legislature 
by some of its staunchest supporters, mostly from Baltimore County and Baltimore 
City. This was no accident, as the Baltimore region has long suffered from capital 
disinvestment and is perhaps the most economically distressed in the state. Local 
business leaders, like the Greater Baltimore Committee, threw early support behind 
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Smart Growth, as did many of the area conservation groups and urban planners, 
largely from the lauded urban planning program at the University of Maryland at 
Baltimore. What they had on their side was a governor who was determined to get 
Smart Growth passed in the legislature as quickly as possible. In order to achieve this, 
Governor Glendening needed willing legislators with enough clout and prestige who 
would sponsor the bill and oversee its progress. What better way to pursue this 
objective than to have the powerful Speaker of the House, Casper R. Taylor, Jr., to 
sponsor the legislation, sending it to the House Committee on Environmental Matters 
Chairman, Ronald A Guns,80 and then on to the Senate Economic and Environmental 
Affairs and Budget and Taxation committees for favorable review.  
The Senate version, S.B. 389, quickly passed both the committee and full 
chamber with amendments. The most important of these amendments concerned 
giving the counties—who were initially opposed to Smart Growth—an enhanced 
authority to help city and municipal governments identify their priority funding areas. 
This amended bill passed the full assembly on second reading, March 26, 1997, with 
only 12 dissenting votes. Though most of these votes came from Republicans, a 
majority of the 57 Republican members of the assembly joined with Democrats in 
support of the Smart Growth legislation. When asked why Republicans signed on in 
support of Maryland Smart Growth, one prominent Republican from Cecil County 
and a sponsor of the Senate version that eventually became law explains: 
 
80 The initial House version, H.B. 508, called for the establishment of priority funding areas and 
included a provision requiring the Office of Planning to oversee local or county government 
designation of those areas. This version was quite controversial and was rejected by the Maryland 
Association of Counties. 
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One of the reasons why I personally supported this 
legislation was not so much that I was in agreement with 
everything it said, I just thought that the bill was more in line 
with my personal views on how growth should be 
managed—at the local level with local government input. 
Had the original version of the bill passed [the one with the 
provision for the state planning office to oversee local 
government planning], then I would have voted against the 
bill. And yet there are still a number of Republicans who 
disagree with this Smart Growth thing, but go along with it 
because it sounds like a good idea. It’s kind of like marrying 
this bold, new idea or concept with actual action. And me 
being on the [Education, Health &] Environmental Matters 
committee, I feel that I still have some responsibility to 
[make] sure that I am at least as concerned about the 
Chesapeake Bay and other overriding environmental issues 
that everyone else in this state is concerned with. I guess 
that’s why I signed on to this bill in the first place. 
 
Aside from this senator’s perspective, I spoke with other prominent 
legislators who were the most involved with Smart Growth legislation and who were 
largely responsible for overseeing its passage. In the House of Delegates and in 
conjunction with the Speaker, there’s former member of the Oversight Committee on 
Program Open Space & Agricultural Land Preservation (1993-1998), and now the 
Chair of the House Committee on Environmental Matters, Maggie McIntosh, who 
threw her early and unwavering support for Maryland’s Project Open Space and 
Glendening’s Smart Growth initiative. Chairman McIntosh, a representative of 
Baltimore City’s 43rd District, is a staunch supporter of Smart Growth who had a 
hand in working with the governor’s office and a conservation group, Partners for 
Maryland Open Space. Also in the House is Montgomery County Delegate Peter 
Franchot, representing the Takoma Park area. Delegate Franchot, a member of the 
powerful Appropriations Committee since 1987, expressed support in backing Smart 
Growth initiatives in the state and in his district, in particular, which he says suffers 
some of the “greatest injustices stemming from urban sprawl.” 
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However, once the Smart Growth bill was sent to the Senate, many of the 
initial provisions were reworked and shaped into what we now know as a 
compromised version of Smart Growth, which incorporated some of the wishes from 
the most enthusiastic of Smart Growth advocates, balanced with the wishes of the 
county governments and the real estate and developer industries. The Senate version, 
sponsored by Senators Clarence W. Blount, Michael J. Collins and now Chairman of 
the Senate Education, Health and Environmental Affairs Committee, Joan Carter 
Conway, was accepted by a near-unanimous vote, even with most of the 15 
Republicans signing on. Most of the sponsors of the Senate compromised version 
represented the Baltimore region. As one of the most recognizable and influential of 
the Baltimore Delegation asserts: 
We realized that we could not alienate businesses in our 
communities; that the final version must be in keeping with 
the bill’s original intent as the governor envisioned it, and 
that was to encourage business involvement, while at the 
same time, being mindful of the concerns from the counties 
and environmental groups. I think we just may have 
assuaged many of the fears of the [Smart Growth] program 
at that time because we really worked hard to appease 
everyone on board. Yes, there are still some of those 
lingering concerns from the developer industry; they don’t 
like what we are doing and how we are pushing for Smart 
Growth, but at least we still got some support from some [of 
those] in the business community. It’s going to be quite a 
challenge. But we still had to clean up some of that bill’s 
language because it just wouldn’t fly and the counties would 
not be on board. Well…they still aren’t really on board—not 
all of them—but the majority of them are, like Baltimore 
City, P. G. [Prince George’s County], Montgomery 
County…and now even Carroll County is coming around to 
the table. 
So what is the state of Smart Growth in the state legislature today? Numerous 
pieces of legislation have been enacted, including Senate Bill 208 (2000), which 
called for “Smart Coded” infill development projects in many of the state’s poorest 
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neighborhoods, but also requires state agencies to work in conjunction with the local 
governments on ways to extend tax incentives to attract potential real estate 
investment.81 In the House, Delegates John Leopold (R-District 31) and Samuel 
Rosenberg (D-District 43), have worked together to reinforce the state’s commitment 
to preserving county level authority in the Smart Growth movement. Their co-
sponsored legislation, H.B. 256, has the purpose of allowing two or more contiguous 
county jurisdictions to work together in designating their priority funding areas. This 
legislation passed with overriding support from both sides of the aisle, with many of 
the state’s 23 counties and Baltimore City expressing both support and relief. Still, 
the legislature is working within the context of divided government, and some 
legislators expressed concern that Governor Ehrlich has given an unclear or 
ambiguous stance on Smart Growth.82 Though they acknowledge his vocal 
commitment to Smart Growth, they worry that his cuts in various Smart Growth 
funding is just the beginning of what’s to come; that is, more of the same—cuts and 
more cuts to Smart Growth. 
 Interest groups have also weighed in on how well the state general assembly 
has been attuned to environmental issues. The Maryland League of Conservation 
Voters, for instance, has published a legislative scorecard every year since 1979 that 
 
81 Many of these smart growth initiatives are sponsored by some of the same champions of the earliest 
smart growth legislation, including The President of the Senate (Mike Miller) and Senators Blount, 
Collins, Conway and then-Senator Chris Van Hollen. 
82For instance, one of the legislators I spoke with believes that Governor Ehrlich seems moved by 
pressures placed on him by business organizations to sell some of the state land resources for private 
development (recorded on February 23, 2003). Pressure is amounting on all levels: from transportation 
interests who want to build an inter-county connector; from developer industries who want lax 
regulations on density requirements; and from pro-environmentalists who want the governor to take a 
more active role in protecting the bay. 
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rates Maryland state legislators on their commitment to the environment based on 
how they vote on a host of conservation topics. According to one representative, the 
scorecard also provides a fairly accurate prediction of how legislators will vote on 
future environmental issues. Based on the ratings for the 2001-2002 legislative 
session, we can get a good sense of how well Smart Growth and related issues have 
fared in the general assembly. Below is a table summary of the average percentage 
votes for the legislature:83 
TABLE 4.5 
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE VOTE ON CONSERVATION & SMART GROWTH ISSUES, 
1998-2002 
2001-2002 1999-2000 1995-1998 
Senate: 60% 56% 67% 
Republicans: 20% 35% 41% 
Democrats: 76% 70% 79% 
House: 66% 63% 52% 
Republicans: 29% 23% 24% 
Democrats: 79% 75% 64% 
Highest scores (100%) for Senators: Blount, Carter Conway, Green, Frosh, Pinsky, Schrader; for Delegates:
Barkley, Bobo, Clagett, Dembrow, Franchot, Grosfeld, Heller, Hurson, Kopp, A. Jones, V. Jones, Mandel, 
McHale, Menes, Moe, Pitkin, Rosso, Turner; Lowest Scores (0%) for Senators: Haines, Hooper, Jacobs; for 
Delegates: Bates, Brinkley, Greenip, J. Kelly, Pielke 
Table 4.5 shows variation in support for environmental issues in both 
chambers of the general assembly. The Senate, long known as the more conservative 
chamber, appears slightly less committed to conservation efforts overall, according to 
the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scorecard, and has a lower overall 
percentage than the House. Yet, in the earliest years of Smart Growth, we see greater 
support for environmental issues in the Senate than in the House, even among 
Republicans. By 2000, there was a slight drop in voting for environmental issues in 
 
83Higher percentages indicate the average amount of times votes are cast in favor of 
conservation/environmental issues. Each legislator is also assigned a percentage score based on his or 
her total number of floor and committee votes. The entire report and scorecard are available at the 
Maryland League of Conversation Voters at http://www.mdlcv.org/score.htm. 
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the Senate but an increase in support for conservation legislation in the House. 
Democrats in both chambers are more consistent in their voting records on 
environmental issues, their support averaging at around 75% for all years. Support 
from Republicans in both chambers appears more varied, especially in the Senate, 
where from 1995 to 1998, they registered the highest percentage at 41%. From then 
on, the LCV scores for Republicans in the Senate have declined sharply, whereas in 
the House, Republican support has remained steady over the entire period under 
investigation. 
The Legislature and Regional Differences 
TABLE 4.6 
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE VOTE ON CONSERVATION & SMART GROWTH ISSUES, 
BY REGION, 1998-2002 
Senate House 
Region 2001-2002 1999-2000 1995-1998 2001-2002 1999-2000 1995-1998 
Western MD 13% 19% 20% 39% 28% 22% 
Baltimore 69% 63% 83% 60% 53% 41% 
Howard 53% 47% 65% 66% 66% 62% 
Montgomery 74% 63% 87% 72% 82% 72% 
Prince George’s 80% 81% 92% 82% 84% 77% 
Southern Maryland 68% 47% 39% 48% 42% 23% 
Anne Arundel 59% 57% 62% 61% 57% 38% 
Harford 0% 16% 24% 56% 61% 33% 
Eastern Shore 23% 27% 12% 53% 63% 23% 
Baltimore City 79% 74% 87% 78% 68% 69% 
It should be apparent to the observer right away that there are regional 
differences with respect to voting behavior on environmental issues. More striking, 
however, is that these regional differences also reflect variations in political ideology. 
The conservative areas of Southern Maryland, Western Maryland and rural Hartford 
counties, for instance, have lower voting scores on environmental issues than the 
more moderate Howard and Anne Arundel counties; and much lower than the 
progressive (metropolitan) areas of Prince George’s County, Baltimore City and 
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Montgomery County. We do witness these differences being played out in the state 
legislature as Smart Growth legislation was being debated. Smart Growth efforts have 
been relatively popular in Baltimore City and Prince George’s County, and the 
majority of the county delegations have thrown full support for Smart Growth. The 
response to Smart Growth in Montgomery County has been slightly more varied, due 
in some part, to disagreements between the county government, headed by a self-
proclaimed liberal County Executive, Doug M. Duncan, and state administrative 
agencies. For instance, Duncan found himself at odds with the Smart Growth 
community and his own county council on plans for the Inter-County Connector, 
which he thoroughly supports. And there have been slight differences of opinion of 
how much power the county should retain with respect to administering Smart 
Growth initiatives.84 But generally speaking, Smart Growth advocates have prevailed 
in these areas. 
 Corporate organizations, like the state and county Chambers of Commerce, 
produce their own ratings report to gauge how business-friendly Maryland elected 
officials have been with respect to their voting habits. The Maryland Business for 
Responsive Government (MBRG) maintains its tally of legislative commitment to 
business interests across the state. The ratings indicate the degree to which each 
 
84 Former Montgomery County councilwoman, Nancy Dacek and other prominent members of the 
council, including its president, Steve Silverman, vied with Duncan and sided with smart growth 
advocates on this one controversial issue. Duncan argued that the interstate plan would actually boost 
potential business for the region. But Duncan’s efforts to promote the ICC failed when Montgomery 
County residents rallied with smart growth and other opponents to defeat the measure. Opponents 
believe that the ICC plan would cost citizens too much and based on an environmental impact study 
from the Sierra Club, they argued that the plan would actually promote sprawl and further pollute the 
Chesapeake Bay and the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers by increasing toxic runoff.  
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elected state official supports the interests of the organization for the specified year. 
Below I have included a summary of the ratings from the 2002 legislative session:85 
TABLE 4.7 
MARYLAND BUSINESS FOR RESPONSIVE 
GOVERNMENT RATING SCORE 








The Senate appears to be more conservative, registering over 52% in favor of 
business-oriented legislation. Senate Republicans received a score of over 80% from 
the MBRG. In stark contrast, their Democratic counterparts were awarded a score of 
only 39% in the Senate, and an even lower score in the House (25%). This score may 
suggest that Democrats in the House are more liberal than their Senate neighbors, 
which may be true even for Republicans. Moreover, the House of Delegates, as a 
whole, was given a collective score of only 35% for their commitment to corporate 
and business concerns, according to the MBRG scorecard. Based on the full report, 
the regional differences reflect variations in political ideology. The districts of 
Western and Southern Maryland, the more conservative, rural areas of the state, 
registered higher scores among their elected officials for business and industry than 
did the more liberal and urban communities of Baltimore City and the Washington, 
 
85 For a more complete report, the entire scorecard may be downloaded at Project Vote Smart, 
http://www.vote-smart.org/issue_rating_detail.php?sig_id=002971M. I calculated the averages for 
each chamber of the general assembly. 
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D.C. metropolitan area (Prince George’s, Montgomery, and some areas of Howard 
and Anne Arundel counties).  
Interviewees were asked to give their opinion of how influential the 
legislature was in encouraging passage of the Smart Growth legislation in Maryland. 
Only 3 of the 32 respondents cited the legislature as most influential, with the 
governor coming in a close second. As a prominent moderate Republican from Anne 
Arundel explained: 
I don’t really have a role other than that of a staunch 
supporter of [smart] growth. I signed on and helped to draft 
some of the legislation for that bill, along with my 
colleagues. Governor Glendening [is the most influential], 
but he can’t do it alone. He needs [the] support of a vast 
number of legislators. Without us his policy would have 
failed. I would choose the legislature first, then the governor, 
because the legislative committees in both houses were 
crucial in disseminating information about this issue. And 
the staff is indispensable. Of course, you already know how 
hard they work for us. Some of the executive agencies, and 
of course all the groups that supported us. 
 
And a representative from the 1000 Friends of Maryland echoed the sentiments of her 
Republican counterpart, citing the significant role of legislative committees: 
To be completely honest, our participation in subcommittee 
and committee level hearings certainly guaranteed the 
support of legislature. Because you know in the beginning, 
there was a lot of confusion as to what we were about. And 
we’re a fledgling organization, so when we arrived before 
the legislators, they kind of was curious as to who we were 
and what we were doing in Annapolis. And when they 
learned about how many supporters we actually had, they 
seemed more inclined to move forward. They could have 
totally ignored us because [Governor] Glendening thought 
that he had already convinced many in the legislative 
community. But the truth is that he hadn’t. There was still 
confusion, so to get the legislators on board, we had to make 
ourselves clear. And the legislature could’ve have slashed 




Finally, a representative from the conservative think thank, Partnership for 
Quality Growth, explains that it was the legislature that moved to carry out the wishes 
of the governor in terms of finding ways of bringing businesses to the bargaining 
table. As he puts it: 
I would say [that] at the time, I would choose the legislature. 
We worked closely with several committees, including this 
very powerful Senate Committee on the Budget and the 
other one [Ways And Means], testifying on behalf of the real 
estate and developer industries and against Smart Growth. 
And even though we don’t really go along with Smart 
Growth as a concept, I think we understood why our 
concerns would be better addressed [at] the committee 
[level] because that’s where we got our points across the 
most. We presented research to support our claims. And 
even now after Smart Growth has been law for the last five 
years or so, we are finding that our relationship with 
legislators is very important. If I had to choose today, I 
would I would be more inclined to choose the governor’s 
office, but at the time [when] Smart Growth was being 
discussed, the legislature was more involved in the 
arguments that were presented in subcommittee. 
 
Apart from these 3 who placed the legislature at the top of the list of most important 
actors, most respondents rated the legislature as the second most important actor 
behind the governor. Based on the interviews, I conclude that other actors, including 
groups and representatives from other communities (citizen organizations, research 
think tanks, etc.) are not as prominent as the legislature or the governor when it 
comes to Smart Growth passage in Maryland.  
 
Section 4.4: Interest Groups 
 
In the preceding chapters, I argued that along with the governor and the state 
legislature, interest groups played a pivotal role in the passage of Maryland’s Smart 
Growth initiative. More specifically, I argued that two opposing groups—
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environmentalists and real estate/construction industries—use tactical resources, 
namely campaign contributions, to either encourage or prevent Smart Growth 
passage. Environmental or conservation interests, spend more on campaigns to 
encourage Smart Growth passage, while pro-business interests work against such 
efforts and will spend money to counter Smart Growth enactment.  
In Chapter 3, the results from my statistical analysis revealed a surprising 
outcome: while campaign contributions from the construction industry had no effect 
on the passage of Smart Growth, the results suggest an inverse relationship between 
campaign funding from environmental groups and Smart Growth passage. That is, the 
results showed that as environmentalists devote less of their budget to Smart Growth 
causes, the more likely Smart Growth will pass. This is the exact opposite of what I 
argued—that with more spending, not less, Smart Growth passes. I offered an 
alternative explanation for this finding. I suggested that with repeated interactions 
with decision makers, groups have an opportunity to establish a rapport with 
legislators and can gain some insight on how they are likely to vote on a host of 
related issues. Of course, the credibility of this argument depends on whether or not 
the group has adequate access to legislators, and provided that there is relatively little 
electoral turnover. In the state of Maryland, my assumptions about the behavior of 
environmental groups as it relates to the tactical skills used to influence legislative 
voting proved correct. Environmental groups may not influence legislators with 
campaign funds because they already know how supporters—and detractors—will 
vote on the issues of growth management and Smart Growth.  
130 
 
There are many state and local level environmental organizations, too 
numerous to list here. Perhaps one of the largest and most visible of these 
conservation groups is the 1000 Friends of Maryland. 1000 Friends of Maryland is a 
collaborative outfit of literally thousands of “friends” who have made generous 
contributions to the organization’s various environmental causes. Among the 
benefactors include some private corporate entities like the Abell Foundation, the 
Maryland Downtown Development Association, and other conservation groups, such 
as the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the Sierra Club. Other contributions are 
generated from ordinary citizens. Donations range from $20 to well over $20,000.86 
1000 Friends was and remains one of the major players in the Maryland Smart 
Growth movement, helping to bring awareness to the public at large about sprawl-
related issues, and assisted the state of Maryland and its local government entities 
with what they view as “sound approaches” to managed growth. 
 The 1000 Friends and their affiliated organizations (the Sierra Club, 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Baltimore Regional Partnership, and the APA, among 
others), were instrumental in guiding the Smart Growth policy by lending suggestions 
to both governors Glendening and Ehrlich on hot button topics, such as growth 
boundaries, priority funding areas, Chesapeake preservation, and encouraging more 
efficient mass transit.87 In their own 1000 Friends Smart Growth Platform, they call 
for implementation tools that county governments can use to assist them with their 
Smart Growth plans. Since the passage of the Smart Growth Areas Act in 1997, the 
 
86 See the 2003 Annual Report available at www.friendsofmd.org.




coalition has continued its close connection with state legislators and the governor’s 
office, testifying before both the House of Delegates and the Senate well over one 
hundred times since Smart Growth’s inception.88 Although the coalition has been 
active in promoting Smart Growth issues, one of its major claims to fame was its push 
to block governor Ehrlich’s proposal to increase funding for the controversial 
Intercounty Connector (ICC); instead, it sought to encourage the legislature’s move to 
establish an impact study on the environmental hazards that an ICC would impose on 
Maryland citizens living in Montgomery County, Prince George’s County, the 
Greater Baltimore area, and the Washington, D.C. corridor. As a result, Senate Joint 
Resolution 8 was passed with overwhelming legislative support by Democrats, with 
some Republicans joining.89 So while I didn’t find evidence that campaign funding 
from these groups made any difference in terms of Smart Growth passage, I did 
discover that environmental groups’ influence was attributed to their research and 
informational role, raising consciousness about urban sprawl, and working with both 
the executive and legislative branches to bring more awareness to this issue. And I 
also discovered that these organizations continue to have ongoing relationships with 
elected officials in this capacity, which lends credence to my argument that perhaps 
the influence of groups is more indirect and based on repeated interactions with 
decision makers who rely on groups for this purpose. 
 
88 The 1000 Friends of Maryland Platform is available at http://www.friendsofmd.org/platform.html.
Again, 1000 comprises various organizations like the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Friends of the 
Chesapeake, The Maryland Homebuilders Association, Smart Growth America (now headed by former 
Department of Planning head, Harriet Tregoning), and the Greater Baltimore Alliance. Collectively 
these organizations have appeared before legislative committees in both houses of the state general 
assembly over a 100 times, according to one representative of the organization. 
89 Enacted March 14, 2002. 
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On the other side of the debate are most pro-businesses, real estate and 
construction industries. Bolstered by research from moderate to conservative think 
tanks and armed with equally convincing counterarguments, the Smart Growth 
opposition has not given up its fight in Maryland. Take the Partnership for Quality 
Growth coalition, for instance—a viable counterpart to 1000 Friends of Maryland. 
The Partnership for Quality Growth consists of numerous organizations, including the 
Construction Industry Manufacturers Association, the American Board & 
Transportation Builders Association, and the Transportation Construction Coalition.90 
Although the coalition could not successfully thwart Smart Growth passage in 
Maryland, it has established its own growth “toolkit,” comparable to that of the 
American Planning Associations’ Planning for Smart Growth (2002) series or the 
National Governors Association’s Growing Pains (2000) report. This toolkit, called 
“Building Better Communities: A Toolkit for Quality Growth” (2000), offers a 
comprehensive critique of Smart Growth in general and Maryland’s Smart Growth 
initiative, in particular. The Smart Growth vision, they contend, is incompatible with 
traditional American values. The central charge against Maryland’s Smart Growth 
program is that as long as the average American is willing to tolerate long driving 
commutes in exchange for the choice to live in the suburbs on spacious lots and take 
advantage of better schools, then Smart Growth cannot expect to successfully address 
concerns stemming from sprawl.91 The implication is that sprawl is partly a reflection 
 
90 See organizational webpage, http://www.qualitygrowth.org.
91 pp. 17-18. 
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of a consumer choice about where development ought to take place, and therefore 
cannot be controlled solely by land use regulations.92 
As for Maryland’s celebrated Priority Funding Areas program, the coalition 
argues that placing strict regulatory barriers on where growth can occur not only 
impedes sensible growth, but also leads to increased housing prices within and 
immediately surrounding the PFAs. In fact, the imposition of PFAs, according to 
opponents, may actually exacerbate sprawl by encouraging leapfrog development to 
outer-ring suburbs.93 In sum, the anti-Smart Growth movement in Maryland, led by 
many pro-business and construction interests, in general, argue that the market must 
be free to operate in accordance with citizen demand and that other, more 
“pragmatic” market-centered solutions to sprawl, ought to be considered. Growth 
management strategies should be guided by this concept of “choice,” rather than 
bureaucratic-oriented ones. So, for instance, adding additional traffic lanes in the 
most congested areas and allocating general obligation funds for highway and road 
expansion could, in their view, alleviate sprawl, and at the same time, preserve 
citizens’ right to own and operate cars.94 
Many other pro-business and anti-Smart Growth groups have emerged over 
the course of the 6 years since Maryland instituted the program. I have spent some 
 
92 A 2002 Consumers Survey conducted by the National Association of Realtors and the National 
Association of Home Builders found that while 64% of suburban respondents surveyed wished that 
their homes were larger, 62% felt that it is most important that houses be spread out, nearly one-half 
(49%) cited the residential builder/developer as being most responsible for urban sprawl and about 
70% of the sample viewed urban sprawl as a “very serious” or “serious” problem. Report available 
from the National Association of Realtors and the National Association of Home Builders, April 22, 
2002. 
93 Ibid. p. 18. 
94 Ibid. p. 24. 
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time with representatives from these organizations, including the Greater Baltimore 
Board of Realtors and the Transportation Construction Coalition to get a better 
understanding of how their role in the Maryland Smart Growth movement has 
evolved overtime. While these groups initially lost the battle over Smart Growth in 
Maryland, some of them feel empowered by current political trends. Others argue that 
they were proven right about Smart Growth. To them, the Smart Growth movement 
has failed, and further efforts to reinvigorate the movement will also fail.95 
When asked who were the most important players of the Smart Growth 
movement in Maryland, 3 of the 32 respondents said that businesses rank at the top. 
A leader from the pro-business group, the Maryland Highway Contractors, ranked 
business groups as the most important actors, with governor coming in second and the 
legislature third. According to him: 
Very few understand the efforts we put into meeting with the 
governor [Glendening] to try and persuade him to suggest 
other ways of implementing tax incentive programs that 
would support our organizational objectives. It’s not that I 
think he was hostile to business. [Quite] the contrary. He 
seemed opened to our concerns. We never really had to go 
through the legislature at all. He had an open door policy 
where we could just schedule a meeting with Secretary [of 
Transportation] Porcari. And he seemed like he wanted to 
appease us or at least listen to what we had to say. 
 
Section 4.5: The Determinants of Smart Growth Policy in Maryland 
 
Discussants were asked to give their opinions on what they think is the most 
important political or economic factor, if any, that had the greatest impact on Smart 
 
95 Maryland Association of Realtors, The Maryland Association of Counties, ALEC, and others, for 
instance, have made public statements against the Maryland smart growth program, claiming that 
growth boundaries have not stopped sprawl. Most sprawl related problems are attributed, not to 
excessive growth, but to population growth and migratory patterns (more people moving to suburbs 
and away from cities). 
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Growth passage in Maryland. They were asked to rank—again, in order of 
importance—political ideology, political party, the state of the economy, or some 
other spurious factor. Each of these potential determinants were assigned a number 
ranging from 1 to 4, with 1 representing the factor they felt to have the greatest 
impact on Smart Growth, 2 representing the second most important factor, 3 
representing the third most important determinant of Smart Growth, and finally 4, if 
they chose some other issue mentioned. 
 A noticeable pattern emerged with respect to the responses presented in this 
survey. Discussants seemed more inclined to give political parties a low order of 
importance than other factors, particularly ideology and the state of the economy. As 
I have emphasized previously, Smart Growth in Maryland was touted as a bipartisan 
effort. Yet, 12 of the 32 responses suggest that party has some importance, albeit not 
as influential as ideology, where 13 of the 32 ranked ideology as most important, and 
7 of 32, as second most important. Still, party influence does not lag that far behind. I 
attribute this finding to a recurring theme that many respondents seem to allude to: 
The two major political parties have become more polarized than ever. The current 
cohort of Republicans is more conservative than their counterparts were ten years 
ago. Democrats, on the other hand, come from varied communities, so there is still a 
mixture of liberal, moderate and conservative Democrats; however, the liberals did 
have their say in the Smart Growth movement, particularly the ones that aligned 
themselves with progressive conservation groups. Case in point, a member of the 
House of Delegates Committee on Environmental Matters from Baltimore City, had 
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established a close-knit relationship with the Partners of Open Space. She maintains 
that: 
There seems to be a wave of conservatism flowing 
throughout the country at the moment. But Maryland is very 
interesting. The southern and western parts of the state are 
conservative; the urban and inland areas are more 
progressive. But I’ve seen changes even in these so-called 
conservative areas. Cecil County is coming around to some 
Smart Growth ideas. So is Garrett. But the conservative 
areas are not standing for some of this. Hartford, some parts 
of Howard, Worchester. There will always be a staunch 
conservative contingent that will come after us idealistic 
liberals. 
 
Our Republican friend from Anne Arundel has a slightly different take:  
 
Yes, there some Republicans who are a lot more 
conservative, so yes, I think you’re right. But don’t 
underestimate us moderates, either. We stood with some 
Democrats to oppose the ICC. Well, I’m not sure that some 
Democrats want to embrace the liberal label, though. That 
liberal [label] gets [them] into some serious trouble and 
Republicans know it. Still, maybe if Smart Growth is 
continued to be thought of as a liberal enterprise, then there 
will be more resistance if the conservatives have their way. 
 
A delegate from Prince George’s County, however, is one of the few legislators who 
believe that political parties have not lost their influence, and the change in 
administration, for instance, has had detrimental consequences for Smart Growth in 
his district: 
On the one hand, I would say that party doesn’t matter, but 
let’s face it, since this administration has assumed power, I 
am finding outright hostility to what we’re trying to do in 
P.G. [Prince George’s] County and in my district. We have 
all these rehabilitation proposals set before the legislature, 
and while my colleagues are on board, the administration is 
cutting many of these programs. My friends on the other side 
of the aisle could care less about Smart Growth. We’re 
trying to increase funds for school construction. P.G. has 
137 
 
some of the worst schools, you know. But, as I said, 
Republicans are trying to subtly thwart rehab efforts in P.G., 
yet they want us to support their transportation proposals. 
It’s no go!  
 
Section 4.6: Smart Growth and the Economy 
Although I found no evidence to suggest that the health of the economy 
mattered in terms of Smart Growth passage in Maryland, 12 of the 32 respondents 
from my discussions chose the economy as the most significant factor, and 16 
respondents ranked the economy second only to ideology as the most important 
determinant of Smart Growth. The pro-business lobby, in particular, was more 
inclined to view the economy as the most significant factor in determining how Smart 
Growth would fare in the state. Additionally, representatives from the executive 
branch were also more likely to rank the state of the economy high, either the most or 
second most important factor influencing Smart Growth. As one representative96 from 
the anti-Smart Growth community who placed economic conditions at the top of the 
list, argued: 
I don’t think it’s a mistake that Smart Growth [in Maryland] 
just got lucky. It was implemented during a time of relative 
economic prosperity. With concerns about an impending 
recession, a possible war…well, that seems inevitable right 
now, we can’t expect Smart Growth to go much further. The 
state economy must take precedence because we face 
enormous deficits. 
 
96 Respondent represents the Homebuilders Association of Maryland, which opposes smart growth 
initiatives. The association policy position holds that smart growth drives up housing costs to both 




Another discussant from the Maryland League of Conservation Voters also 
expressed how the state of the economy has an impact on how well Smart Growth has 
fared in the state of Maryland. As she contends: 
Even with all the mounting evidence that suggests how much 
people are listening to us and taking a stance against [urban] 
sprawl, they are also more concerned with their pockets. And 
Marylanders haven’t been doing too well in that department 
lately. The big issue now is this whole state medical 
insurance industry and how the citizens will be impacted by 
changes in health insurance. That whole slots [controversy] 
as well. And then there’s the debate on higher education and 
what to do about that. Tuition is going up. These are the 
things people care about, even if they also care about traffic, 
air pollution—that kind of thing. For some reason, with all 
the work we have done to bring these issues to light, they 
just become less important than your everyday ‘how do we 
make ends meet,’ bread and butter concerns. 
 
And finally, a very prominent leader of the House Appropriations Committee, 
a Democrat from Baltimore City, a moderate, and a pragmatist concurs with the 
business community: 
It’s always heartbreaking to have to decide which programs 
to cut. Cutting [higher] education is totally out of the 
question. But something has to [be] done and some group is 
always going to be mad, but the Maryland economy is 
faltering. We made some mistakes in the past. In prior 
[legislative] sessions [under Governor Glendening] we spent 
too much money, spending surpluses and draining Rainy 
Day funds. We gave him everything he wanted and failed to 
think ahead. Now we’re paying for it because now we have 
to balance the budget and we’re already faced with little or 
no funds [for every program] that we like. But the economy 
dictates what one can and cannot do and some people will 
have to suffer during these tough times. 
 
Based on my interaction with the respondents, I can conclude that the health of the 
economy is salient but not as important as the influence of political factors, such as 
ideology and political parties. This conclusion is consistent with my finding in the 
previous chapter: political factors outperform economic conditions or concerns about 
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the health of the state economy. And even though many respondents expressed 
reservations about Smart Growth when concerns about the state of the economy take 
precedence, I did not encounter enough evidence that would suggest that the economy 
matters more than ideology or other political factors.  
 
Section 4.7: Conclusion—Smart Growth Begins Here! 
 
Undoubtedly the state of Maryland has become the leader of the American 
Smart Growth movement, thanks in large part, to a governor who had an innovative 
vision, political resources, and support from various advocates, to guide Smart 
Growth to its fruition. In this chapter, I provided an account of that vision and traced 
the historical development of Smart Growth in Maryland. This Smart Growth case 
study also involved discussions with thirty-two key players in the Maryland Smart 
Growth community. Based on these discussions, I came away with a fascinating 
account of Smart Growth in the state and gained more insight on how politics played 
a vital role in the enactment of the Smart Growth program. More importantly, my 
observations led to interesting findings. 
First, my interactions with those directly involved in the Maryland Smart 
Growth movement helped clear up several misconceptions I had about the politics of 
Smart Growth. I learned that resistance to Smart Growth is not necessarily rooted in 
pro-business sentiment across the board. In fact, based on interviews with 
representatives of the business, construction and developer communities, the success 
of Smart Growth very much depended on cooperative agreements between various 
stakeholders often on opposite sides of the issue. Some representatives from the 
construction industry had a say in how Maryland Smart Growth program would be 
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implemented, and the popularity of incentive-based strategies seemed to appease 
some in the industry. Still, it ought to be noted that in a general sense, most 
construction or developer interests are wary of Smart Growth in Maryland, and there 
is still resistance from these communities. 
Second, while cities like Baltimore, College Park, and Rockville strive to 
promote and incorporate Smart Growth strategies to address sprawl, resistance comes 
from county level governments. My discussions with county level personnel reveal a 
cautious acceptance of Smart Growth, especially in the more conservative counties 
like St. Mary’s and Carroll. In these counties, in particular, there has always been a 
strong property rights culture and citizens are quite active in property rights 
demonstrations and pending legal action against eminent domain initiatives. In 
contrast, Prince George’s County, Baltimore County, and Montgomery County have 
registered strong support for Smart Growth, albeit small disagreements with respect 
to issues like the ICC and the extension of a Purple Metro transit line. Howard 
County, a politically moderate county, has had an interesting turn around with respect 
to Smart Growth support. Some conservatives in the county, although initially leery 
about Smart Growth, eventually signed on with the promise of more state funding for 
roads. However, the controversial plan to expand Route 32 created a backlash with 
some Smart Growth supporters who disagreed with the plan. Those who did agree 
with the plan—Smart Growth supporters and opponents, citizens groups, and county 




Third, and most important, I stressed the overwhelming importance of 
political ideology and its impact on Smart Growth passage in Maryland. Smart 
Growth enjoyed widespread support amongst Maryland’s most progressive elite. 
Governor Glendening, while moderate on some social and economic issues, is often 
viewed as one of the most liberal of all state governors. His loyal supporters are some 
of the most liberal in the General Assembly and represent liberal areas of the state 
from Prince George’s and Montgomery counties. In contrast, Smart Growth 
opponents tend to represent the more conservative, rural areas of the state in the 
western and southern regions, including Worchester, Frederick, Carroll and Wimico 
counties.  
Nevertheless, Smart Growth’s greatest achievement is that the program, as 
implemented, represents a compromise between opposing groups, with both 
Republicans and Democrats signing on. When Glendening’s successor, Republican 
Robert Ehrlich, became Maryland’s governor, there was some Republican backlash 
against Smart Growth. However, I attribute this backlash to a wave of conservatism 
that has taken place over the course of the last five years or so. According to most 
respondents in my survey, it is the governor who is the most important figure in the 
Maryland Smart Growth movement. The Glendening-Ehrlich contrasting story 
reinforces the argument that governors can and do set the stage for most policy 
battles, and their actions often dictate whether or not policies they prefer are enacted 
or rejected. 
 Finally, I want to underscore the importance of context. In a post-911 world, 
we can expect that Smart Growth will no longer be on the radar as one of the most 
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popular and visible issues on the Maryland political agenda. With a weak economy 
and looming concerns about terrorism, the prospect of Smart Growth reemerging as a 
central issue is even less likely. Additionally, based on my interactions with 
respondents, I got the sense that the political trends in Maryland mirror those 
occurring across the country. Politics is moving to the right, and in Maryland, 
Democrats and liberals no longer have ultimate influence over policy making. While 
state Republicans are still generally weak, the advantage of having a relatively 
conservative governor places liberal Democrats in the position where they must strive 
for compromise on a host of issues. Even the more moderate and conservative 
Democrats joined with conservative Republicans to cut Smart Growth funding and 
downsize executive agencies directly responsible for Smart Growth administration. 
 Some liberals question Governor Ehrlich’s commitment to Smart Growth. But 
with the state still facing economic woes, preoccupation with other policy priorities, 
and change in political context, Smart Growth efforts continue to stall in the state. It 
appears likely that Smart Growth can only thrive with a change in political climate 
where liberal stalwarts and staunch supporters with enough influence and visibility to 
push for Smart Growth will regain control the governmental agenda. It seems as 
though the only hope for liberals is their ability to take advantage of the declining 
popularity of the Republican governor and his failed attempts at securing his 
administrative legacy. In the following chapter on Smart Growth in the state of 
Virginia, we shall see how both ideology and the underlying political conditions 
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GOVERNOR’S OFFICE (& Executive Branch)
1. Maryland Department of Smart Growth, Respondent #1 
2. Division of Resource Conservation, Department of Planning, Respondent #2 
3. Division of Neighborhood Revitalization, Department of Housing and 
Community Development, Respondent #3 
4. Division of Financing Programs, Baltimore Region, Dept. of Business & 
Economic Development, Respondent #4 
 
STATE LEGISLATURE
1. Delegate, House Committee on Environmental Matters (supports Smart 
Growth), Respondent #5 
2. Delegate, House Committee on Appropriations; Transportation & 
Environment Subcommittee (supports Smart Growth), Respondent #6 
3. Delegate, House Committee on Appropriations, Transportation & 
Environment Subcommittee (supports Smart Growth), Respondent #7 
4. Delegate, House Committee on Appropriations, Education Subcommittee 
(supports Smart Growth), Respondent #8 
5. Delegate, House Committee on Appropriations (neutral on Smart Growth), 
Respondent #9 
6. State Senator, Environmental Subcommittee and Senate Commission on 
Education, Health & Environmental Affairs (supports Smart Growth), 
Respondent #10 
7. Delegate, Oversight Committee on Program Open Space & Agricultural Land 
Preservation; House Appropriations Committee (opposes Smart Growth), 
Respondent #11 
8. Delegate, Oversight Committee on Program Open Space & Agricultural Land 
Preservation; House Appropriations Committee (opposes Smart Growth), 
Respondent #12 
9. Delegate, House Ways & Means; Finance Resources Subcommittee, 
Transportation Committee (opposes Smart Growth), Respondent #13 
144 
 
10. State Senator, Education, Health & Environmental Affairs, Judicial 
Proceedings, License & Regulatory Affairs Committee. (supports Smart 
Growth), Respondent #14 
 
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS:
Smart Growth Advocacy Groups: 
1. Representative, 1000 Friends of Maryland, Respondent #15 
2. Representative, Division of Environmental Protection and Restoration, 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Respondent #16 
3. Representative, Maryland Chapter, Sierra Club, Respondent #17 
4. Representative, Partners For Maryland Open Space, Respondent #18 
5. Representative, Maryland League of Conservation Voters, Respondent #19 
 
Neutral: 
1. Representative, Division of Regulatory Affairs & Land Development, 
National Association of Homebuilders, Respondent #20 
2. Representative, American Farmland Trust, Respondent #21 
 
Anti-Smart Growth Groups/Pro-Business: 
1. Representative, Homebuilders Association of Maryland, Respondent #22 
2. Member, Government Relations, Greater Baltimore Board of Realtors, 
Respondent #23 
3. Representative, Maryland Highway Contractors, Respondent #24 
4. Member, Partnership for Quality Growth, Respondent #25 
5. Representative, Division of Government Affairs, National Asphalt Pavement 
Association, Respondent #26 
 
OTHERS
1. Representative, Smart Growth America, Respondent #27  
2. Representative, Division of Programs & Planning, Dept. of Environmental 
Resource, Prince George’s County Government, Respondent #28 
3. EPA Representative re: Chesapeake Bay Report, Respondent #29 




5. Representative, Washington Regional Network for Livable Communities, 
Respondent #31 
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Interview Questions (Standard Questionnaire) 
 
Each respondent was asked 10 standard questions regarding the Smart Growth 
program in the state of Maryland. Some questions were altered depending on the 
institution or organization that the respondent represents. 
 
1. What is your role with respect to the Smart Growth program in Maryland? If 
you were directly involved with the concept or administration, can you 
describe your involvement? How has that role evolved since the passage of 
Smart Growth? 
2. Who were the other important actors involved in pushing for and ultimately 
getting Smart Growth approved? 
3. If you had to identify the most important, most visible or most influential 
player(s) involved, who would you choose? The governor? The legislature? 
Any other group(s)? 
4. If you had to identify the least important of these actors, who would you 
choose and why? 
5. I began this project under the assumption that interest groups, namely 
environmental groups, had a large role in the Maryland Smart Growth 
movement. Can you elaborate on the role of these organizations? 
6. What about developer, real estate or other pro-business industries? How 
influential are they? Do you believe that they have considerable influence in 
the state legislature? 
7. Smart Growth has often been touted as a bipartisan effort. Do you agree with 
this assertion?  
8. A follow-up question: I am finding that it is political ideology (or differences 
in opinion about how much government should be involved in Smart Growth) 
that is driving the Smart Growth debate. Do you believe that ideology played 
a pivotal role in shaping the Smart Growth initiative in Maryland? 
9. Most states are grappling with a sluggish economy. Do you feel that the state 
of the economy has an impact on whether or not the state might accomplish 
Smart Growth goals? 
10. Consider those actors that you identified earlier as being the most (and least) 
important players in the Smart Growth movement. Do you think that a change 
in political or economic climate (e.g., electoral turnover, wars, the economy) 





Chapter 4: Maryland’s Smart Growth Program: Smart Growth Begins Here! 
 
For one of the questions, respondents were asked to identify—and rank from 1 to 4—
those actors in the Maryland Smart Growth movement who were most influential in 
encouraging Smart Growth passage and implementation in the state (1 is most 
important): 
 
Representative Governor Legislature Group(s) Other(s) 
Executive 
Respondent 1 1 2 4 3 
Respondent 2 1 4 2 (bus) 3 
Respondent 3 1 2 3 (bus) 4 (cit) 
Respondent 4 2 3 1 (bus) 4 
Legislature 
Respondent 5 1 2 3 (env) 4 
Respondent 6 2 1 3 4 
Respondent 7 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 8 1 3 2 4 
Respondent 9 1 2 3 (cou) 4 
Respondent 10 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 11 1 2 3 (bus) 4 
Respondent 12 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 13 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 14 1 2 3 4 
Environmental 
Respondent 15 2 1 3 4 
Respondent 16 1 2 3 (bus) 4 
Respondent 17 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 18 1 2 4 (bus) 3 (cou) 
Respondent 19 1 3 4 (bus) 2 (cit) 
Neutral  
Respondent 20 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 21 1 3 2 4 
Pro-Business 
Respondent 22 1 3 2 4 
Respondent 23 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 24 2 3 1 4 
Respondent 25 2 1 3 4 
Respondent 26 1 2 3 4 
Other 
Respondent 27 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 28 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 29 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 30 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 31 1 2 3 4 
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Summary:
Governor ranked #1 or most important: 27 out of the 32 respondents 
Legislature ranked #1or most important: 3 of the 32 respondents 
Group(s) ranked #1or most important: 2 of 32 respondents 
Other(s) ranked #1or most important, none of the 32 respondents cited “other” 
players 
 
Governor ranked #2, or second most important: 5 of 32 respondents 
Legislature ranked #2, or second most important: 22 of 32 respondents 
Group(s) ranked #2, or second most important: 4 of 32 respondents 
Other(s) ranked #2, or second most important: 1 of 32 chose “other” 
 
Governor ranked #3, or third most important: none of the 32 respondents 
Legislature ranked #3, or third most important: 6 of the 32 respondents 
Group(s) ranked #3, or third most important: 23 of the 32 respondents 
Other(s) ranked #3, or third most important: 3 of the 32 respondents 
 
Governor ranked #4, or least most important: none of the 32 respondents 
Legislature ranked #4, or least most important: 1 of the 32 respondents 
Group(s) ranked #4, or least most important: 3 of the 32 respondents 
Other(s) ranked #4, or least most important: 28 of the 32 respondents cited “other”  
 
Interview Highlights on the Most Important Actor(s) in the MD Smart Growth:
1. Governors are never ranked last in order of importance. 
2. Governors ranked either most or second most important actor. 
3. Legislature ranks last in only one instance. 
4. Of the group ranked most important, business (bus) was chosen in both instances. 
5. Businesses ranked last in only 2 instances 
6. Businesses chosen over other groups as more influential by a 6 to 1 ratio. 
7. In the “other” categories, county governments (cou) were ranked as the third most 
important actor in 2 of the 32 cases. 
8. In the “other” category, citizen action groups (cit) and farming groups were 
mentioned in the list of actors, with one respondent ranking citizen groups as 
second most important actor. 
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Discussants were also asked to identify what they perceived to be the most significant 
determinant of Smart Growth policy adoption in the state (in rank order, from 1 to 4): 
 
Representative Ideology Party Economy Other (N/A) 
Executive 
Respondent 1 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 2 2 3 1 4 
Respondent 3 2 3 1 4 
Respondent 4 3 1 2 4 
Legislature 
Respondent 5 1 3 2 4 
Respondent 6 3 2 1 4 
Respondent 7 1 3 2 4 
Respondent 8 3 1 2 4 
Respondent 9 2 4 1 3 
Respondent 10 1 4 2 3 
Respondent 11 1 3 2 4 
Respondent 12 2 3 1 4 
Respondent 13 3 1 2 4 
Respondent 14 1 4 2 3 
Environmental 
Respondent 15 2 4 1 3 
Respondent 16 2 1 3 4 
Respondent 17 1 4 2 3 
Respondent 18 2 1 3 4 
Respondent 19 2 3 1 4 
Neutral  
Respondent 20 3 1 2 4 
Respondent 21 1 4 3 2 
Pro-Business 
Respondent 22 3 2 1 4 
Respondent 23 2 4 1 3 
Respondent 24 1 4 2 3 
Respondent 25 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 26 2 4 1 3 
Other 
Respondent 27 1 4 2 3 
Respondent 28 2 3 1 4 
Respondent 29 1 4 2 3 
Respondent 30 3 1 2 4 
Respondent 31 1 4 2 3 
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Summary of Responses from Interviewees 
Political ideology ranked #1 or most important by 13 out of 32 respondents 
Political party ranked #1or most important by12 out of 32 respondents 
State of the economy ranked #1or most important by 7 out of 32 respondents 
Other ranked #1or most important by none of 32 respondents 
 
Political ideology ranked #2, or second most important: 7 out of 32 respondents 
Political party ranked #2, or second most important: 4 out of 32 respondents 
State of the economy ranked #2, or second most important: 8 out of 32 respondents 
Other ranked #2, or second most important: 13 out of 32 respondents 
 
Political ideology ranked #3, or third most important by 11 out of 32 respondents 
Political party ranked #3, or third most important by 15 out of 32 respondents 
State of the economy ranked #3, or third most important by 6 out of 32 respondents 
Other ranked #3, or third most important by none of the 32 respondents 
 
Political ideology ranked #4, or least most important by none of the 32 respondents 
Political party ranked #4, or least most important by 13 out of 32 respondents 
State of the economy ranked #4, or least most important by none of the 32 
respondents 
Other ranked #4, or least most important by 19 of the 32 respondents 
 
Key:
Respondents #1 - #4:  represent members from the Executive branch 
Respondents #5 - #14:  represent members of the Legislature 
Respondents #15 - #19: represent members from the environmentalist communities 
Respondents #20 - #21: are from interest groups with a neutral/ambiguous stance on 
Smart Growth 
Respondents #22 - #26: are from developer/construction or real estate industries 
Respondents #27 - #32: represent organizations outside the Maryland Smart Growth 
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Interview Highlights on the Most Significant Determinant of the MD Smart 
Growth Policy: 
1. Respondents ranked political ideology the most significant determinant of Smart 
Growth passage. They rank ideology as the second most important factor 
influencing Smart Growth in 7 of the 32 cases. 
2. An overwhelming majority of respondents ranked ideology as either the most 
important (13 of 32) or the second most important (7 of 32) determinant, 
comprising of the responses given.  
3. In contrast to political ideology, political party is chosen as the most important 
factor of Smart Growth in 12 of the 32 instances or the second most important 
factor in only 4 of 32 instances. 
4. Neither political ideology nor the health of the economy is chosen as the least 
important determinant of Smart Growth in Maryland.  
5. Compared to the economy, political ideology is selected as the most or second 
most important determinant by well over one-half of all respondents, while fewer 
than one-half of respondents chose the health of the economy as the most 
significant impact on Smart Growth passage. 
6. Political party has the slightest edge over the state of the economy as the most 
important factor driving the Smart Growth efforts in Maryland. While one-half or 
16 respondents chose party as the most or second most important factor, slightly 
under half cited the health of the economy as the most or second most important 
determinant of Smart Growth in Maryland. 
7. A majority of respondents believed that either ideology, party or the health of the 
economy—or a combination of all three factors—is the most important 
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The Five Pillars of Maryland’s Smart Growth Program 
1. Smart Growth Priority Funding Areas Act of 1997: The Smart Growth Priority 
Funding Areas Act of 1997 served as the cornerstone of the Maryland Smart 
Growth program. The state set funding priorities to encourage development in 
existing infrastructure and directs state resources to underserved areas, such as the 
most impoverished neighborhoods of Baltimore City or Hyattsville and older 
suburban communities that suffer from lack of investment. The Department of 
Housing and Community Development is responsible for assisting local 
governments in their designation of these most deserving neighborhoods; the 
Department of Planning is responsible for identifying geographical areas that have 
demonstrated the greatest need, such as areas along the Washington, D.C. corridor 
that spill over into parts of Prince George’s county and southern Maryland—or 
federally-designated enterprise zones or empowerment communities (Baltimore 
city). Counties are not left out of this process. They are directly involved in the 
determining priority funding areas.  
2. Rural Legacy: The Rural Legacy program earmarks $70-$140 million over a five-
year period in the form of grants to local governments and private land entities to 
purchase developer rights and land easements in designated rural areas.97 The goal 
is to protect farmland and rural interests. This program is administered by the 
Maryland Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and allows for the transfer of 
developer rights98 to be used to secure funds for capital projects in rural areas. 
3. Brownfield’s Voluntary Cleanup and Revitalization Incentive Program: This 
revitalization program provides tax incentives to encourage existing refuse 
cleanup and infill development projects. The funds can also be used to rehabilitate 
abandoned residential, commercial or industrial properties located in urban areas 
or blighted older suburban communities. (Note that state funds are also used to 
 
97 Recall that the Chesapeake Bay Agreement called for a rural legacy component. This rural legacy 
program established under the umbrella of the smart growth act fulfills that commitment. Rural legacy 
is quite popular in Maryland according to one official I spoke with. The program also appeases many 
rural interests and agri-businesses. There is some resistance from property rights advocates, but 
overall, rural legacy has met with widespread support. 
98 In the transfer of developer rights, there are three parties involved in the exchange: (1) the original 
landowner, (2) the developer or other interested party wanted the rights to build, and (3) the local 
governmental entities or jurisdictions that ensure that the exchange of rights occurs in designated 
priority funding areas. The landowner sells his land rights to the developer who ten submits one-half 
(50%) of the value of the property to fund Rural Legacy projects in PFAs. As with the other programs 
under the banner of smart growth, the Rural Legacy grants are awarded on a competitive basis. 
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clean up sites either contaminated or thought to be contaminated.) The key word 
here is “voluntary!” The state sets aside $1.3 million in grants, which are awarded 
on a competitive basis. Local governments, as well as other public and private 
entities can vie for these grants. Property tax easements are rewarded to site 
owners who satisfactorily complete cleanups, and the state provides 50% of the 
costs associated with the rehab projects. The Brownfield Voluntary Cleanup 
program is administered by the Maryland Department of Environment and the 
Department of Business and Economic Development. 
4. Job Creation Tax Credit Program: The Job Creation Tax Credit Program 
(JCTCP) provides tax incentives, also in the form of grants, to businesses that 
create jobs in designated priority funding areas (PFAs). The state awards $1,500 
for each new job that is created, but the reward is increased for job creation in 
federally designated enterprise zones or empowerment communities.99 The state 
increases the award for businesses that attempt to attract qualified individuals for 
high-tech or semi-skilled positions in manufacturing and transportation, computer 
technology and information systems, entertainment, recreation and tourism. These 
are the industries that have been hardest hit in the state for some time. Again, jobs 
created must be located in local or state determined priority funding areas.  
5. Live Near Your Work Program: The Live Near Your Work Program (LNYW) 
has the dual purpose of increasing homeownership in Maryland, particularly in 
economically disadvantaged communities and creating a “sense of place” by 
encouraging individuals and families to work and live together. Administered by 
the Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development, employees 
and potential homeowners provide $1,000 for down payment and closing costs; 
the agency matches that amount for each participant and channels the funds to 
local housing authority and lending agencies to assist with their LNYW program. 
Local governments determine the eligibility requirements or the exact distance 
between place of work and residence. 
 
99 Encouraged by Vice President’s Al Gore’s sustainable communities ideas, a group of senators led by 
then-Republican Jim Jeffords (VT) and Democrat Carl Levin (MI), established a Senate Smart Growth 
Task Force in 1999, which provided a forum for senators and other interested parties to discuss ways 
the federal government could assist local governments with their smart growth plans. Among these 
discussions was the Commuters Benefit Equity Act (Senate Bill 661), which raises the tax credit for 
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The following is a brief summary from the Negative Population Growth’s, “Maryland 
Voter Survey,” conducted in July 2000. 
 
Methodology: Mason-Dixon Polling & Research, Inc. conducted the survey in July 
2000, with a total of 631 Maryland “likely” voters, using randomly selected four-digit 
telephone number. (Error of margin, plus or minus 3.98 percentage points) 
 
1. Rating the ‘quality of life’ Maryland: 89% of likely voters said the quality of 
life is either excellent or good; 10% rated the quality of life as fair or poor. 
2. But 69% of likely voters expressed concern that the quality of life will 
deteriorate if current trends in population growth continue. 









4. Voters expressed concern about the impact of increased population and 
economic development in their own region of the state. 54% of Maryland 
voters say that the population in their region is too large (particularly those in 
Baltimore County, 60% and Baltimore City, 56%, respectively). 
5. 52% of Marylanders are able to make the connection between sprawl and 
population growth/density as its root cause. That percentage of voters who say 
that sprawl cannot be contained unless something is done to channel the 
state’s population growth. 






Too Slow 6% 
Right Pace 22% 
Too Fast 71% 
Commercial 
Too Slow 15% 
Right Pace 33% 
Too Fast 51% 
7. Seven out of 10 voters say that they are spending more time commuting and 
less time with family, due to traffic congestion and sprawl. 
8. 82% blame the current pace of development and population growth trends. 
9. 60% believe that Smart Growth is the answer to the state’s sprawl problems. 
However, well over a majority (62%) were not confident that Smart Growth 
policies would alleviate sprawl and that there is little that elected officials can 
do to address sprawl with the current trends in population growth. 
10. 80% of voters say that the state of Maryland, as well as the federal 
government, as a responsibility to enact policies that reduce the rate of 




Region: Percent of Voters: 
Eastern Shore/Southern Maryland 11.6% 
Baltimore County 15.5% 
Baltimore City 8.6% 
Central Maryland 22.7% 
Prince George’s County 14.4% 
Montgomery County 19.0% 
Western Maryland 8.2% 









Chapter 5:   Dashed Hopes in the Commonwealth  
 Why Smart Growth Failed in Virginia 
 
In a recent poll conducted by the Tarrance Group, a bipartisan surveying 
organization, nearly 90% of Virginia voters believe that the General Assembly and 
governor’s office should address issues related to urban sprawl, including the 
preservation of open space, air and water quality, and traffic congestion. Virginians 
cite urban sprawl as one of the state’s most pressing concerns. They worry that sprawl 
is among the greatest threat to the quality of life in the state. Yet, Smart Growth 
efforts to encourage the implementation of a statewide, comprehensive land use 
management program have largely failed, despite growing citizen concerns over 
sprawl and the environment.100 In this chapter, I discuss why hopes were dashed in 
Virginia and why the Smart Growth movement was ultimately unsuccessful.  
 Unlike Maryland, Virginia does not have a rich history of growth management 
statutory laws and legislation at the state level. Most planning and land use 
management has taken place at the local level. Virginia has a strong historical 
tradition of Jeffersonian-style politics, where counties and municipal governments 
govern land use planning and growth management through broad zoning powers. The 
counties are headed by very powerful supervisors who oversee long range 
comprehensive land use plans and detailed zoning ordinances that place limitations 
on land development (Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Planning Assistance 
2003, 3).101 The resulting local ordinances that are put in place remain the law of the 
 
100 See the Appendix for a description and results of this resent consumer and voter survey. 
101 See also Shelley S. Manstran and Donna Hanousek (2001). “Virginia Policies that Contribute to 
Sprawl: An Agenda for Change;” and, Larry Morandi and Christie Rewey (2001). “Reshaping Sprawl: 
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land until the parties with vested interests appeal. This is where the politics of Smart 
Growth is realized. 
 In the politics of Smart Growth in Virginia, there are two competing interests. 
On the one hand, Smart Growth advocates push for restrictions on development in 
rapidly growing areas, stressing affordable housing opportunities near job centers and 
encouraging more pedestrian friendly planning designs like bicycle routes, crosswalks 
and running trails (Szold and Carbonell 2002, Commonwealth of Virginia 
Department of Planning Assistance 2003). On the opposing side, there are the 
landowners who recognize when land use proposals may reduce the development 
potential of their property values. These property rights activists generally band 
together with local developers to make appeals to the county supervisors, or seek 
redress in state courts when a more immediate remedy cannot be met. In a general 
sense, the winners in the growth management debate are the local landowners and 
developers. The losers—Smart Growth advocacy groups—remain, collectively 
scratching their heads and wondering how to alter the rules to their benefit. In this 
chapter, I set out to understand why the efforts to institute a statewide Smart Growth 
program in the state of Virginia failed.  
 The chapter begins with a discussion on the historical significance of 
Virginia’s unique political culture and its rich tradition of Jeffersonian-style 
governing. I then turn to Virginia’s political institutions and the role of the governor, 
the executive branch, and the state legislature. It is interesting to point out at the 
outset that unlike the substantive role that the governors assumed with respect to 
 
State Legislative Options for Managing Growth.”  
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Smart Growth passage in Maryland, Virginia’s most recent governors—Republican 
James Gilmore, III and current governor, Mark Warner—have not been too visible or 
involved in the Smart Growth controversy. The state legislature did not participate in 
many of the Smart Growth battles. Those battles, rather, mostly occurred at the local 
and regional levels of government. In the Virginia case scenario, interest groups took 
center stage. If local governing officials set the rules of the game, it was certainly the 
special interest groups—particularly the property rights and developer industries—
who determined how the game was played…and they won!  
 I have spent some time in discussion with various actors involved in 
Virginia’s Smart Growth movement. In all, I conducted 33 interviews with local, 
regional and state government officials from each branch of government and from 
both the Gilmore and Warner administrations. I also spoke with members of Smart 
Growth advocacy groups, including those from the local environmental and planning 
associations. Included in the mix where representatives from liberal, conservative and 
nonpartisan research organizations and think tanks. Finally, interactions with 
developer industries and real estate development corporations shed light on why 
Smart Growth was unsuccessful at the state level. The business groups have been 
most visible and most active in blocking Smart Growth efforts across the state, even 
in areas where urban sprawl runs rampant. The most important conclusion that can be 
drawn from these discussions is that the failure of Smart Growth in the state of 
Virginia is directly attributable to the state’s underlying political culture and its 
prevailing conservative, pro-business sentiment.  
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Section 5.1: The History of Growth Management in Virginia: Jeffersonian Style 
 The reader must not expect an elaborate discussion on the historical 
development of land use planning for the state of Virginia. It does not have one. 
Rather, the state has delegated most planning powers to its governmental subdivisions 
known as counties. The Virginia General Assembly has always served as the 
representative body of the people, and since 1634, the county governments have been 
structured in such a way that policy decisions would be responsive to local 
concerns—back then, those in power were the very rich who owned land: a small 
minority. Even the issue of who could vote or serve in government was largely 
determined by a land-owning aristocracy. To be sure, Virginia, like most colonial 
states of that period, did not offer a political system where the poor would be actively 
involved in decision making or engaged in politics. That privilege was afforded to 
only those who owned land. After all, the Founding Fathers were among the 
wealthiest people in the Commonwealth. Those who owned property were those with 
the most to lose. The political system in Virginia was initially designed to encourage 
a political system that restricted voting rights to those who owned land. And although 
this restriction on voting has obviously been rescinded, the cultural underpinnings 
remain.  
The property rights groups in Virginia are the most active special interests 
groups in the state, especially—and without accident—at the local level. Therefore, 
when Smart Growth advocates began to push for land use restrictions at the local 
level, they initially failed, particularly in rural areas where private property ownership 
is commonplace. They did better in counties and regions that experienced the fastest 
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growth and where citizens demand solutions to urban sprawl. But Smart Growth 
supporters failed miserably, as they tried to get their comprehensive planning 
proposals through the state general assembly. 
 Planning and land use control are two of local government’s most important 
functions awarded to it specifically by the state. The tradition in Virginia, as it is in 
Maryland, is that localities ought to maintain control of local land use decisions, and 
that neither the state nor the federal government should usurp those powers (DeGrove 
1984, Diamond and Noonan 1996, Leigh 2002). Instead, the state and county level 
governments are charged with guiding municipalities to develop better 
comprehensive plans that best add to the quality of life for their citizens, but one that 
also addresses problems stemming from excessive land development (Virginia 
Chapter of the American Planning Association 2002, 4). If necessary, local 
governments, according to the state, are given enhanced authority to place restrictions 
on development through the use of impact fees or the transfer of developer rights.102 
Added to this tradition is the overwhelming presence and influence of private 
landowners and developers. Historically, it has been a common practice for local 
governments to allow individual developers to subdivide parcels of land without 
much interference. The private sector determines what lands will be developed, when, 
and in what manner. Now the state, under Dillon’s Rule, gives the local governments 
 
102 Recall that the transfer of developer rights involves three parties: (1) the original landowner, (2) the 
developer or other interested party seeking the developer rights, and (3) the local governmental 
entity(ies) or jurisdiction(s) that oversee the exchange of rights and ensures that the transfer occurs in 
designated priority funding areas. The landowner sells his/her land rights to the developer, who then 
submits a certain percentage of the value of the property to fund various projects that are overseen by 
the local government or municipality. The value percentage is determined by the local government in 




specific authority to place restrictions on land use development. But when political 
conflicts do ensue between rural and urban areas over land use decisions, for instance, 
it is the developers and property rights groups that are most active in blocking land 
regulations when they perceive a threat to their economic interests (Byrnes 2003, 
Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Planning Assistance 2003). The developer 
industry, in particular, has been effective at hindering any legislative proposals that 
call for enhanced government authority to institute stricter impact fees. And as I will 
show later on, the real estate and developer industries have given more campaign 
contributions to members of the state legislature than any other special interest group. 
It is no secret, then, that the General Assembly has been most receptive to the 
industry’s demands and legislative committees and subcommittees are stacked with 
pro-developer constituencies—from both political parties. 
Recently, however, real estate developers and homebuilder associations have 
been largely unsuccessful in preventing local governments from implementing 
density requirements on certain land parcels in the more progressive, fast-growing 
counties of Loudon and Fauquier. The problem is that land development has not kept 
pace with rapid population growth in Virginia’s largest metropolitan areas (see Table 
5.1). With accelerated growth, the industry must also accommodate consumer 
demands for more single-family dwelling units. As consumers demand more 
construction projects, local governments are not given the necessary regulatory tools, 
like impact fees, to stave off excessive development (Shoffner 2003, 17). In 
accordance with Dillon’s Rule, local governments are restricted from exercising 
powers not specifically guaranteed by the state constitution. Since the General 
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Assembly has been unable or unwilling to enhance the regulatory powers of the 
municipalities, uncontrolled development continues mostly unabated.  




POPULATION GROWTH IN VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1990-2000 
Metropolitan Area 1990 2000 Amount Percent 
Northern Virginia 1,732,432 2,167,757 435,320 25.13 
Richmond 865,640 996,512 130,872 15.12 
Hampton Roads 1,430,974 1,551,351 120,377 8.41 
Charlottesville 131,373 159,576 28,203 21.46 
Lynchburg 193,928 214,911 20,983 10.82 
Roanoke 224,592 235,932 11,340 5.05 
Bristol 87,517 91,873 4,356 4.97 
Danville 108,728 110,156 1,428 1.31 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
Section 5.2: Land Use and Development Patterns 
The Virginia Commonwealth has experienced a dramatic increase in land 
development over the last 20 years or so, according to the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.103 In 1982, nearly 2 million acres of land was demarcated for residential 
and commercial development across the state. By 2000, nearly 3 million acres of land 
was reserved for development, including the construction of new roads. At the 
regional level, land development increased from 9,700 to 10,000 acres in Northern 
Virginia, which includes Fairfax and Arlington counties and the cities of Falls Church 
and Alexandria. In Richmond, development more than doubled during this period.104 
103 Land development patterns can be viewed at the VA Chapter of the American Planning Association 
at http://www.vaplanning.org/vapajobs.htm. 
104 Shoffner 2003, pp. 22-24. 
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Table 5.2a and 5.2b:  Developed Land Has Increased Statewide Since 1980 
 
TABLE 5.2 A 
AMOUNT OF DEVELOPED LAND 
STATEWIDE, 1982-2000 
TABLE 5.2B 
AVERAGE AMOUNT OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 
(IN ACRES), 1982-2000 
Year In Millions of Acres 
 Region 1982 2000 
1982 1.8  Hampton Roads 6,000 8,000 
1987 2.2  Northern Virginia 9,700 10,000 
1992 2.45  Richmond 5,000 12,000 
2000 2.82  Virginia Beach 9,000 11,000 
Source: USDA Natural Resources Inventory, 
2000 
 Source: USDA Natural Resources Inventory, 2000 
Section 5.3: Agricultural and Rural Land Development Patterns 
 Between 1982 and 1997, land development increased by 75%, and about 
780,000 acres of agricultural land was transformed into commercial and residential 
projects (e.g., subdivisions and office parks). By the same token, the Virginia 
Commonwealth witnessed a dramatic decline in farmland and other rural or 
agricultural land (Shoffner 2003, 27). Before World War II, nearly one-half of the 
land area in Virginia consisted of agricultural, vegetation or forest land (Ibid. 28). The 
proportion of agricultural land has declined over the last twenty years or so.105 Table 
5.3 shows patterns in agricultural land coverage and development over the last two 
decades. 
 
105 According to a study conducted by the Southern Law Center, only 30% of the land area in Virginia 
is now undeveloped farmland. The state has experienced a loss of 21,500 acres of prime farmland and 




LAND USE AND COVERAGE IN NONFEDERAL, RURAL VIRGINIA, 1982-2000 
Year Cropland 
CRP 









1982 3,397.6 0.0 3,249.6 0.0 13,455.8 617.8 20,720.8 
1987 3,109.8 23.2 3,222.3 0.0 13,511.4 594.6 20,461.3 
1992 2,901.5 74.0 3,206.9 0.0 13,460.7 588.1 20,231.2 
1997 2,917.5 70.7 2,995.3 0.0 13,315.8 586.7 19,886.0 
Source: 1997 National Resources Inventory 
Section 5.4: The Role of Virginia’s Governors and the Executive Branch? 
 
Like Maryland, Virginia governors have very broad formal, procedural and 
administrative powers. They use their budgetary authority to set the governmental 
agenda with policy proposals which are awarded highest priorities. However, unlike 
Maryland, the two most recent governors, Republican James Gilmore, III and his 
Democratic successor, Mark R. Warner, have not taken full advantage of these formal 
powers to direct growth management policies in the state of Virginia. In fact, they 
have been rather silent on the particular issue of Smart Growth, much to the 
frustration of Smart Growth advocates. Gilmore, a very conservative and pro-business 
advocate, generally tended to side with property rights groups on most controversial 
growth management issues. But if Smart Growth proponents thought they would fare 
better under Warner’s Democratic administration, they were mistaken. Warner, a 
moderate on social issues and conservative on economic issues, rarely even 
mentioned Smart Growth until very recently. Indifference, however, should not be 
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misinterpreted as the governors’ inability or incapacity to influence decision making 
through their formal powers.106
Still, both governors recognized growing concerns over traffic congestion, and 
if any Smart Growth-related initiative were to flourish, it would have to take place 
within the powerful Virginia Department of Transportation. In fact, in no other policy 
arena has the effort to specifically address sprawl been more apparent than in the area 
of transportation. Governor Gilmore often sided with the developer industry to build 
more roads and highways and propos additional lanes to highways as a remedy for 
traffic congestion.107 
In 2003, Governor Warner instituted a different approach. He directed his 
Department of Transportation head and special transportation commissioners to 
collaborate with local and regional governmental entities, “slow-growth” advocates, 
and corporate entities, to come up with “sound” policy solutions to address sprawl. 
These policy solutions would have the dual purpose of addressing traffic congestion 
while keeping infrastructural costs low.108 This collaborative outfit was specifically 
charged with proposing policies that encourage improvements to existing roads and 
 
106 In fact, according to famed scholar of gubernatorial powers, Thad Beyle, Virginia ranks 26th in 
terms of governor formal powers; they have, in other words, moderately strong formal powers 
according to Beyle’s most recent ranking scores. Virginia governors, to be sure, are rated highly on 
their veto powers and moderately high on budget authority. But since the governor rarely uses these 
powers to inform growth management policy, the formal powers do not seem to matter much in this 
context of Virginia style of politics. As for informal powers, Governor Gilmore was rated fairly high, 
about a 4 on a 5-point scale (5 being the highest). By 2002, his successor, Mark Warner was rated 
about 3.4 on informal power. To see the completed updated scores, see Professor Beyle’s website, 
http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/gubnewpwr.html.
107 For instance, Governor Gilmore was supporter of road expansion projects in Montgomery County 
(I-81) and Charlottesville bypass highway (US 29). The proposals awards developer communities 
high-end contracts to complete these construction projects.  
108 See Governor Warner’s 2003 State of the State address. 
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highways and would provide technical assistance to local governments on their 
comprehensive infrastructural design plans. Specifically, the coalition would make 
recommendations to local governments for designating targeted areas of greatest need 
then suggest earmarked funds for priority projects.109 
In other policy areas, relatively little has been done to address growth 
management issues at the state level. In 1999, Governor Gilmore charged the state 
legislature to establish the Virginia Land Conservation Fund (VLCF).110 The governor 
directed his administrative agencies to set aside funding for open space preservation 
in areas that are experiencing the fastest growth.111 This program was similar to that of 
Maryland’s popular Priority Funding Areas Act of 1997, where the state would assist 
local governments with identifying their most distressed areas that are in greatest 
need of capital investment. However, the VLCF was never fully funded by the 
legislature.112 At best, the fund collaborated with other study commissions instituted 
by the legislature to investigate the impact of sprawl on Virginia’s infrastructure, but 
eventually the agency became defunct due to the lack of provisional funding.  
 I spoke with various representatives from the executive branch, local and for-
profit entities to gain a better perspective on the role of the governor in growth 
management and land use decision making. Respondents were asked to rate—in order 
of importance—the most to least important actor in the Virginia land use management 
 
109 Each “priority funding” project is allocated $2 million unless the project calls for new development 
in a targeted area rather than an existing project. These policy priorities are outlined in Governor 
Warner’s 2003 State of the State address, January 2003. 
110 American Planning Association 2002, p. 128 
111 Ibid. 128 
112 Ibid. 129 
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policy arena. Nearly all of the representatives from the executive branch chose the 
governor as the least significant figure in the land use movement. Again, it is not 
because Virginia governors cannot exercise their constitutional powers to influence 
decision making in this policy area, but because they are reluctant to do so. As a 
prominent member in the Department of Economic Development Partnership 
explains: 
Well, it should come as no surprise that, given Virginia’s 
history of local [government] control, the governor would be 
far removed from growth management issues. Even within 
the realm of economic development, most of those decisions 
come from the municipalities, even from city [governments]. 
Most of the time, [the] mayors and their councils that are 
most involved in that type of thing. And that’s how it should 
be. If anything is to get done right, it should be done there. 
That’s where compromise contracts are drawn. Business is at 
the center of those contracts, but they have to go along to get 
along with the local governments in order [to] get anything 
accomplished. 
 
A representative from the Virginia Municipal League adds: 
 
The governor has no say in what the local government can or 
cannot do. It’s there by design that local governments along 
with businesses and maybe other private interests…these are 
the ones that really provide the groundwork. People want 
growth; they want development projects because those 
projects bring jobs to the local community. When people 
have jobs, the economy flourishes. Maybe sprawl is an 
unintended consequence of [that growth], but there’s nothing 
you can do if the localities rely on property values to 
enhance their economy. The governor has nothing to do with 
it. The localities have everything to do with it. 
 
One respondent from the transportation industry, however, disagrees. He counters: 
 
I’m well aware that relevant discussions [concerning growth 
management] take place at the local [level]. But I’m not that 
naïve as to believe that the governor—the most powerful 
figure in Virginia politics—has no [role]. Governor Warner 
has argued, for instance, that improvements in transportation 
systems are crucial, even vitally important, to tackle this 
issue—you call it “sprawl”—I just refer to it as the result of 
irresponsible transportation policies, where the state 
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transportation agencies are not [held] responsible for 
runaway policies, overspending, and not really addressing 
the issue of traffic congestion. Too much emphasis is placed 
on new roads—trying to make citizens pay for it in the form 
of tax hikes, since the car tax is being phased out. The 
emphases should be on ways to improve transit system and 
public transportation, in addition to road improvements. The 
governor can guide those policies as he has by executive 
order.113 
An influential Republican delegate from Abernale and Augusta counties, who also 
chose the governor as the most influential actor in Virginia’s growth management 
community, further adds: 
You are well aware that the governor still outlines his policy 
preferences at the beginning of each legislative session. 
Recently he [Governor Warner] has come out in favor of 
growth controls, which of course, I disagree with—not 
because I think growth controls are necessarily a bad idea 
across the board—I just think they’re unnecessary. But in his 
capacity, the governor could, if he wanted, give the state 
planning agencies like the Virginia Department of Planning 
[Assistance] more authority to force local governments into 
comprehensive [planning]. He just hasn’t done so. But he 
has, in my view, used his position to influence the legislature 
to at least consider some of these growth control proposals. 
At the very least, he has been an active proponent of this 
new roads initiative and most of us [in the legislature] 
support him on this. 
 
In the previous chapters, I discussed how both the Democratic and Republican 
gubernatorial administrations were highly visible in growth management issues. In 
stark contrast, only two of the thirty-three respondents ranked the governor as the 
most important actor. In fact, nearly all respondents, when asked, believe that the 
governor is the least influential actor in Virginia’s growth movement. Again, the 
 
113 The delegate is referring to a new roads initiative called the Virginia Smart Roads initiative, which 
provides commuters a direct route between Interstate 81 and Blacksburg, Virginia (Montgomery 
County). The “smart road” will be a 5.7 mile stretch road also to be used to evaluate environmental and 
safety standards. Research will be undertaken by the Virginia Tech Transportation Institution. For a 




simplest explanation for this anomaly is that in Virginia’s history, land use decision 
making has generally been relegated to the local level. There have been a number of 
recommendations from many in the urban planning community, such as the Virginia 
Chapter of the American Planning Association and the Piedmont Environment 
Council, that call for a more active state role in local land use planning.114 If not at the 
state level, then the legislature ought to enhance the regulatory and oversight powers 
of the local governments to monitor growth trends and experiment with various 
innovative approaches to monitor and contain urban sprawl. In sum, if any change is 
going to take place, that change must come from the top—the governor, who sets the 
agenda and has the authority to enlist his executive agencies115 to oversee and fund 
investment projects—and the legislature, which could give the localities more 
discretionary powers to mandate stricter land use controls.116 However, we will see 
that in the Virginia state legislature, the odds are stacked against Smart Growth 
 
114 The Piedmont Environment Council is one of the oldest nonprofit conservation organizations, and is 
the oldest one in Virginia. The council recommends that the Virginia state legislature consider 
purchasing land easements for the purpose of preserving valuable land and protecting critical areas 
against land development encroachment. The council is also opposed to new roads initiatives, 
including the proposed Charlottesville bypass road (US Route 29) and Interstate 81. 
115 For instance, the Department of Economic Development does have limited planning authority. Like 
Maryland’s Department of Business and Economic Development, VA’s economic department can 
assist local governments with state regulatory permits. The department also helps conduct impact 
studies on regulatory decisions that affect small businesses and developers. The agency’s Industrial 
Development Services Advisory Board oversees industrial development across the state. Virginia also 
has a Department of Environmental Quality, which is charged with monitoring development activities 
that take place in “highly sensitive” environmental areas, particularly the watersheds. For more 
description, see “Growing Smart” (2002, Statutory Summary for the state of Virginia). 
116 The Coalition for Smarter Growth, for example, suggest that local and regional governments 
encourage “New Urbanism” designs that emphasize restrictions on building lot sizes, call for 
pedestrian street grids, and encourage multimodal transportation systems. The coalition is currently 




advocates and in favor of pro-growth or developer interests…and it’s been that way 
for a long time. 
 
Section 5.5: Smart Growth and the State Legislature: Some Successes, Many 
 More Failures 
 
In 1999, the Vision and Plan Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Agriculture, Conservation and Natural Resources, appointed a special delegation that 
was dispatched to Baltimore and Annapolis, Maryland to study the state’s much 
celebrated Smart Growth program. Rather than returning with policy ideas for how to 
address Virginia’s own problems with sprawl, the delegation recommended the 
establishment of a joint subcommittee to study land development patterns across the 
state.117 In fact, the closest that the state legislature ever came to instituting any kind 
of statewide comprehensive plan in the name of Smart Growth, stalled at the research 
and development phase. The legislature institutes research commissions to undertake 
impact studies on various regulatory barriers that could, either positively or 
negatively, affect land development in the state. Much of the proposed legislation that 
dealt with establishing land regulations, specifically developer impact fees, proved 
unsuccessful in the general assembly. These proposals failed, in large part, because of 
the visibility of powerful pro-developer lobbies that were able to stall or stop 
legislation in committee or on the floor. The committees are stacked with corporate 
and real estate interests. But, even if proposals get to the floor, the legislature, as a 
whole, is not committed to growth management issues because it holds steadfastly to 
 
117 House Joint Resolution 543 mandated a study to assess land use patterns and the possible 
relationship to sprawl. But apart from the study, which never really got underway, no policy 
recommendations were put forth. 
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the tradition that places these types of decisions in the hands of the local 
governments. Echoing this sentiment is powerful Republican delegate from the 20th 
District in Augusta and Highland counties: 
We simply will not touch this issue [of land use 
management]. We will flirt with it when it concerns us [the 
legislature]. But it is not within our legislative mandate to do 
so. We do, however, look at critical areas legislation. The 
bigger issues that affect the state as a whole, like agricultural 
protection, the Chesapeake, bigger infrastructure 
projects…that kind of thing. And now we have this issue set 
before us, of how to address sprawl on a regional scale, but 
of course, that’s probably not going anywhere soon, either. 
Not [during] this session. Perhaps later. 
 
Another Republican, a senator from Newport News who opposed Smart Growth, 
explains: 
Where I come from, urban sprawl is a major problem. We all 
recognize that sprawl occurs across the state. But the state 
does not have the necessary resources, or the tools to address 
issues of local concern. Of course, sprawl eventually 
becomes regional in scope, but local governments can ban 
together to form regional coalitions that address these kinds 
of issues. It’s out of state jurisdiction, and I don’t believe 
that Smart Growth is the answer, anyway. Sprawl exists 
because people exist. The more people you have, sprawl is 
[an] inevitable result of that. But if we give local businesses 
an incentive to invest in areas where growth is needed to 
accommodate changes in population, then maybe we don’t 
need Smart Growth anyway. It’s not really a concern for the 
state legislature. 
 
Table 5.4 below gives a brief overview of Smart Growth-related action that 
has taken place since 1998. The state has not instituted any growth reforms at the 
state level, and has not awarded enhanced regulatory authority at the local level to 




GROWTH MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION IN THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
1998-2002 
Legislation, Year Description Status 
H.B. 2702, 2002 Restricts powers of local jurisdictions to interfere with developer decisions. Passed 
Senate Joint Resolution 
177, 1998 
Establishes the Commission on the Future of Virginia’s Environment 
(to study Smart Growth issues) Passed 
Senate Joint Resolution 
503, 1999 
Establishes a study to review farmland and agricultural laws; an impact 




A commission to study the impact of landfills fees or local 
government’s ability to pay for the closure of landfills and the impact 
of regulatory mandates from the Department of Environmental Quality 
Passed 
S.B. 670, 2000 Department of General Services to require other state agencies to study the fiscal impact of Smart Growth (new vs. “rehab” infrastructure) Passed 
H.B. 1232, 2000 Urban Public-Private Partnership Redevelopment Fund to help local governments survey decaying building sites and rehab projects Passed 
House Joint Resolution 
671, 2001 Established the Commission on Growth and Economic Development Passed 
H.B. 2324, 1999 Addresses special use permits Failed on Floor 
H.B. 2532, 1999 Addresses zoning violations by local governments Passed 
1992 Conservation 
Recreation Foundation Establishes Virginia Land Conservation Foundation in 1999 Passed 
H.B. 2039, 2003 A commission to study impact fees to be assess on developers Failed 
The pro-growth sentiment is most observable in the House, which is often 
viewed as the more conservative chamber. According to one delegate from Prince 
William County, a Republican and supporter of Smart Growth: 
The conservatism runs so deep; it’s palpable. You can see it, 
feel it, taste it, even touch it! I supported the bill to assess the 
impact of developer fees, for instance [H.B. 2039]. It was 
just a study, for goodness sakes. But my conservative friends 
didn’t even want a study! A study! That’s all it was. But 
anything that even remotely has anything to do with Smart 
Growth, or fees or anything [related] is bound to be rejected 
at the outset. It doesn’t matter what it is. They [the 
conservatives in House] don’t even want to consider it at all. 
I’m relatively conservative myself, but I understand that 
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even business has to be held to some kind of standard. It’s 
the people who ultimately are harmed by this sprawl; we are 
allowing them to get away with all kinds of irresponsible 
activity. But, it’s not all of them. Some of them do realize 
that there should be some restrictions [on their activities]. 
All the impact [fees] do is say, ‘hey, we don’t want you 
build in this area where there’s already too much’. But, they 
don’t even want the study! The [Virginia] homebuilders 
associations said no and lobbied against me to the bitter end. 
In the Senate, some observers do not necessarily object to the idea of regulatory 
barriers in theory, but have disagreements about how local governments would 
implement them. For instance, a prominent senator from the Finance, Commerce and 
Labor committee explains: 
Impact fees sound feasible, but you must understand this 
from a practical standpoint. Local developer fees work in 
theory, not in practice. Developers will avoid these fees by 
just going and taking their construction [projects] 
elsewhere—to another jurisdiction that does not have the 
fees. Do you know how that would hurt the local economy? 
The local governments would then have no choice but to 
raise taxes to offset the effect of the fees. And this is 
something that the state cannot mandate. I don’t know of any 
place—not even in Maryland—where a statewide imposition 
of developer fees would fly. In this state, the local 
government wouldn’t stand for it; the developers would not 
stand for it, and ultimately the citizens could not accept 
higher taxes. 
 
Thus, it should not come as a surprise that when I asked the interview subjects to rate 
the general assembly on its role in state growth management practices, specifically as 
they relate to the issue of Smart Growth, most respondents did not chose the 
legislature. Only 5 of the 33 identified the state assembly as the most important actor 
in Virginia’s growth movement. In fact, 11 of the 33 discussants, ranked local 
governments above the legislature. Only the governor did worse. And even 
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environmental groups did better than the legislature. As a representative from the 
Coalition for Smarter Growth118 explains: 
Our Smart Growth battles are being fought and won at the 
local and regional levels. I don’t even really know or care 
who my state representative is. Well…that’s not entirely 
true. I am much more concerned with what I have to face in 
terms of these construction interests. They have mounted 
quite an attack on Smart Growth, but the Coalition always 
remains confident. We won in the Loudon county battle to 
get local governments to mandate density restrictions for 
subdivisions. They’re [the developer community] still 
coming after us, but we succeeded in getting citizens and 
elected officials on our side in Loudon and Fairfax. We 
haven’t been too successful elsewhere, but it’s a start. 
 
However, a representative from the Piedmont Environmental Council, a nonprofit and 
active leader in the effort to push Smart Growth at the regional level, did view the 
state legislature as the most influential: 
With all that we’ve seen, you know, getting beat by 
developers and local governments not really taking a strong 
stance in support of what we’re trying to do, I can definitely 
envision a scenario where nothing is accomplished at the 
local level. If change is going to come, it’s going to have to 
[come] from the top. Only the legislature has the power to do 
something. The citizens should hold their elected officials 
accountable for their negligence, but the legislature seems 
beholden to these special interest groups; they are in lockstep 
with them. People want [growth] controls. Until they really 
start demanding the state to take action, nothing positive is 
going to come. We can do it at the regional level, but we 
have no power to enforce anything. That comes from the 
state planning agencies and the legislature. 
 
In sum, what we are witnessing in Virginia is a legislature that has the 
constitutional authority—under Dillon’s Rule—to grant local authorities strong 
growth management tools. However, according to what I have found, the legislature, 
 
118 The Coalition for Smarter Growth focuses on regional smart growth efforts in the Washington, D.C. 
area. The coalition focuses on improving regional transportation systems in the Northern Virginia 
regions and works with both Maryland and Washington, D.C. non- and for-profit organizations, as well 




by and large, is acquiescent to business interests, and it is those interests that 
dominate the legislative agenda. But this acquiescence reflects the underlying 
political ethos of the state as a whole. Smart Growth failed to gain any traction in the 
state legislature simply because the political context is governed by a prevailing 
conservative, laissez faire ideology. That is not to say that there are no liberals in the 
legislature; they mostly represent the northern region of the state—in Fairfax and 
Arlington counties, for instance—and these largely urban, progressive constituencies 
do not have enough clout in the legislature to influence decision making. Their 
political victories, rather, are realized at the local and regional levels where it is easier 
to garner support and create winning coalitions that generally support Smart Growth 
initiatives. 
 
Section 5.6: Interest Groups in Virginia: Outsmarting Smart Growth 
 
Up to this point, we have witnessed the success of the pro-business lobby and 
its ability to stall Smart Growth progress at the state and local levels. Why are the real 
estate and construction industries so powerful in the Virginia state assembly? In 
Chapter 3, I found no statistical evidence that campaign contributions given to both 
Democrats and Republicans on behalf of the developer industry, made any difference 
when it came to public policy outcomes. However, my discussions with 
representatives from various construction industries appear to contradict that finding 
in the sense that money was used to maintain the legislature’s commitment to pro-
growth free enterprise. In other words, based on several of these conversations—even 
from outside observers—campaign funding did seem to matter in terms of reinforcing 
a pro-business bias in state decision making. What this implies is that the developer 
176 
 
industry had already established relationships with state legislators, and their financial 
contributions were used to thwart Smart Growth in the state in as much as they 
maintained an existing relationship. In fact, Table 5.5a below shows campaign 
funding for the top industries during the 2002 midterm elections. Table 5.5b shows 
campaign funding activities for local developer and real estate construction 
industries.119 




CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS  
FROM SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 2002 
Industry Amount 
Real Estate/Construction Industry $429,948 
Finance, Insurance $109,750 
Business – Retail, Services $71,106 
Technology, Communications $40,250 
Political $11,500 
Defense $5,100 
Environment, Natural Resources $4,000 
Law $2,600 





As the preceding table shows, the construction industry spends well over 100 
times more in campaign contributions than environmental groups. Do campaign 
contributions pay off in terms of meeting their legislative objective to stop Smart 
Growth activity across the state? The answer appears to be yes. According to an 
 
119 The Virginia Access Project, which is responsible for collecting this data on state campaign 
funding, notes that the real estate and construction industries were just as likely to support Democratic 




administrative head of the Virginia Club for Growth, a conservative and anti-Smart 
Growth organization: 
No one can deny the power of the lobby! We are all 
supporters of growth. We can’t allow growth to slow. To do 
so would be dishonest about the realities of free enterprise. 
People want the growth, and as long as they want the 
growth, it will continue. And since people want the growth, 
the state legislators must respond to [what] they want. 
Sometimes they [the politicians] need a little financial 
incentive. You can’t run a campaign without incentive. If we 
believe a candidate will address the concerns of the people in 
terms of what they want—that is, more, not less growth, then 
we give them more of an incentive. Smart Growth 
[proponents] do not seem to grasp this fact. 
 
And a policy analyst from the Thomas Jefferson Institute of Public Policy agreed that: 
 
Politics is driven by pro-growth concerns. State economies 
cannot thrive either way, and let’s be real: politicians are 
held [accountable] when the economy falters, as it has. It’s a 
game, really, and oftentimes [it is] the growth machine that 
not only determines the rules, but also determines who can 
play. The Smart Growth advocacy [groups] have become too 
self-righteous. They can’t play unless they shed that stigma. 
That’s why they keep losing. No one’s stopping growth, and 
the politicians sure as heck aren’t. 
 
At the local level, campaign contributions come from a variety of sources, but 
again, the corporate interests are among the most generous and plentiful. Table 5.5b 




Table 5.5b: Local Developers Are Among the Top Donors to Political Campaigns 
 
TABLE 5.5B 
TOP 25 DONORS TO VIRGINIA LOCAL POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 
Amount Donor 
$100,000 Erkietian, Myron P. (Alexandria) 
$50,000 First VA Bank (Falls Church) 
$50,000 Fairfax County Chamber of Commerce 
$50,000 West Group (McLean) 
$35,000 Affordable Shelter PAC (Fairfax) 
$30,000 Issues Mobilization PAC (Merrifield) 
$30,000 Realtors PAC of Virginia (Glen Allen) 
$25,000 Dyn Corp (Reston) 
$25,000 Fried, B. Mark (Springfield) 
$25,000 Hazel, John “Til” T. Jr. (Broad Run) 
$25,000 Mark Winkler Co (Alexandria) 
$25,000 William A. Hazel, Inc. (Chantilly) 
$10,000 Albrittain Family Trust (Vienna) 
$10,000 Boston Properties LP (Boston, MA) 
$10,000 Dewberry & Davis (Arlington) 
$10,000 Friends of Rollison – Jack (Woodbridge) 
$10,000 GTSI Corp (Chantilly) 
$10,000 Natl. Assn. Of Industrial & Office Prop. (Herndon) 
$10,000 Trammel Crow Co. (Washington, D.C.) 
$6,806 VA Greater Washington Board of Trade (Washington, D.C.) 
$5,000 Guernsey Office Products, Inc (Chantilly) 
$5,000 Associated Builders & Contractors PAC (Chantilly) 
$5,000 Associated General Contractors (Glen Allen) 
$5,000 Bank of America PAC (Richmond) 
$5,000 Equity Homes (Fairfax) 
Note:  Real Estate/Construction Industry Donors in bold 
Source:  Virginia Public Access Project 
When interview participants were asked to rate the influence of interest groups, 
nearly one-half (or 15 of 33) said that special interests, particularly the construction 
and real estate industries, ranked at the top in order of importance. However, very few 
respondents chose environmental groups as being most important. When asked why it 
179 
 
is that business groups are favored over environmental organizations, a high-ranking 
official from the National Trust for Historic Preservation,120 gives her opinion: 
It’s not that environmental groups are that powerless; it’s 
just that the business groups have found a more effective and 
clever way of framing the issue. It’s not that they have better 
ideas. They play to the economic fears that most people have 
these days. Other issues, too, have taken priority. Like, it’s 
so secret that most states are struggling with constraining 
budgets. But, then again, you’re talking about Virginia 
where environmental concerns are important; they just often 
take a backseat to what the state may view as more urgent 
needs, like how to allocate funding for these big 
transportation projects. As conservative as things are, they 
sure do like to spend money on large transportation 
projects—but, these interests win out because they get the 
contracts. Then, the [governing] officials make the excuse 
that the businesses will bring more growth to the area. 
There’s always been this trade off between growth and the 
public good. Protecting the environment is a common good 
that we all benefit from; we don’t all benefit from developer 
contracts, now do we? 
 
Finally, two senators—one Republican, the other, a Democrat—sound off 
about the prowess of pro-growth lobbies and private rights organizations that have 
been successful in discouraging Smart Growth policy priorities. Both senators were 
instrumental in pushing for H.B. 2039, but their efforts proved futile against the 
powerful developer interests. The Democrat, from Culpepper County and a member 
of the Transportation Committee, sheds some light on the issue: 
Seems that these bills get stuck at what I call the ‘study 
level’. That’s just a clever way of saying ‘you’ll never get 
your bills passed, so forget it’. Look, Smart Growth is 
embraced by most in the local community in theory, but 
when local governments are burdened with constraining 
deficits, the developers tend to win. And because the state 
refuses to step in tell these special interests that they must 
comply with local comprehensive plans, those interests win. 
 
120 The National Trust for Historic Preservation is a nonprofit organization, established in 1949, 




Why [do] people seem confused about what Smart Growth 
is—like it’s an anathema to growth and property rights. I 
was accused of being insensitive to the property rights lobby 
during the campaign. I was even afraid to talk about Smart 
Growth or impact fees or anything like that too much 
because I didn’t want to upset my landowning constituents. 
 
On the particular issue of the highly influential real estate lobby, the Republican, 
representing Fredericksburg and Fauquier Counties, was asked to give his opinion: 
The localities simply don’t have the wherewithal, let alone 
the resources, to direct investments in public facility projects 
that the people want. They try to shift the burden to 
developers, then, as you know, in the form of [developer] 
fees or transfer of developer rights. The developers then 
retreat to the General Assembly every year because they 
know [that] they can win here. They get their way nearly 
every time, but not all the time. But they win enough times 
to make a difference. Then they ban together with property 
rights’ organizations or use the courts to advance their 
claims against what they view as attempts at eminent 
domain. And they win there, too! 
 
Section 5.7: Virginia’s Political Ideology: Why Smart Growth Failed 
 
There is no empirical tool to adequately categorize the variations in political 
ideology across the state of Virginia. There are no interest group ratings of state 
legislators available on voting behavior to extrapolate ideology. And unlike 
Maryland, most state legislators refuse to respond to Project Vote Smart surveys that 
assess opinions on various social, political and economic issues from which we could 
use to correctly identify ideological variations within the general assembly. We can, 
however, be relatively confident that based on the patterns of policy adoption across 
the state, the more politically liberal areas tend to be concentrated in Northern 
Virginia. In general, however, Virginia has a very strong conservative political ethos 
which is deeply rooted in the ideals of limited government and free-market enterprise. 
Smart Growth reflects the state’s commitment to those conservative principles: a 
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rejection of a statewide comprehensive plan; lingering concerns about local 
government authority to place restrictions on land development; a vibrant property 
rights tradition; and a powerful pro-business industry. All of these conservative 
factors explain why Smart Growth was unsuccessful at the state level. As for the local 
government, there is no requirement for comprehensive plans from the state or county 
governments; and, localities are not encouraged to use zoning powers to regulate the 
use of land or building structures—they only may to do if they so choose.121 
Like Maryland, it is easy to identify those areas where Smart Growth has 
faced little or no challenge. In Northern Virginia, Smart Growth is still gaining 
momentum, particularly in those communities which has experienced excessive 
growth and severe sprawl-induced symptoms. Arlington, Fairfax and Loudon 
counties have collaborated to offer a Metrorail extension to Dulles Airport.122 And the 
regional counties have teamed with the Coalition for Smarter Growth, 1000 Friends, 
and Trust for Public Land to address issues affecting the Chesapeake Bay. However, 
there have been Smart Growth-related successes in the more politically moderate 
areas in Fauquier and Prince William counties. Citizens elected “slow-growth” 
Republican mayors and city councils to push for better comprehensive plans and 
place restrictions of fast-developing areas. Even in these areas, Virginians have come 
to view sprawl as an urgent problem. Yet, they continue to face challenges from the 
 
121 American Planning Association, “Growing Smart,” 2002, p. 124. 
122 Virginia Depart of Planning Assistance 2003, p. 7. 
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powerful developer communities that have taken their claims to the state appellate 
courts.123
I have argued that Smart Growth interests are driven by political ideology, 
where state political systems that are guided by a prevailing liberal ideology, are more 
likely to adopt Smart Growth legislation than conservative states. By and large, Smart 
Growth continues to be viewed as a liberal enterprise, with demands being pressed 
largely by liberal or progressive special interests. The responses to my survey bear 
this out. When I asked respondents to give their views on the most important 
determining factor of Smart Growth, an overwhelming majority (26 out of the 33 
responses) cite political ideology as the most significant determining factor of Smart 
Growth adoption.  
 
Section 5.8: Smart Growth and the Virginia Economy 
Economic considerations—the health of the economy—were assigned a lesser 
order of importance than ideology. The state of the economy only garnered 6 “most 
important” responses and 2 “second most important” responses. In other words, 
political ideology was considered most important, even when concerns about the 
sluggish Virginia economy were expressed. When asked to compare the influence of 
state economic interests with that of political ideology, interest group activities from 
real estate and construction industries still ranked second or third to political 
ideology. I was particularly amazed at how well the respondents were able to 
articulate their views on ideology and how state policy outcomes reflect deeply felt 
views on the role of the government. These views are longstanding and, according to 
 
123 Ibid. p. 8. 
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most discussants, are very easy to pin down. As one delegate who represents the 100th 
District of Northampton, and a member of the House Finance Committee, puts it: 
We lost because they keep calling us liberals, as you say. It’s 
easy to get branded a liberal just because you say that you 
support policies that deter sprawl. But they can’t explain 
why Republicans are joining us. Are they liberal, too? They 
say it like it’s a bad thing…to be for Smart Growth. It’s the 
devil incarnate around these parts.  
 
In a candid statement, Republican delegate from Augusta and Highland counties 
admits: 
I come from a conservative district and people don’t want to 
hear about no Smart Growth. Even if I may agree [that] 
sprawl should be contained; I wouldn’t dare go back there 
[to my district] talking about Smart Growth. What’s not 
‘smart’ about ‘growth’? We do have this notion, this idea 
that Smart Growth is some idealistic, unattainable…some 
liberal ideal that can never be attained. There is this notion 
that liberals are out of touch with the realities of the world. 
Smart Growth is some kind of panacea that they’ve dreamt 
up but without real or realistic solutions to this problem [of 
sprawl].  
 
But a member of a local real estate political action committee sees it a little 
differently: 
Smart Growth failed because it made no sense, not because 
of some liberal ideology. I don’t think Smart Growth is 
liberal or conservative; I think it’s just stupid—a very stupid, 
not at all smart—way of doing business in this state. After 
all this time, you can’t tell real estate developers [what] to do 
and where to grow! That’s not [their] concern. That’s a 
concern for the consumer. If consumers want bigger houses 
on larger lot sizes, you have to respect [that]. The nerve of 
Smart Growth [or] anybody to try and control what the 
consumer wants. That’s not liberal at all. That’s just plain 
dumb! 
 
In summary, then, as long as Smart Growth continues to be viewed as a liberal 
policy solution—whether accurate or not—the forces of resistance that exist across 
most of the state will continue to mount relentless challenges against it. Progressives 
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might witness success at the local or regional levels, but even those gains might very 
well be lost with increasing conservative sentiment, as those Smart Growth advocacy 
groups in Maryland learned. The bottom line is that the Smart Growth community 
ought to learn to operate within the context of Virginia’s conservative political 
climate and accept that as long as this culture prevails, the most they can hope for is 
limited success at the local level. 
 
Section 5.9: Why Parties Still Don’t Matter…or, Do They? 
 
Are state legislatures controlled by one of the two major political parties more 
or less likely to adopt Smart Growth? To test the effect of party on policy adoption, in 
Chapter 3, I included a dichotomous variable that identified each state headed by a 
Democratic governor (coded 1) or by a Republican governor or otherwise (coded 0). I 
hypothesized that since Smart Growth has been presented as a bipartisan effort, the 
partisan control of the state legislature will not matter in terms of whether or not 
Smart Growth legislation is adopted. The results of my analysis supported this 
hypothesis. It also did not make any statistical difference whether the state is headed 
by a Republican or Democratic governor. As we witnessed in the Chapter 4 case 
study on Maryland, state Republicans were nearly as likely as their Democratic 
counterparts to support Smart Growth policies. Any anomalies that existed—where 
Republicans vehemently opposed Smart Growth—could be explained by the fact that 
those Republicans are considerably more conservative than their moderate 
Republican colleagues. Ideological differences existed within Democratic circles as 
well, where moderate or conservative Democrats sometimes sided with conservative 
Republicans to cut Smart Growth programs. 
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Similar partisan patterns emerge in Virginia, but those differences are 
markedly visible with respect to ideology. As noted earlier, Republicans in the 
Virginia state assembly are much more conservative, particularly in the House. They 
are more likely to oppose Smart Growth on all fronts. However, I spoke with 
Democrats who also oppose Smart Growth; these Democrats represent ideologically 
conservative constituencies in Mount Vernon and Springfield. For example, a senator 
who sits on the Subcommittee on Local Government explains: 
I am opposed to Smart Growth on a philosophical level. I 
represent the interests of the local municipal governments, 
and I believe that Smart Growth is an attempt to infringe on 
the authority of the localities. They’ve tried it in [my] 
district, to stop development in an economically 
disadvantaged area. The developer wanted to build a 
shopping center so that residents didn’t have to drive to the 
next suburban town, which is about 20 miles out of the way. 
Well, the Smart Growth groups would not have that. 
Sometimes they don’t see people; they just see land and their 
own interests. They don’t realize that we need that land to 
fulfill necessary social and economic needs. How many jobs 
could have been created with that storefront? I bet some 
people would have been happy for it.  
 
The other Democratic senator, also from Springfield, put it this way: 
 
I am a conservative, practical Democrat who strongly 
believes in the power and persuasion of the almighty dollar! 
It all comes down to setting priorities and getting those 
priorities in order. Right now my number one priority is to 
serve my constituents. We need new real estate construction 
projects in my district to help create jobs. You have two 
choices: you can either create the necessary capital revenue 
generated by these investments in the form of new jobs; or, 
you can sit around and worry about how to support your 
family during this time of economic crisis because the Smart 
Growth special interests have gotten their priorities all 
confused. 
 
Again, respondents seem to be able to distinguish between party and ideology. Thus, 
we cannot assume that Republicans will reject Smart Growth proposals because they 
are conservative, as a number of Republicans support some restrictions on growth. 
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Similarly, we cannot presume that all Democrats support Smart Growth, even though 
many of them do. There are some who clearly are not open to all aspects of Smart 
Growth. Ideology, rather than party affiliation, determines the degree of support for 
Smart Growth policies, and rejection of those policies reflects strongly held 
philosophical opinions on the proper role of government in both the political and 
economic realm. 
 
Section 5.10: The Citizens Respond 
 
A recent poll conducted by the Nature Conservancy Fund, Trust for Public 
Land, and the Chesapeake Bay Foundation found that Virginians are most concerned 
with issues relating to land use and growth management. Figure 5.1124 below 
demonstrates how strongly citizens feel about the issue of sprawl and how it has 
adversely impacted the state. More important, the results of this survey, like so many 
recent ones, emphasize voter support for more government involvement—at both the 
local and state levels. And the respondents seem to be able to recognize a linkage 
between sprawl, existing land use practices and patterns, and the need for government 
to pursue sound planning policies to combat sprawl. For instance, the results show 
that 89% of the respondents believe that protecting open space should be a high state 
priority and 80% of those surveyed would support some portion of property tax 
values dedicated to land conservation efforts. 
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be lost forever unless





As we have seen thus far, most Smart Growth successes have occurred at the 
local level. County and municipal governments have tried to implement Smart 
Growth-related proposals by encouraging referenda, which may lend more credibility 
to the argument that citizens want growth controls, despite claims from the developer 
industry that voters actually prefer more development. Again, Smart Growth 
proponents have enjoyed success in politically progressive areas as shown in the 
following table, where Smart Growth referenda were passed by an overwhelming 
majority of voting constituencies: 
TABLE 5.6 
SMART GROWTH-RELATED REFERENDA 
1998-2002 
Referendum Description 
Henrico County, 2000 $16m bond issue for recreation and parks projects 
Loudon County, 2000 $7.8m bond for acquisition and development of Dulles South Regional Park 
Fairfax City, 2000 $0.5m, property tax increase for open space and parks over 5-year period 
Arlington County, 2002 $67.4m bond for conservation, parks, roads, safety, drainage, pedestrians, metro projects 
Fairfax County, 2002 $20m bond to acquire and development parkland facilities 
Arlington County, 1998 $17.5m bond for land acquisition, parks 
Prince William, 1998 $8m bond for land acquisition, parks 
Fairfax County, 1998 $87m bond for parks and facilities 
Roanoke, 1997 $39m bond for parks and recreation 
Chesterfield County, 1996 $9.3m bond for parks and facilities 
Source: Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Planning Assistance, 2003 
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Smart Growth advocates have also enjoyed electoral victories in recent 
elections. For instance, the citizens of Front Royal, a district outside of the 
Shenandoah Valley, elected a staunch supporter of Smart Growth. Elected in 2002, 
Mayor James M. Eastman successfully led the fight against a proposal to build a Wal-
Mart megastore that was vigorously opposed by the majority in his district. Relying 
on the Smart Growth principle as a mantra of his campaign, Mayor Eastman pledged 
his commitment to preserve the 121-acre land parcel for a public park. Although the 
developer for the project vowed to move forward, the mayor and members of the city 
council countered with a massive campaign to stop further encroachment efforts.125 
Elsewhere, Smart Growth enthusiasts celebrated the electoral victories of pro-
conservationists in the recent Falls Church municipal elections. These elected 
officials have pledged to continue efforts to encourage mixed-use, high-density 
development in the area, and to combat traffic congestion by proposing referenda for 
extension of mass transit systems.126 
Section 5.11: Conclusion—Does Smart Growth Have A Future In Virginia? 
 
Smart Growth efforts were unsuccessful in the state of Virginia for two main 
reasons: one, the constitutional directives set forth by Dillon’s Rule, restricts the local 
government’s authority in the areas of growth management and land use planning. 
The state, for instance, does not give the local government a strong regulatory 
 
125 “Front Royal Voters Elect New Mayor, Council Members to Move Site of Proposed Supercenter,” 
Washington Post, (5/10/2002). 
126 Fredericksburg Area Metropolitan Planning Organization, or FAMPO, has established a long range 
plan to promote multimodal transportation systems and encourage pedestrian-friendly community 
design schemes, including bicycle and running trails. And the city of Hampton Roads is making plans 
to establish its own light rail system with citizen approval. See the Virginia Department of Planning 
Assistance, 2003, p. 10 
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apparatus to guide land use planning or oversee developer patterns. And yet, the local 
government maintains sole authority over land use planning decisions. However, 
Dillon’s Rule should not be blamed solely for Smart Growth failures, as Smart 
Growth has thrived in states where Dillon’s Rule shapes local policy making. In fact, 
Maryland and Wisconsin have instituted statutory law based on Dillon’s principle, yet 
both also have also adopted innovative Smart Growth programs. The defining factor, 
according to many in the Smart Growth community, is the state’s unwillingness to 
give the localities the necessary tools for effective growth management. When armed 
with these planning mechanisms, they argue, local governments can mandate growth 
control strategies that would directly address the issue of sprawl. But the Virginia 
state legislature has not given local governments that authority, which brings us to the 
second underlying explanation for why Smart Growth has failed in Virginia: the 
political culture of the state, under girded by a strong conservative ethic, appears to be 
antithetical to Smart Growth prerogatives. Smart Growth has met with success only in 
politically liberal or progressive areas like Fairfax County or the City of Alexandria, 
where sprawl has also been rampant. 
 When I surveyed interview subjects about what they thought was the 
prevailing factor driving growth management in the state, a majority of the 
respondents said that political ideology was the most important factor in determining 
Smart Growth success or failure. Most respondents were able to identify specific 
instances where advocates were successful and where they were the least effective in 
pushing for Smart Growth policies. But the overriding factor that determined Smart 
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Growth’s fate in the state of Virginia was political ideology—even when economic 
considerations were taken into account. 
 Interview participants were also asked to rank, in order of importance, the 
governor’s office, the state legislature, interest groups and political parties in terms of 
how influential each actor was in pushing for or against Smart Growth in the state. 
Again, by an overwhelming majority, the respondents chose interest groups, 
particularly real estate entities, as the most influential of these. The legislature and 
governor were ranked second and third, respectively, and most respondents explained 
that because growth management and land use planning are activities reserved to 
county and municipal governments, there is a very limited role for the state as a 
whole.  
 Political parties also appeared to be less visible, only in the sense that Smart 
Growth has been understood as a bipartisan effort. Many Republicans joined 
Democrats in support of Smart Growth study commissions, even though that support 
from Republicans may not have been as vigorous as that of their Democratic 
counterparts. I spoke to both Republican and Democrats in the state legislature that 
proposed major Smart Growth legislation, which ultimately failed. I also spoke with 
figures in the executive and legislative branches that opposed Smart Growth and 
happened to identify as Democrats. The state legislature is dominated by Republican 
interests that have varying points of view on Smart Growth. And yet, the state is 
headed by a Democratic governor who has not made any explicit statements in 
support of or against Smart Growth. Any expressions of support have been tacitly 
given at best. 
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So, what is the future of Smart Growth in Virginia, if any? Unlike Maryland 
where comprehensive planning is encouraged and even required, Virginia state 
planning laws do not mandate local comprehensive planning. It has been suggested 
by many in the Smart Growth community that Virginia could, under its Virginia 
Areas Development Act, otherwise known as the “Regional Cooperation Act,” 
attempt to encourage local governments to create regional planning entities, such as 
planning districts, to help find solutions to sprawl that has created regional spillover 
effects.127 These planning commissions would not impinge on local governmental 
authority but could, rather, aid them in comprehensive planning and growth 
management practices. Smart Growth could conceivably see a future in regional 
planning, but any effort to involve the state would ultimately fail as long as the 
executive and legislative branches remain wedded to the cultural traditions that have 
long prevailed throughout the state’s history. 
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Interview Questions (Standard Questionnaire) 
 
Each respondent was asked 10 standard questions regarding the Smart Growth 
movement in the state of Virginia. Some questions were slightly altered as needed to 
suit the unique organizational or institutional role of each subject. 
1. What is your role with respect to the Smart Growth movement at the state 
level in Virginia? What are your personal thoughts on the issue of Smart 
Growth, as a concept and as a policy? 
2. Who would you say is/are the most visible and important actor(s) involved in 
the Smart Growth movement in Virginia? 
3. If you had to identify the most important, most visible or most influential 
governmental player(s) involved, who would you choose? The governor? The 
legislature? Any other group(s)? 
4. If you had to identify the least important of these actors, who would you 
choose and why? 
5. How would you characterize the role of interest groups in the Smart Growth 
movement? Where they particularly influential with respect to how Smart 
Growth proceeded and/or failed at the state level? 
6. What about developer, real estate or other pro-business industries? How 
influential are they? Do you believe that they have considerable influence in 
the state legislature? 
7. Smart Growth has often been touted as a bipartisan effort. Do you agree with 
this assertion?  
8. Virginia has a strong tradition of property rights laws. How strong are 
property rights groups in this state? Were they particularly visible or 
influential in the Smart Growth debate in Virginia? 
9. Most states are grappling with a sluggish economy. Do you feel that the state 
of the economy has an impact on whether or not the state might accomplish 
Smart Growth goals? 
10. Smart Growth still receives some attention across the states. According to 
some polls, most Virginians support some form of restriction on land 
development. In practice, however, Smart Growth has essentially been 
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For one of the questions, respondents were asked to identify—and rank from 1 to 4—
those actors in the Virginia Smart Growth movement who were most influential in 
discouraging and ultimately blocking Smart Growth passage and implementation in 
the state (1 is most important): 
 
Representative Governor Legislature Interest Groups 
Local 
Governments 
From Governor’s Office or Executive Branch 
Respondent 1 4 2 3 1 
Respondent 2 4 3 2 1 
Respondent 3 1 2 4 3 
Respondent 4 4 3 2 1 
Respondent 5 4 3 1 2 
Other Governmental 
Respondent 6 4 3 1 2 
Respondent 7 4 2 3 1 
Respondent 8 4 2 1 3 
Anti-Smart Growth 
Respondent 9 4 3 1 2 
Respondent 10 4 3 2 1 
Respondent 11 4 2 3 1 
Respondent 12 4 3 2 1 
Respondent 13 4 3 1 2 
Respondent 14 4 2 1 3 
Smart Growth Advocates 
Respondent 15 4 1 2 3 
Respondent 16 4 3 1 2 
Respondent 17 4 3 1 2 
Respondent 18 4 3 1 2 
Respondent 19 4 3 1 2 
Pro Smart Growth Legislators 
Respondent 20 4 2 3 1 
Respondent 21 4 3 2 1 
Respondent 22 4 2 3 1 
Respondent 23 4 3 1 2 
Respondent 24 4 2 1 3 
Respondent 25 4 1 3 2 
Anti-Smart Growth Legislators 
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Respondent 26 4 3 1 2 
Respondent 27 4 3 1 2 
Respondent 28 2 1 4 3 
Respondent 29 4 1 2 3 
Respondent 30 1 3 4 2 
Respondent 31 2 1 4 3 
Other/Neutral Observers 
Respondent 32 4 3 1 2 
Respondent 33 4 3 2 1 
Totals:
Governor ranked #1 or most important, 2 of 33 (6%)
Legislature ranked #1or most important, 5 of 33 (15%)
Group(s) ranked #1or most important, 15 of 33 (45%)
Other(s) ranked #1or most important, 11 of 33 (33%)
Governor ranked #2, or second most important, 2 of 33 (6%)
Legislature ranked #2, or second most important, 8 of 33 (24%)
Group(s) ranked #2, or second most important, 8 of 33 (24%)
Other(s) ranked #2, or second most important, 14 of 33 (42%)
Governor ranked #3, or third most important, 0 of 33 (0%)
Legislature ranked #3, or third most important, 19 of 33 (58%)
Group(s) ranked #3, or third most important, 6 of 33 (18%)
Other(s) ranked #3, or third most important, 8 of 33 (24%)
Governor ranked #4, or least most important, 29 of 33 (88%)
Legislature ranked #4, or least most important, 0 of 33 (0%)
Group(s) ranked #4, or least most important, 4 of 33 (12%)
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Interview Highlights on the Most Important Actor(s) in the VA Smart Growth 
Movement:
1. In stark contrast to Maryland’s Smart Growth program, only 2 or the 33 
interview subjects ranked the governor as the most important actor in 
Virginia’s Smart Growth program. Only 2 of the 33 (15%) ranked the 
governor as the second most important actor. In fact, nearly all the 
respondents believe that the governor is least important. 
2. The state legislature, however, is viewed as slightly more important than the 
governor. Five of thirty-three respondents view the legislature as the most 
important and 8 of the entire sample view the legislature as the second most 
important actor. The legislature is tied with groups—with 8 of 33 
respondents—as the second most important actors in the debate on land use. 
3. Nearly one-half or 15 of 33 respondents cited interest groups, namely pro-
business interest as the most important actors in Virginia’s growth 
management community. Like Maryland, very few respondents chose 
environmental groups as most important. 
4. More often than not, groups seen as most or second most important than either 
the governor’s office or the state legislature. 
5. Not surprisingly, the “other” category—made up of local governments—was 
cited as the most or second most important actors behind interest groups. The 
responses seem to reemphasize the convergence of groups and local 
governments on issues pertaining to land use decisions. The responses also 
reflect Virginia’s unique political culture, where local governments, along 
with laissez faire interests, generally tend to set the agenda when it comes to 
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Interview subjects were also asked to identify what they perceived to be the most 
significant determinant of Smart Growth policy failure in the state (in rank order, 






Economy Interest Groups Other 
From the Governor’s Office or Executive Branch 
Respondent 1 3 2 1 4 
Respondent 2 2 3 1 4 
Respondent 3 2 3 1 4 
Respondent 4 2 3 1 4 
Respondent 5 1 3 2 4
Other Governmental 
Respondent 6 2 3 1 4 
Respondent 7 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 8 1 3 2 4 
Anti-Smart Growth 
Respondent 9 2 1 3 4 
Respondent 10 2 1 3 4 
Respondent 11 1 3 2 4 
Respondent 12 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 13 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 14 3 2 1 4 
Smart Growth Advocates 
Respondent 15 3 1 2 4 
Respondent 16 1 3 2 4 
Respondent 17 4 3 2 1 
Respondent 18 2 4 3 1 
Respondent 19 1 3 2 4 
Pro Smart Growth Legislators 
Respondent 20 4 2 3 1 
Respondent 21 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 22 1 2 3 1 
Respondent 23 1 3 2 4 
Respondent 24 2 3 4 1 
Respondent 25 1 3 4 2 
Anti-Smart Growth Legislators 
Respondent 26 4 1 3 2 
Respondent 27 3 1 4 2 
Respondent 28 1 2 3 4 
Respondent 29 1 3 2 4 
Respondent 30 1 4 3 2 




Respondent 32 2 1 3 4 
Respondent 33 2 3 4 1 
Totals:
Political ideology/political parties ranked #1, or most important, 16 of 33 (48%)
State of the economy ranked #1, or most important, 6 of 33 (18%)
Interest Groups #1, or most important, 6 of 33 (18%)
Other ranked #1, or most important, 6 of 33 (18%)
Political ideology/political parties ranked #2, or second most important, 10 of 33 
(30%)
State of the economy, ranked #2, or second most important, 2 of 33 (6%)
Interest Groups #2, or second most important, 9 of 33 (27%)
Other ranked #2, or second most important, 4 of 33 (12%)
Political ideology/political parties ranked #3, or third most important, 4 of 33 (12%)
State of the economy ranked #3, or third most important, 15 of 33 (45%)
Interest Groups #3, or third most important, 13 of 33 (39%)
Other ranked #3, or third most important, 1 of 33 (3%)
Political ideology/political parties ranked #4, or least important, 3 of 33 (9%)
State of the economy ranked #4, or least important, 2 of 33 (6%)
Interest Groups #4, or least important, 5 of 33 (15%)
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Interview Highlights on the Most Significant Determinant of VA Smart Growth: 
1. Nearly all (78% or 26 of 33) respondents cite political ideology and/or party 
as the most or second most important factor determining the failure of Smart 
Growth policies in Virginia. 
2. When asked to rate interest group activity with other possible determinants of 
public policy, interest group action (from real estate and developer industries) 
was cited as the second most important factor after ideology. 
3. The state of the economy only garnered 6 “most important” responses and 2 
“second most important” responses. In other words, political ideology and/or 
parties were considered more important than the state of the economy. And 
interest group activity was cited as more important than the health of the 
economy.  
4. “Other” factors, including terrorism, Iraq war were viewed as “least 
important” of all factors determining policy outcomes (22 of 33 respondents 
cited these “other” concerns as least important).  
 
Key:
Respondents #1 - #5: Representatives from the Executive branch 
Respondents #6 - #8:  Representatives from other governmental agencies 
Respondents #9 - #14: Members from the anti-Smart Growth community 
Respondents #15 - #19: Members from conservation or environmental groups 
Respondents #20 - #25: Legislators who generally support Smart Growth 
Respondents #26 - #31: Legislators who generally oppose Smart Growth 












1.  Representative, Virginia Department of Business Assistance, Respondent #1 
2.  Representative, Prince William County Department of Planning, Planning 
Office, Respondent #2 
3.  Representative, Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation, Urban 
Program & STIP, Respondent #3 
4.  Representative, Virginia Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services, 
Respondent #4 
5.  Representative, Virginia Department of Economic Development Partnership, 
Respondent #5 
 
Other Governmental Agencies 
 
6.  Member, Virginia Municipal League, Respondent #6 
7.  Member, Virginia Association of Counties, Respondent #7 
8.  Member, Virginia Department of Trade, Respondent #8 
 
Anti-Smart Growth/Interest Groups 
 
9.  Member, Virginia Club for Growth, Respondent #9 
10.  Representative, Thomas Jefferson Institute of Public Policy, Agricultural 
Policy & Programs, Respondent #10 
11.  Representative, Thoreau Institute, Respondent #11 
12.  Representative, Virginia Institute for Public Policy, Respondent #12 
13.  Member, Citizens for Better Transportation, Respondent #13 
14.  Representative, Realtors PAC of Virginia, Respondent #14 
 
Pro-Smart Growth/Interest Groups 
 
15.  Member, Piedmont Environmental Council, Respondent #15 
16.  Member, Trust for Public Land, Respondent #16 
17.  Member, Southern Environmental Law Center, Respondent #17 
18.  Member, Coalition for Smarter Growth, Respondent #18 











20.  Delegate, Transportation Subcommittee, Respondent #20 
21.  Delegate, Counties, Cities, Towns Subcommittee, Respondent #21 
22.  State Senator, Agriculture, Conservation and Natural Resources, Respondent 
#22 
23.  State Senator, Transportation and Rules Committees, Respondent #23 
24.  State Senator, Agriculture, Conservation and Natural Resources, Respondent 
#24 




26.  State Senator, Finance, Commerce and Labor, Respondent #26 
27.  State Senator, Transportation, Commerce and Labor, Respondent #27 
28.  State Senator, Commerce and Labor, Respondent #28 
29.  State Senator, Subcommittee on Local Government, Respondent #29 
30.  Delegate, Majority Caucus, Agriculture, Commerce and Technology, 
Respondent #30 




32.  Representative, Office of Policy, Economics and Innovation, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent #32 





Chapter 5: Dashed Hopes in the Commonwealth 
 
The following is a brief summary from a statewide survey of registered voters in 
Virginia on their opinions of land use and growth management in the state. This bi-
partisan survey was conducted by the Tarrance Group (a Republican research firm), 
in conjunction with a nonprofit organization, The Kitchens Group (a Democratic 
research firm). Voters were asked a series of questions about land use conditions and 
quality of life issues currently being debated in the state. This survey was undertaken 
prior to the 2002 midterm elections (August 2001), and the results were presented in 
May 2002. 
 
Methodology: The Tarrance Group and the Kitchens Group selected 750 “likely” 
voters, randomly-selected by telephone numbers, covering a broad geographic area 
and varying demographic factors.  
 
Here are the highlights of the survey: 
1. Voters say that preserving open space and other land use issues should be 
equally as important as concerns about crime and public education. Eighty-
nine (89%) of likely voters believe that growth management issues ought to be 
awarded a high priority for both the governor and state legislature. Nearly all 
(97%) of voters are willing to forego tax cuts in favor of conservation or 
preservation efforts. 
2. An overwhelming majority of Virginians (90%) are willing to shoulder the 
financial burden of paying higher taxes to fund preservation projects. 
3. Nearly one-half or 45% of likely voters also believe that a larger share of the 
state budget ought to be earmarked for conservation and open space 
preservation. 
In addition, certain “quality of life” issues were brought up in the survey. Open-ended 
questions about the life conditions for Virginian’s were presented. When asked what 
“makes where you live a good place,” they responded: 
Peaceful/quiet/private/rural/less crowded/country life 16% 
Good community/neighborhood/neighbors 13% 
Low crime rate/no crime/safe 9% 
Beautiful scenery/mountains/coastal lakes/rivers/woods 8% 
Schools/public education 8% 
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Friendly people 7% 
Location is convenient/close to malls, amenities 6% 
Respondents were given a list of political, social and economic issues being 
addressed in the Virginia state legislature. They were asked to rank the following 
policy priorities, in order of importance (1 being most important, 4 being the least 
important; 5, unsure): 
Issue Most Important   
(1) 
Somewhat 










Cutting Taxes 47% 33% 12% 6% 2% 
Protecting Air & Water Quality 69% 28% 2% 1% 0% 
Reducing Crime 75% 21% 3% 1% 0% 
Public Education 83% 15% 1% 0% 1% 
Preserving & Protecting Open 
Space
44% 45% 8% 2% 1% 
How much of the state budget should be allocated to land conservation efforts (open 
space protection, clear air and water standards, Chesapeake, etc)?: 
One to Five Percent 35% 
Six to Ten Percent 11% 
Eleven to Twenty Percent 9% 
Twenty-One to Thirty Percent 11% 
Thirty-One to Fifty Percent 9% 
Fifty-One to Seventy-Five Percent 2% 
Seventy-Six to One Hundred Percent 3% 





Chapter 5: Dashed Hopes in the Commonwealth 
Methods to pay for land and water conservation: 









Increasing sales tax by 1/8 of 1 
percent 
20% 28% 19% 31% 2% 
Increasing the gasoline tax by 1 cent 
per gallon 
12% 15% 18% 53% 1% 
$200 million bond for land 
conservation over 20-year period 











Strong Republican 22%  
Moderate Republican 16% 
Moderate Democrat 12% 







Central City 8% 
Suburban 34% 
Mid-size City 18% 
Small Town 17% 

















Some High School 5% 
High School Graduate 20% 
Some College 23% 
Vocational Training 5% 
College Graduate 27% 











This entire survey results can be viewed at www.tarrance.com. Or, contact The 
Tarrance Group at (703) 684-6688. 
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CHAPTER 6: Smart Growth: Then, Now…and the Future? 
 
For nearly a decade, Smart Growth has received widespread attention 
throughout the halls of state and local government. Advocates celebrate the fact that 
almost twenty states have considered moderate to aggressive land use reforms, Smart 
Growth being the most innovative of these. Voters have also signaled their support 
for growth management reforms, and have expressed growing concern over urban 
sprawl in their communities. However, the Smart Growth community faces 
formidable challenges from a pro-growth countermovement. Leery of Smart Growth 
objectives and suspicious of the policy’s central objective—encouraging the state to 
regulate real estate behavior—opponents maintain that market-oriented strategies 
ought to be pursued rather than top-down approaches to address and effectively stop 
sprawl. As we have seen in Virginia and other states that have rejected Smart Growth, 
a recurring patterns emerges: the decision not to adopt Smart Growth is a reflection of 
deeply held beliefs about the proper role of government in the lives of American 
citizens. In states where Smart Growth has been accepted, there was a general belief 
that the state and local governments, rather than the market alone, ought to be 
involved in managing growth and finding viable solutions to the sprawl problem. 
Because the decision of state policy makers to adopt or reject Smart Growth 
reflect an ideological disposition of their respective state, Smart Growth has not only 
become one of the most controversial of policy issues in government discourse; it is 
also a highly charged political issue. Smart Growth is controversial primarily because 
it calls for a drastic change in how states and local governments plan for growth and 
how they address voter discontent with sprawl. Governors, state legislators, and 
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interest groups are all important actors in the politics of Smart Growth. The decision 
to pass or reject Smart Growth proposals is best explained by how these actors 
respond to their constituencies. And although Americans have clearly voiced their 
concerns about urban and suburban sprawl, and seem to embrace—albeit in theory—
Smart Growth ideals, most state legislatures have not pursued Smart Growth as 
vigorously as others. I have argued that political ideology provides an important 
explanation for these differences. Conservative states are likely to oppose Smart 
Growth on the philosophical ground that growth should be managed by the market, 
while liberal states are more likely to support and pass Smart Growth policies because 
they believe that the state ought to assume a central role in addressing sprawl-related 
problems. 
My theory of Smart Growth underscores the importance of politics. I believe 
that any model of Smart Growth activity should include political variables that 
capture both institutional and behavioral aspects of the political process. I have 
argued in this dissertation—quite fervently—that the decision of policymakers to 
adopt (or reject) Smart Growth is greatly determined by politics and various 
characteristics of state political systems: governmental officials, interest groups, 
political ideology, culture, and public opinion, for instance.  
 
Section 6.1: Smart Growth, Then: What We Know 
The Origins of State Growth Management Practices 
Land use and growth management practices in America long precede Smart 
Growth. In the 1920’s the local governments were given wide discretion in their 
zoning powers that were guaranteed by the Standard Zoning Enabling Acts. Land use 
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planning as we know it today was essentially an afterthought and restrictions on land 
development were virtually nonexistent. By the end of the Depression, the Standard 
Planning Enabling Act, which followed the Zoning Acts, gave municipal 
governments a very limited role in land use planning, but with no regulatory tools 
(Fishman 2000, Garreau 1991).  
After WWII, the U.S. population boomed, and suburbs were transformed by 
massive migration from cities to outlying areas. Lack of role for states concerned 
many in planning and environmental communities. Efforts culminated into a so-called 
“quiet revolution” where state legislatures, pressured by these conservationists, began 
to review statutory laws with respect to growth management. Several states—which 
now have instituted statewide, Smart Growth comprehensive programs—began to 
take a more active role in land use planning: New York, Maryland, Vermont and 
Connecticut (Burchell et al. 2000, 836).128 
How We Got To Smart Growth  
 The underlying concept of Smart Growth is not new. By the 1980’s, states had 
already become more involved in growth management practices. Florida and 
California, for instance, issued coastal protection plans, while Hawaii assumed the 
most aggressive role in the country. Hawaii’s program involved a state-centered 
approach to land use planning, mandating that local governments submit 
comprehensive plans for state approval by an executive-level planning board. Other 
states, such as Rhode Island and Washington, combined conservation efforts with 
 
128 For another thorough discussion of growth management trends in the U.S., see Brookings Institute 
(2003a) and Burby and May (1997). 
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economic development and housing affordability programs. In each of these states, 
state-centered planning eventually met with some criticism because there was no 
explicitly stated role for local governments. Even Hawaii overhauled its program. But 
the seeds of Smart Growth were being planted and began to take root by the 1990’s, 
in response to conservationists and urban planners who argued for a more central 
state role in managing growth (Cobb 1997, Fulton et al. 2001, Meck 2003). 
 
The Smart Growth Revolution 
 As the federal government scaled back urban redevelopment programs, states 
stepped up efforts to tackle suburban sprawl by instituting strategies to address urban 
blight. States flirted with both market approaches and pro-conservation strategies to 
stop excessive outward expansion in outer-ring suburbs. Among the states to adopt a 
statewide comprehensive, Smart Growth programs, Maryland, Oregon, Washington 
and Maine were the first. By the end of the decade, nearly 20 states followed with 
their own Smart Growth laws. States incorporated innovative strategies to combat 
sprawl (e.g., urban growth boundaries; transfer of developer rights; multimodal 
transportation systems; incentive-based reward systems to discourage leap frog 
development in suburban areas; mixed-used residential and commercial development, 
etc.).129 So, while the original concept is not novel, what is innovative about Smart 
Growth is this integrated approach to growth management, where the planning 
process fuses policies that address sprawl-related problems in a variety of policy 
domains—transportation, housing, urban renewal, and the environment. 
 
129 Goode et al. (2001) and the APA’s (2002) updated State of the States handbook provides overviews 
of each state’s history of growth management laws.  
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Section 6.2: Smart Growth, Now: What We Have Learned 
What we have learned about Smart Growth is that politics matters. As for the 
politics of Smart Growth, those who make policy decisions have the power, skills and 
knowledge base about the issues of greatest concern to voters. The success of Smart 
Growth depends on variations of each state political system: the powers of the 
governor, state legislatures, and tactical skills employed by special interest groups 
and variations in political culture. In Maryland—the governor and state legislatures 
are the most influential actors in the politics of Smart Growth. Not to be forgotten are 
interests groups, which were also quite visible in the Smart Growth movement, 
particularly in Virginia. Pro-growth and developer industries were critical in shaping 
the state’s growth management policies at the local level, while environmental groups 
in Maryland were instrumental in reinforcing the commitment to Smart Growth. 
Political parties, on the other hand, were not as active in the Smart Growth 
movement; both Republicans and Democrats threw their support for Smart Growth 
policies in Maryland. In fact, I demonstrated that neither single-party control of the 
state legislature, nor the party affiliation of the governor had an impact on Smart 
Growth practices in the states.  
Until very recently, political scientists have been relatively silent on the issue 
of Smart Growth. However, a handful of notable research exists that provide useful 
analyses of growth management issues in the states from a political science 
perspective. The strength of these studies is that they emphasize the crucial 
importance of politics (Borick 2001, Gerber 2001, Jenkins 2001). Scholars rightly 
point out that growth management reforms occur because they are pursued by 
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political elites and explicitly approved by constituencies at the ballot box. However, 
many of these studies lack empirical testing of political variables, instead focusing on 
the types of growth measures being passed throughout the state and how the results 
were achieved. This research, attempts to test the impact of various political variables 
on the policy process. 
 
Section 6.3: Review of Research Findings and Discussion 
Do characteristics inherent in state political systems influence the decision to 
adopt or reject Smart Growth policies? Or, in other words, what factors account for 
the adoption or rejection of Smart Growth in the American states? I have argued that 
there are a number of political variables, controlling for socioeconomic indicators, 
which determine the success or failure of Smart Growth. The political forces that 
shape land-use decisions are clear. In order for there to be successful administration 
of Smart Growth, states rely on an influential governor, a state legislature that can 
offer Smart Growth as a policy priority and direct clear and sound proposals to 
achieve that end, the presence and strength of interest groups in their capacity to 
shape public policy, directly or indirectly; and most important, a political ideology or 
philosophy that generally supports the idea that government ought to have a greater 





Governors have the constitutional authority to oversee and direct state 
agencies on how Smart Growth policies should be implemented. They achieve their 
policy objectives by making use of their constitutional powers to impact decisions 
favorable to their administrative agenda. The degree of formal authority varies from 
state to state.  This authority includes budgetary powers, the ability to appoint 
executive agency heads and other non-elected officials, veto power, and tenure in 
office. Based on these characteristics, Thad Beyle (2000) created a typology of 
governor strength that has become a hallmark of presidential scholarship. According 
to his classification, governors in states like Arkansas, Massachusetts and Tennessee 
have strong constitutional powers. Governors in Colorado, Virginia and Washington 
have moderate formal powers, and Alabama and Texas rank near the bottom on the 
gubernatorial power scale.130 
For this research, I created an index of gubernatorial influence relying on 
three formal power indicators and one measure of informal power. The three formal 
measures of gubernatorial influence are veto power, appointive power, and executive 
orders invoked in the area of economic development. I argued that in states where 
governors have strong formal and informal powers, Smart Growth is likely to be 
adopted. Based on the predicted values, in states where governors have the power to 
issue executive orders, Smart Growth is more likely to succeed than in states where 
 
130 Beyle has updated the formal powers typology for the most recent years. These latest power scores 
can be assessed at http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/gubnewpwr.html. Beyle’s work is widely cited and has 




governors do not have this power. However, because this variable fails to reach 
statistical significance, so I could not conclude, with certainty that the governor’s 
power to issue executive orders matters much. On the other hand, I found that the 
authority of the governor to invoke the item veto had the greatest predictive impact on 
Smart Growth of all of the formal powers. In fact, the item veto variable was highly 
significant, and the likelihood that states will adopt Smart Growth when governors 
have use of the veto—one of the greatest influential tools available to a governor—is 
nearly 16% compared to those governors without this constitutional power. 
Additionally, I have argued that governors are able to influence policy making 
if they are popular, and can and do rely on their popularity to persuade the legislature 
and visible actors (i.e., interest groups) to advance their agenda. Unpopular 
governors, by contrast, have a harder time building coalitions around issues they 
support. For the informal power measure, I considered the percentage of votes 
received in previous election. This informal measure of governor influence reflects 
public approval of the governor during any given election. The logic of this argument 
is that governors who win elections by favorable margins are able to capitalize on that 
electoral success and get their agenda priorities passed through the legislature. The 
implication here is that popular governors are liked, and if they are generally well 
liked, then state legislators can piggyback on their popularity and share in the 
successes enjoyed by the administration. In Maryland, this happened when Smart 
Growth was initially passed. Nearly every legislator who supported the legislation 
claimed credit for helping the governor secure his Smart Growth pledge.131 When I 
 
131 For an excellent discussion on informal powers, consult Kevin B. Smith et al. (2005), Governing 
States & Localities, pp. 223-224. 
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spoke with a Republican member of the Maryland House Committee on 
Appropriations, who admittedly took advantage of the fact that the governor’s Smart 
Growth policies were generally well regarded at that time, the legislator also 
commented that it was also mutually beneficial for both the governor and legislature 
that Glendening generally got his way on just about every policy proposal because he 
was initially liked and respected as a leader. 
 The results from the probit analysis affirm the legislator’s sentiments: the 
informal power of the governor was highly significant, and confirms my argument 
that popular governors are able to exert influence on the Smart Growth debate in 
positive ways. States with popular governors are more likely to adopt Smart Growth 
than states with unpopular governors. In the earliest years of his administration, 
buoyed by his initial popularity and electoral mandate, Maryland’s Governor, Parris 
N. Glendening, enjoyed support for his Smart Growth initiatives mainly from the 
democratically controlled legislature but also from both conservation and many 
business organizations, such as the Maryland Chamber of Commerce and the Back of 
America Corporation. 
 
Legislative Professionalism and Smart Growth Policies 
 I hypothesized that the more professional a state legislature is, the more 
influence, knowledge and expertise it has about difficult or complex policy issues like 
Smart Growth. Included in the model are three of the “five S’s” of legislative 
professionalism: the length of the legislative session, compensation or legislative 
salaries, and average number of professional legislative staff. The actual number of 
days in session and the average salary are important factors because they explain why 
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state legislatures have become more professional since the 1960’s. With more time 
spent on considering important issues, the incentive becomes greater to stay in office 
if legislators receive a financial reward. Moreover, where there are constitutional 
restrictions on session length, the degree of professionalism is affected. Therefore, I 
argued that as issues become more complex and as decision makers spend more time 
and effort gathering information, debating and making decisions on complex issues, 
their days in session will increase, along with pay. As they continue to spend more 
time legislating, they become specialized in any given subject matter. 
 The two other professionalism variables—the average number of legislators in 
each state assembly and the mean number of professional staff—are widely used in 
studies of state legislative policy making. As stressed in earlier chapters, legislative 
staff is vitally important because they perform an informational function that often 
supplements that of interest groups or executive agencies. Legislative compensation 
and salary were added to the index.  
 The results confirm that legislative professionalism and Smart Growth are 
positively associated. However, some professionalism indicators demonstrated 
greater predictive power than others. The session length variable was highly 
significant and in the expected direction. As state general assemblies increase their 
days in session, the likelihood increases that state legislatures will pursue and enact 
Smart Growth.  Thus, when we compare a state with the shortest legislative session 
with a state with the longest, Smart Growth as a 60% probability of passage. States 
witnessed a surge in Smart Growth activity over the past five years, and the fact that 
Smart Growth bills are brought to the floor from the committee level demonstrates 
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both the saliency of the issue and the amount of time devoted to it. Across the 
country, state legislatures continue to consider Smart Growth proposals, state ballot 
initiatives, and pressures brought forth by stakeholder groups.132 Though some believe 
that support for Smart Growth has waned in recent years, there is still a flurry of 
Smart Growth activity taking place at the local and state levels of government since 
2002.133 I also concluded that professionalized staff plays a vital role in state 
legislative decision making. State legislatures that boast professional staffs are 13% 
more likely to witness Smart Growth passage than states without professionals. 
 Finally, a word about legislative salaries. The predicted values show that 
states that offer higher legislative compensation are nearly 20% less likely to pass 
Smart Growth than states with lower member salaries. This finding is contrary to 
what I expected, but since the variable failed to reach an appropriate level of 
significance, I did not put much confidence in this result. In this instance, salary does 
not seem to make much of a difference; the implication being that legislators may 
also be concerned with making good public policy. In Maryland, where the average 
salary is right around $43,000 a year, most legislators hold other careers as well, a 
number of them are either lawyers or in business, but many are also public school 
teachers.134 One teacher from Prince George’s County and a member of the esteemed 
 
132 See Tables 6.2 and 6.3 in the Appendix, which provide a comparative outline of ballot measures 
and funding priorities for growth management and smart growth activities taking across the country 
between 1994 and 2004. According to the Trust for Public Land, states spent approved about $23.5 
billion on pro-conservation initiatives in the last decade. 
133 See Table 6.1 in the Appendix for an overview of the most recent smart growth activity occurring 
across the country. 
134 The NCSL provided statistics on legislative salaries. The Maryland Manual provided information 
on the careers of legislators. 
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House Committee on Appropriations, boasted about his support for Smart Growth as 
a good public policy. He believes that Smart Growth’s commitment to providing 
funds for school construction in the county is one of the ways to improve public 
education and laments the fact that Smart Growth funding has been cut during the 
current administration. 
 
Interest Groups and the Party Factor 
 I have also argued that campaign contributions provide a reliable measure of 
interest group influence. The question at hand is whether intended policies serve the 
public or ultimately cater to potentially regulated interests? In other words, can 
businesses or construction companies influence the political decision making process 
through their campaign contributions? Or, have environmental interests become adept 
at persuading legislatures to adopt proposals favorable to their cause through their 
fund-raising efforts? With public opinion on their side, conservation groups are 
bringing awareness to the public about sprawl’s negative impact on air, water and 
land resources. To test the influence of both corporate and environmental groups, I 
included a measure consisting of campaign funds to state legislators compiled by the 
Institute on Money in State Politics. 
 The results also set up an interesting paradox. I found that Smart Growth is 
more likely to be enacted where environmental interests spend less, not more money 
on state campaigns. In fact, the results show that the probability of Smart Growth 
passage is near 40% when environmental groups devote less money. This is exactly 
the opposite of what I argued: that as groups spend more, Smart Growth has a 
greater chance of adoption.
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I then offered an alternative argument: groups are strategic actors that weigh 
the costs and benefits of employing different strategies to gain political access and 
influence policy outcomes. They will not devote tactical resources to champion 
causes where they perceive no chance at winning.135 In particular, they will not waste 
resources—e.g., campaign contributions—on causes for which they already have a 
great chance at advancing their claims.136 In my conversations with representatives 
from Maryland and Virginia environmental and developer organizations, groups seem 
to rely on campaign contributions to block legislation—this in the specific case of the 
pro-developer interests in Virginia. Environmental groups in Maryland, on the other 
hand, were pretty much assured a victory on Smart Growth because of the widespread 
support from the governor’s office and most in the state assembly. In the context of 
Virginia’s pro-business-centered politics, money did in fact seem to make a 
difference in terms of fighting against Smart Growth issues that came before the 
assembly. I spoke to some politicians and members of the business elite who did not 
seem apologetic in pointing out the influence that donations have on campaigns when 
used to block legislation; in this sense, those fights involved property rights and 
 
135 Hall and Wayman (1990, 801) demonstrate that interest group preferences are closely aligned with 
those for whom they lobby. This was clearly apparent in Maryland and Virginia. Environmental groups 
had established a long-standing, ongoing relationship with both the executive and legislative branchs in 
Maryland. Groups like 1000 Friends and Project Open Space often met with legislators and other 
interested parties. They testified often. In contrast, pro-developer and real estate industries were quite 
aggressive in their campaign strategies. But they did face some challenges from the smart growth 
community. They donated money to both Democrats and Republicans to thwart smart growth efforts 
from the progressive constituencies in Northern Virginia. See also Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) 
and Kollman (1997) for studies on strategic lobbying. These scholars generally confirm my argument 





eminent domain claims, which conservatives believed were being threatened by 
Smart Growth advocates. 
 Second, I contended that with repeated interactions with political elites, 
groups already know where decision makers stand on any given issue. Groups have 
information on how legislators vote simply by relying on past voting behavior. Thus, 
if a legislator is known to vote a certain way on a range of issues that pertain to 
environmental regulation, the group has a pretty good indication of how that decision 
maker will vote on Smart Growth. Is it likely, then, that environmental groups may 
use their resources for other policy priorities because they have been assured a win on 
Smart Growth. In Maryland, Project Vote Smart surveys, as well as those undertaken 
by conservation and business organizations, are used to identify legislators that share 
the same views as they do. In Virginia, it is somewhat difficult to measure consistent 
voting behavior patterns, but research organizations, like the Virginia Public Access 
Network, monitor lobbying activities of interest groups. 
 The Smart Growth issue is unique in that it appears not to reflect the 
conventional partisan inclinations as much as traditional regulatory policies do. The 
question here is whether or not public policies enacted at the state level reflect the 
ideological dispositions of political parties. In other words, will Democratic-
controlled governments pass liberal policies? Will Republican-controlled assemblies 
enact conservative public policies? When it comes to Smart Growth—widely 
depicted as a liberal or progressive policy reform—will Democrats move to enact 
while Republicans reject? As the results indicated, there does not appear to be a 
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patterned relationship between Democratic-controlled legislatures and Smart Growth 
passage or Republican-controlled legislatures and rejection of Smart Growth. 
Political parties do not seem to make much of a difference in terms of Smart 
Growth adoption. Neither the party affiliation of the governor nor the partisan 
composition of the legislature added any value to the results. Although the results 
showed that Republican-controlled state legislatures were less likely than their 
Democratic counterparts to enact Smart Growth, again, this finding holds little 
predictive power because the variable fails to reach any level of statistical 
significance.  Similarly, the results showed that in states where there is a Democratic 
governor, Smart Growth is more likely to be enacted than in states with Republican 
governors, but like the other results, this factor was also found to be insignificant.  
The results of the party analysis and Smart Growth generally reflect what 
Smart Growth supporters have observed: Smart Growth is a bipartisan effort. Both 
the Maryland and Virginia interview participants acknowledge that Republicans and 
Democrats have thrown support for Smart Growth, indeed with varying degrees. In 
Maryland, many of the Republicans who supported the central Smart Growth precepts 
continue to advance the cause, and yet there were some Democrats who questioned 
the effectiveness of the policy. In Virginia, the differences were slightly more 
noticeable with Republicans, many of them staunch conservatives, denouncing the 
policy and liberal Democrats from the northern region generally in enthusiastic 
supporters of Smart Growth. Therefore, I was able to safely conclude that when it 
comes to this particular issue, the traditionally accepted notion that Republicans are 
conservative and Democrats are liberal does not hold in this instance.  
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Smart Growth as a Liberal Policy 
These opponents of Smart Growth are deeply committed and 
more energized than ever. The leaders of the Smart Growth 
movement are in for much more effective opposition than 
anything in the past. The conservatives are fine-tuning their 
rhetoric, learning from their successes and failures, and 
reshaping their avalanche of statistics. They are getting more 
organized and unified. Their tactics and rhetoric are 
impressive: Smart Growth is now “snob growth.” Smart 
Growth is coercive. Smart Growth reduces home and 
transportation choices. Smart Growth increases home prices 
and traffic congestion. Smart Growth reduces affordable 
housing and harms minorities. Smart Growth opposes 
economic growth and prosperity. Smart Growth threatens the 
American dream. State groups are not likely to call 
themselves 1,000 Friends of Sprawl.137 
What we know about liberal political philosophy is this: liberals generally 
believe that government should assume greater responsibility in both the social and 
economic domains. On social issues, liberals generally believe that government ought 
to protect both individual and group freedoms. Liberals also agree that government 
should regulate business to ensure that their profit motive does not infringe on 
citizens’ right to enjoy certain public goods, such as clean air and water. On the other 
hand, conservatives tend to argue that government interference is undesirable, 
especially in the economic realm. The proper role for government is to allow the 
market to function by not imposing unnecessary restrictions on how businesses 
operate. The objective is to allow the market to respond to consumer demands. To the 
conservative, Smart Growth reflects the philosophy that government ought to have a 
limited role in managing growth. Therefore, I expected liberals to agree that the state 
 
137 Remarks from an address given by Joel Hirschhorn, an urban planner from the American Planning 
Association, in response to an anti-smart growth forum hosted by various conservative organizations in 
Washington, D.C. 2003. See his op-ed, “Behind Enemy Lines at the Anti-Smart Growth Conference,” 
Planetizen (3 March 2003): http://www.planetizen.com/node/79. 
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ought to pass land use policies that often involve regulatory mandates to curb 
excessive growth or sprawl. To be sure, liberal states are more inclined to adopt 
Smart Growth than conservative states.  
 Alternatively, conservatives tend to perceive Smart Growth as the 
government’s attempt to slow or stop growth altogether. I therefore expected to see 
conservative states, such as Virginia and others, to reject Smart Growth policies. The 
most compelling finding is that political ideology has the greatest independent impact 
on Smart Growth adoption. In contrast, ideology outperformed all variables and had 
an overwhelming impact on the model in general. Liberal states are more likely to 
enact Smart Growth while conservative states are less likely. When it comes to Smart 
Growth, the question of whether or not to adopt the policy greatly depends on 
inherently different points of view about the proper role of government in managing 
growth. Based on the results of the study, when I compared the ideological scores of 
liberal and conservative states, I found that liberals are more likely to pass Smart 
Growth than conservatives.    
 
Section 6.4: Did the Case Studies Add to Our Knowledge Base? 
 I selected two states—one with a statewide Smart Growth policy (Maryland) 
and one control state without Smart Growth (Virginia). To gain a better 
understanding of the politics of Smart Growth in both states, I had conservations with 
thirty-two subjects in Maryland and thirty-three in Virginia. The interviews consisted 
of a cross section of actors who were either directly or indirectly involved in the 
Smart Growth movement. The discussions involved members from the executive and 
legislative branches, supporters and opponents of Smart Growth, representatives from 
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Smart Growth advocacy groups, the counter Smart Growth and pro-industry 
communities, and other, neutral observers.  
 The case studies demonstrated that the success of Smart Growth, greatly 
depends on state political context, but that context is largely shaped by political 
ideology. Smart Growth passed in Maryland because it garnered support from 
progressive or liberal elites. (In some conservative areas of the state, Smart Growth 
efforts have stalled.) In contrast, the attempt to adopt a statewide Smart Growth 
program in Virginia failed because of the state’s philosophical commitment to 
conservative, free enterprise values, which are inherent in its social, political and 
structural institutions. Like Maryland, in the more progressive areas of the state—the 
Northern Virginia towns of Falls Church and Fairfax City, for example—Smart 
Growth flourished and continues to enjoy support from citizens and governing 
officials alike. 
 
Smart Growth Begins in Maryland, Stalls in Virginia 
 I asked respondents to identify—from most to least important—the actor most 
influential in their respective state.  Twenty-seven of the thirty-two respondents 
ranked the governor as the most influential actor in Maryland’s successful Smart 
Growth program. However, this is not the case for Virginia. In stark contrast to 
Maryland’s successful Smart Growth program, only two of the thirty-three 
respondents ranked the governor as the most important actor in Virginia. Similarly, 
the Maryland state legislature is ranked highly in terms of influence, only second to 
that of the governor, while in Virginia, the legislature is viewed by many as 
inconsequential. When asked to give possible reasons for this view, most of the 
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respondents explained that it is a widely held belief that local governments, not state 
governments, are best equipped to address growth management issues. 
 As for interest groups, both Virginia and Maryland share a commonality: 
business groups were ranked highly in both instances. In fact, nearly one-half, or 15 
of the 33 interview subjects, cited corporate interests as the most influential shapers 
of Smart Growth policies, one subject even going as far as to assert that businesses 
were mainly responsible for hindering Smart Growth passage in Virginia. In 
Maryland, although corporate interest were ranked highly, there was still some room 
for environmental groups: the interview participants seem to believe that although 
conservation groups were not considered the most influential, they were instrumental 
in shaping much of the language of the Smart Growth policy. Urban planners, along 
with environmental groups joined with state legislators and the governor’s office in 
support of Smart Growth and provided a very important informational role. 
 The views of the Maryland and Virginia subjects also converged on the 
importance of political ideology. With some exceptions, many respondents chose 
ideology as the most important determining factor of Smart Growth passage in their 
state. In Maryland, only political parties ranked second in order of importance, and in 
Virginia, the economy was rated a close second to ideology. In some instances, there 
was an overlap where a few felt that party and ideology were indistinguishable in the 
sense that Republicans in both states are conservative.  
 There are obvious reasons why case studies are useful. For this research, the 
comparative studies of Maryland and Virginia provided a general understanding of 
how contextual factors shape the policy process in these states, but also make for a 
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much more interesting narrative of Smart Growth that the statistical analysis cannot 
provide. The most apparent strength is that the case studies helped to develop and 
strengthen many of my theoretical assumptions about the role of politics by putting a 
human face to the results. Yes, an overwhelming majority of the respondents agreed 
that politics matters, but in different ways. For instance, many of the Virginia 
respondents discounted the influence of the governor and emphasized the role of 
interest groups; while in Maryland, it is the exact opposite, is a testament to how 
important political context is. The emphasis here, then, is on context rather than 
attempting to make generalizations—a weakness of the case study. 
 Another point to make with regard to the case studies is that they helped me to 
think more intellectually about the political process. Governing officials are 
constrained by structural impediments that dictate what they can or cannot do. 
Although I realize this from many years of studying politics, the discussions proved 
useful in understanding how structure is also related to context. In Maryland, the 
governor sets the agenda through his budget powers. He has full budgetary making 
authority, and the legislature cannot increase the executive budget; they may make 
recommendations, but do not have an enormous power over the agenda in this way. 
Some pro-Smart Growth legislators expressed their frustration over this, as they tried 
to get more Smart Growth measures through the assembly. In Virginia, this is not the 
case. Although the governor has full budget authority, the legislature has unlimited 
power to change the executive budget. Speaking with the subjects, I was able to 
recognize the intensity of feeling and interest in the subject matter, but also the biases 
colored their answers an often got off track.  
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In a general sense, the case studies confirmed the findings from the statistical 
analysis. I was amazed at how well the respondents were able to make a connection 
between the underlying problem of sprawl and Smart Growth. I was also keenly 
aware of the disagreements that many of them had as far as what Smart Growth is and 
is not, and how whether or not Smart Growth could effectively address sprawl. This 
latter concern is tangential to this particular study; however, the respondents still 
seemed to agree that where urban sprawl has created the biggest problems is where 
Smart Growth has been pursued the most.  
 Finally, the most significant complement of the studies and the analysis is 
that, by and large, the subjects view Smart Growth as a politically liberal concept. 
Whether this is a fair assessment or not, the respondents believed, as I do, that as long 
as Smart Growth is viewed as a liberal policy, it will face shortcomings. Some of the 
conservatives I spoke with based their arguments against Smart Growth on the fact 
that it is perceived to be a liberal enterprise. The legislators from the conservative 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), for instance, rejected any other 
notion outside of the accepted assumption, even when presented with various 
definitions of Smart Growth. The Smart Growth advocates, on the other hand, have 
committed themselves to working tirelessly to reframe their arguments and discount 
what they view as negative misconceptions of Smart Growth. 
 
Section 6.5: Smart Growth for the Future? Why Politics Remain Important 
 
The politics of Smart Growth provides important implications for the study of 
state and local politics. My interest in Smart Growth has led me to explore more 
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intently the nature of state and local relations. This relationship between states and 
their localities is a very special one. In the area of land-use regulation, that 
relationship can become more or less complex, depending on the constitutional 
directives and the structural arrangements that shape or constrain policymakers as 
they render decisions. In the case of Smart Growth, most of the implementation 
responsibility that was historically set aside for local governments is now centralized 
at the state level. State governments usually tend to set the agenda, the standards by 
which implementation must take place, and local governments are often obligated to 
comply with state objectives. Even in the case of California, which has decentralized 
land use regulation to local governments, each locality must present its plans for 
implementation to a state task force on Smart Growth for approval before those plans 
can be carried out (American Planning Association 2001).  
The states under examination provide an interesting and unique narrative on 
the politics of land use decision making because their approaches to growth 
management differ broadly. Maryland adopted the strategy that allows the state to 
assist local governments in their comprehensive land use planning. While local 
governments have the option to decide for themselves whether or not to pursue slow-
growth strategies, the state will not fund infrastructural projects that exacerbate 
sprawl. Virginia, by comparison, has not chosen this state centered approach. Instead, 
local governments are generally free from any state imposed obligation to implement 
comprehensive planning and are not encouraged to do so. 
 This study of Smart Growth has presented some lingering research issues for 
scholars of state and local politics. Smart Growth policies have been in effect for 
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nearly seven years, so this research is somewhat limited. However, as more and more 
states consider and implement Smart Growth, researchers might want to consider 
various explanations for why the policy has diffused across the states over a period of 
time. Another important consideration that Smart Growth lends itself to is the 
question of why the movement seems devoted to mobilization at the grassroots level, 
especially where parties appear to be less relevant than interest groups. Finally, a 
study of Smart Growth at the state level has relevant policy implications for 
representative democracy. In states across the country, legislatures are attempting to 
involve citizens in land use decision making by reintroducing the referendum and 
initiative process. Even in the Virginia, there has been a dramatic increase in ballot 
measures involving land use and growth management issues within the last decade or 
so. 
 Some scholars have suggested that sprawl is a byproduct of government 
fragmentation or lack of coordination between various levels of government. States 
and their localities must operate under a set of structural or institutional arrangements 
that dictate their decision making powers. Smart Growth advocates are calling on 
states to strive for better coordinated efforts at the state and local levels to address 
issues related to urban sprawl on a regional scale. As we have seen in Virginia, one of 
the reasons why Smart Growth failed was because local governments were not 
equipped with the necessary regulatory tools to carry out land use comprehensive 
plans. What is more, the sprawl that has pervaded across local jurisdictions also spill 
over into regional areas, and many in the planning community have suggested that 
states strengthen statutory laws that relate to regional planning and oversight. In 
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Virginia, however, the state has not taken an active role in these areas. Only the state 
can revise land use planning or growth management laws that will strengthen land use 
oversight mechanisms that local governments can employ to combat sprawl. But 
because local governments are creatures of the state, Smart Growth supporters are 
frustrated by the fact that local governments are not afforded enhanced powers to 
direct land use planning and growth management initiatives. 
 State and local researchers might want to explore how grassroots involvement 
in growth management decision making may also contribute to Smart Growth success 
or failure at the state level. Growth management reforms have occurred at the local 
and regional levels, and there has been a surge in citizen political participation in 
planning decision making, particularly by suburban homeowners. Although sprawl 
problems are not endemic to the suburbs, suburban residents have taken a more active 
role in preventing locally unwanted construction projects in their communities. The 
most recent example of citizen action occurred in Maryland, where voters helped to 
thwart plans for an inter-county connector between Montgomery, Prince George’s 
and Fairfax, Virginia counties. Elsewhere, citizens have banded together to get Smart 
Growth policies passed in Massachusetts and California. In the most recent election 
of 2004, voters in Ventura County, California approved one of the most stringent 
open space laws in the nation, which allows local governments to impose tough land 
use restrictions against developers. As evidenced by the increase in ballot measures 
and referenda occurring across the country, Smart Growth proponents see an ally in a 




Section 6.6: Concluding Remarks 
 The nascent, but fast-growing Smart Growth movement has captured the 
attention of government officials, real estate developers and other private entities, 
environmentalists, urban planners, and many ordinary Americans. Of the twenty 
states that have adopted Smart Growth programs, Maryland, Oregon, New Jersey, 
Arizona and California are the most innovative. There are, however, a number of 
states that do not have Smart Growth, but have at the very least, co-opted some Smart 
Growth ideals. These ideals are certainly not new, as most elements of Smart Growth 
have been around for decades, such as the incorporation of urban growth boundaries. 
Nevertheless, the Smart Growth label has enjoyed broad appeal across the country. 
State legislatures have passed over 400 growth-related ballot measures, many of them 
concerned more efficient approaches to land-use zoning ordinances, preservation of 
popular tourist and historic attractions, protection of natural resources and Brownfield 
redevelopment. All of these measures dealt with combating urban sprawl. Although 
over one-half of the states have not adopted state-level Smart Growth, the growth 
management ballot trend continues across the country, mainly focusing on local area 
growth issues. 
 However, Smart Growth has received harsh criticism for two main reasons. 
First, there is no universal definition. Smart Growth is, in essence, what anyone says 
it is. To urban planners, Smart Growth means one thing, while to conservationists, it 
means something different. I defined Smart Growth as a catchall phrase that has been 
used by supporters to describe a growth management policy that incorporates 
comprehensive planning and state and locally-imposed sanctions against developers 
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who build in sprawling communities. According to supporters, the goals of Smart 
Growth are to contain sprawl by limiting excessive development in low-density 
suburbs and by redirecting those resources to designated urban and suburban areas 
that are in greatest need of capital or infrastructural improvements. Opponents charge 
that Smart Growth is really an attempt on the behalf of advocates to involve 
government in market affairs. Smart Growth, to them, really means “no growth.”  
 Over the last several years or so, supporters and detractors have fought back 
and forth over this highly charged political issue. In some instances, advocates have 
won; in many others, Smart Growth opponents have enjoyed success and continue to 
gain the advantage. Whoever wins or loses the debate has depended largely on the 
context within which these players find themselves. Context is shaped by political 
forces like the underlying political ideology of the state. However, there are other 
elements that are additionally important. To illustrate, let’s use Maryland—a state 
with a comprehensive Smart Growth program—as an example. Smart Growth worked 
in Maryland due to the presence of an influential governor who was relatively popular 
at the time, combined with bipartisan support from a relatively professional state 
legislature. A pro-Smart Growth consensus was reached between policy makers, 
active interest groups, some in the real estate development community, and citizens 
Smart Growth would require an agreement between all parties that some form of 
regulatory oversight of growth patterns is necessary. These constituencies reached a 
compromise that called for Smart Growth as a way to address the state’s sprawling 
infrastructure and its notorious traffic congestion problems. This compromise, 
however, did not occur in Virginia or other states, like Nevada or New Mexico, where 
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Smart Growth at the state level does not exist even though sprawl-related problems 
pervade throughout their fast-growing metropolitan areas.  
 Although there is no surefire way to predict how successful Smart Growth 
will be in the future without knowledge of political context, we can safely assume 
that the current political climate does not appear to give Smart Growth advocates 
much hope. Conservative Republicans dominate over one half of all the state 
assemblies, and even in Maryland, Smart Growth has taken a backseat to other issues 
currently being debated in the legislature. Still, Smart Growth enthusiasts have not 
given up all hope. Former Maryland governor, Parris Glendening, now heads the 
Smart Growth Leadership Institute in Washington D.C., a nonprofit organization 
committed to advancing the Smart Growth agenda throughout the Washington D.C. 
metropolitan region. Glendening continues to tout Smart Growth ideas at speaking 
engagements across the country and often appears before the American Planning 
Association and the National Governor’s Association, an organization he once 
headed. His goal is to speak to state officials on how to best sell the Smart Growth 
agenda, dispel the misgivings about what Smart Growth is, and offer technical 
assistance to states and localities for how best to implement growth reforms.  
Other administrative officials from the Glendening administration have gone 
on to become prominent figures in the Smart Growth movement, including former 
Planning Department head, Harriet Tregoning, who now leads Smart Growth 
America, which is responsible for marketing Smart Growth ideals to urban planners 
and other important stakeholders throughout the country. Finally, the state has 
continued Smart Growth efforts, even during the Ehrlich administration. The 
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University of Maryland at College Park established its Center for Smart Growth 
Research and Education in 2002 to tackle regional growth issues across the state. 
 Smart Growth efforts continue around the country, albeit at a slowed pace. 
Michigan Governor, Jennifer Granholm, has recently teamed with Republican 
counterparts from the previous administration to establish a Land Use Leadership 
Council to investigate the impact of land use patterns on sprawl. Governors in 
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Tennessee continue to push for Smart Growth in 
their respective states. But Smart Growth enthusiasts still have quite a long way to go 
to convince the broader decision making public that Smart Growth would offer an 
answer to the pervasive problem of urban sprawl. That challenge continues even in 
the face of a staunchly aggressive countermovement that is just as committed, if not 




Chapter 6:  Smart Growth: Then, Now…and the Future? 
TABLE 6.1 
MAKING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SPRAWL AND SMART GROWTH, 2002-2005 
Sprawl Feature Smart Growth Remedy Land Use Control 
Strategy 
State Examples 





Place restrictions on run-
away development, 
incorporate impact fees, 
urban growth boundaries 
OR, WA 
Urban blight Infill development; Urban Service Areas 
Brownfield 
Redevelopment in Existing 
Sprawling Location; 
Rehab Codes 






designs (high and low-
density, pedestrian-
friendly) 
Incorporate both single- 
and multifamily housing 
development, mixed 
commercial and public 
facility developments with 
accessible designs 
IL, MA, CO 
Automobile-centered; non-
accessible for walking, 
cycling and mass transit, 
traffic congested 
Incorporate multi-modal 
transit systems Light rail systems MD, WA, OR 
Accelerated Development  Protect Open Space, Preserve historic sites 
Transfer of development 
rights; coordinated zoning 
ordinances 
MD, NJ, TN 
Excessive Development in 
critical areas Conservation Easements 
Priority Funding Areas, 
Smart Codes, may involve 
tax increment financing 
(CA) 
MD, NJ, NH 




Designated Critical Areas 





assistance to local 
governments; locate 
housing near job centers 
Review local zoning 
ordinances that prescribe 
land uses; incorporate 
density restrictions, require 
minimum lot sizes, modify 
building code requirements 
PA, NJ, ME , MN, 
RI 
Sources: Smart Growth America, 2004. Smart Growth Annual Report, 2004. Washington, D.C.: SGA. See also 





Chapter 6:  Smart Growth: Then, Now…and the Future? 
TABLE 6.2 
LANDVOTE MEASURE SUMMARY  
1994 - 2004 
Year Number of Measures 








($ in billions) 
1994 43 30 $1.0 $.6 
1995 38 29 $1.2 $1.1 
1996 93 73 $5.4 $1.2 
1997 70 57 $2.4 $.6 
1998 184 150 $7.9 $6.4 
1999 105 93 $2.5 $2.2 
2000 212 175 $11.5 $4.8 
2001 199 139 $1.9 $1.6 
2002 194 143 $8.7 $5.5 
2003 133 99 $1.7 $1.2 
2004 219 164 $26.2 $4.1 
TOTALS 1,490 1,152 $70.4 $29.3 
TABLE 6.3 
LANDVOTE MEASURES BY FINANCE MECHANISM 












Property Tax 502 364 $4.4 $3.3 
Bond 385 324 $23.2 $13.7 
Sales Tax 88 62 $27.9 $4.1 
Other 60 49 $2.6 $2.3 
Income Tax 35 28 $0.2 $0.1 




Chapter 6:  Smart Growth: Then, Now…and the Future? 
TABLE 6.4 
LANDVOTE MEASURES BY JURISDICTION TYPE 












State 27 25 $16.8 $10.5 
County 189 148 $31.3 $7.7 
Municipal 814 631 $9.9 $5.0 
Special District 40 23 $.3 $.3 
TOTALS 1,070 827 $58.3 $23.5 
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